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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION EXPANSION
My dissertation consists of three essays that study the unintended consequences of edu-
cation policies. e rst two essays examine the impact of higher education expansion in
China on household saving rate and individual migration rate. e third essay looks into
the impact of a school redistricting plan and the construction a new school on housing
prices in Fayee County, Kentucky.
In the rst essay, I utilize the large national expansion on higher education in China
which exogenously increase the enrollment of college students, to estimate the induced
change in the expected college probability and how it aects saving rates for households
with young children both before and aer the expansion. I nd a ten percentage increase
in the change in college probability raises household saving rates by more than seven
percentage points.
In additional to analyzing the saving behaviors of households, I analyze the migration
rates of young adults in China using the same policy shock. I use an instrumental variable
approach and instrument college status by access to college in province-college year level
to identify the eect of college aendance on young adults’ later life location choice. 2SLS
estimates suggest that aending college signicantly increases the likelihood of residing
in a dierent province later in life by 9.1 percentage points.
In the third essay, I take advantage of the approval of school redistricting plan in
Fayee County, Kentucky to examine the impact of school quality on housing prices.
I nd prices for homes redistricted from a lower-performing school into the proposed
school catchment area increase by six percent. For houses in higher-performing school
catchment areas redistricted to the proposed new school district, there is a smaller in-
crease in value. Houses redistricted from higher-performing schools to lower-performing
schools decrease in value by three to ve percent. e estimate shows that homes in the
redistricted areas increased by $108 million relative to homes that were not redistricted.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Policies related to education are important in every country because they aect human
capital accumulation which has a long-term eect that pass on generations and promote
economic growth. Moreover, such policies could lead to indirect consequences that impact
household nancial behaviors, individual migration decisions, and housing prices. My
dissertation consists of three essays that study the unanticipated impacts of policies that
change the supply side of education. e rst two essays examine the unintended conse-
quences of college expansion in China on household saving and individual cross-province
lifetime migration. e third essay looks at how school redistricting and construction of
a new school aect housing prices in Fayee County, Kentucky.
In the rst essay, I study whether access to higher education impacts household sav-
ing behavior using survey data from Chinese households during a time of unprecedented
higher education expansion. I begin by estimating the change in the expected probability
of college admiance for each family with young children following the education expan-
sion. en I estimate how the increase in college probability aected household saving
rates by comparing households before and aer the reform. e results indicate that a
10-percentage point increase in the probability of going to college raises the saving rate
for a household with school-age children by more than 7 percentage points.
e second essay examines the causal impact of college education on young adults
cross-province migration in China using China Family Panel Studies 2010 wave data. In
1999 China implemented higher education expansion which caused rapid increase in num-
ber of colleges for every province. I take advantage of such shock and instrument college
status by access to college in province-college-year level to identify the eect of college
aendance on young adults’ later life location choice. 2SLS estimates suggest that aend-
ing college signicantly increases the likelihood of residing in a dierent province later
in life by 9.1 percentage points. e results are robust to a set of specications and tests.
e third essay uses changes in school boundaries and the proposal of a new school
in Fayee County, Kentucky to estimate the value of schools through capitalization in
home prices. e ndings from redistricting in the Fayee county school district show
that prices for homes redistricted from a lower-performing (based on test scores) school
into the proposed school catchment area increase by six percent. For houses in higher-
performing school catchment areas redistricted to the proposed new school district, there
is a smaller increase in value. Houses redistricted from higher-performing schools to
lower-performing schools decrease in value by three to ve percent. However, many of
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the redistricted properties see lile or no signicant change, suggesting that only extreme
changes in school quality are capitalized. I estimate that homes in the redistricted areas
increased by $108 million relative to homes that were not redistricted.
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Chapter 2 e Expansion of Higher Education and Household Saving in China
2.1 Introduction
China’s household saving rate has increased dramatically since economic reforms began
in 1978. Before the reforms, households typically saved less than ve percent of their in-
come. Saving gradually trended up during the 1980s and 1990s, before rapidly accelerating
aer 2000. Now, households save over twenty-ve percent of their income, on average.
e saving has helped maintain a high investment rate within China and allowed funds to
ow abroad, particularly to the United States. Several theories have been put forward to
explain the high saving rates, including demographic changes (Modigliani and Cao, 2004;
Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark, 2015; Imrohoroglu and Zhao, 2018b; Ge, Yang, and Zhang,
2018), income uncertainty (Chamon, Liu, and Prasad, 2013), private expenditures (Cha-
mon and Prasad, 2010), economic reforms (He et al., 2018), and gender-related issues (Wei
and Zhang, 2011; Zhou, 2014). None of the theories fully explains the changes. In this
chapter, I provide evidence that household saving responds strongly to the expansion of
college opportunities.
Entrance into higher education in China is determined by an exam and quotas set by
the Ministry of Education. In 1999, the Ministry of Education began an extensive increase
in the number of students allowed to enroll in college. e enrollment rate for high-school
graduates quickly moved from approximately twenty percent to almost sixty percent, and
is now eighty percent. China currently has almost forty million college students, about
one-h of the college students in the world. is unprecedented education expansion
likely impacts society in a number of ways. One of the most obvious eects, and the fo-
cus of this paper, is that Chinese households must nance their child’s education. Since
student loans were not common in China in the early years of the higher education ex-
pansion (Shen and Li, 2003), households paid for tuition out of accumulated savings or
current income. My hypothesis is that as enrollment rates increased, households with
young children saved more in anticipation of future education related expenses.
Understanding the link between saving and education is important for many reasons.
First, understanding saving behavior itself is, of course, important, and education ex-
penses are a key part of household expenditures, over 10 percent on average in China.
Second, researchers and policy makers are interested in explaining China’s high saving
rate in particular because, as mentioned, Chinese savings are a major component of inter-
national capital ows. China owns a large portion of European and US debt. e saving
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has also helped to fuel China’s dramatic economic growth. ird, the relationship between
saving and education may be informative for public policies of human capital accumula-
tion. Many countries are debating whether to increase access to higher education, and it
is natural to question how the additional schooling will be nanced. Research is needed
on how the expansion of education aects the economy and how households respond to
the increase in college opportunities. I nd that aected households sharply increase their
saving.
To motivate my empirical approach and to clearly articulate the connection between
education expansion and saving, I rst present a simple two-period theoretical model of
household saving. In the model, households receive income only in period 1 and must save
for period 2. Households also can save to pay for college. If a household saves enough to
pay tuition and expenses, and their child gets admied, then the household reaps the ben-
ets of having a college graduate. If a household does not save enough, their child cannot
aend college. us, households compare the utility obtained from consuming more in
period 1 against the expected utility from possibly sending their child to college and hav-
ing greater consumption in period 2. As the expansion of higher education increases the
probability of acceptance into college, the expected utility of saving for college increases.
If the expected utility of saving for college becomes larger than that of not doing so, then
the household increases their saving rate in order to have enough to pay for college. us,
the model suggests that household saving rates should go up for households experiencing
a large increase in the likelihood of sending their children to college.
Based on this intuition, I take China’s 1999 higher-education expansion as a natu-
ral experiment and estimate how the policy-induced changes in the likelihood of college
aected saving rates. My empirical strategy consists of two steps. e rst step is to cal-
culate the change in the expected probability of college for individual households. To do
this, I estimate a probit model for the probability of children’s college status using cross-
sectional household level information from the 1995 and 2002 China Household Income
Project (CHIP) surveys. e data allows me to see whether a family has children, their
ages, and whether the children aend college. I estimate the probit model separately for
each year using a host of control variables and only the subset of families with college-
age children (households with a child aged 18 to 23). en, I use the coecient estimates
on the controls to calculate the expected probability of college for the subset of families
with children younger than college age (families with all their children aged 6 to 18). I do
this twice for each household. Once with the coecient estimates from the 1995 probit
and once with the 2002 coecient estimates. e dierence between the two probabilities
proxies for the change in the expected likelihood that a family’s child will be able to at-
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tend college in the future. While college opportunities increased for almost all groups, the
increase was highest for wealthy households with low levels of (parental) education from
certain provinces. I assume that the policy (which induced the changes in college prob-
ability) was exogenous relative to household saving rates, and I provide province-level
evidence in favor of this assumption.
In the second step of my empirical strategy, I estimate how the changes in college
probability relate to household saving rates via a quasi dierence-in-dierences frame-
work. Specically, I regress household saving rates on a set of covariates and the esti-
mated change of college probability (separately) for both households in the 1995 survey
and 2002 survey. I include province xed eects and allow all the parameter estimates
(on the xed eects and other controls) to dier between the 1995 and 2002 regressions to
allow for variation in the observables’ eects. I interpret the dierence between the esti-
mated coecients on the change in college probability between the two years as the pol-
icy’s impact on saving rates. I subtract the estimated coecient estimate generated using
the 1995 sample (before the policy was implemented) from the 2002 coecient estimate
in order to net out any time-invariant unobservables related to the intensity of treatment
(i.e. the change in college probability). Given that the regressions include many controls,
it is dicult to think what these unobservables might be. Nevertheless, the dierence-in-
dierences approach helps to mitigate concerns over such omied variables.
Consistent with the theoretical model, my main nding is that the change in the ex-
pected probability of college status has a quantitatively large and statistically signicant
eect on household saving rates. A 10 percentage point increase in the college probabil-
ity increases the average household’s saving rate by 7.5 percentage points. is result
provides evidence that the education expansion increased saving for households with
school-age children. My results appear to be driven by households experiencing a large
increase in the possibility of college, while households that already had ample savings do
not increase their saving rates; both these ndings are also consistent with the theoretical
model.
I report on a number of alternative specications, and my main ndings remain quali-
tatively unchanged. e robustness checks include omiing the provinces with the largest
changes in enrollment rates and using wealth in place of savings. I also carefully consider
other policy changes that occurred in China, including housing reform, public healthcare
reform, and the reorganization of State-Owned Enterprises. Finally, I consider some of
the large demographic changes that have been on-going in China, as previous literature
has shown that demographic factors have impacted household saving in China. I discuss
the burgeoning literature seeking to explain China’s high household saving rate in the
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next section.
In addition to the recent research on China’s high saving rates, my paper also is related
to the literature on higher education expansion. For example, Che and Zhang (2018) use
an approach similar to this paper to show that the Chinese college expansion increased
human capital and improved productivity. Feng and Xia (2018) examine how the college
expansion aected technology adoption in Chinese rms. Also, see Li and Xing (2010),
Knight, Deng, and Li (2017), Li et al. (2017), and Bollinger and Hu (2017, 2018). ese
papers primarily focus on labor market implications, while I connect college expansion to
saving behavior. Finally, my paper contributes to the growing literature that studies how
decisions made within the family impact the macro-economy. See Doepke and Tertilt
(2016), Doepke and Ziliboi (2019), and Greenwood, Guner, and Vandenbroucke (2017)
and the many recent papers cited within for more on this growing sub-eld.
e rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.3 documents the high saving
rates among Chinese households and provides background on the education expansion.
Section 3.4 presents the model of household saving that motivates the empirical analysis.
Section 3.5 introduces the data, and Section 3.6 discusses the estimation strategy. Section
3.7 presents the main empirical ndings. Section 3.7.2 contains additional analysis, and
Section 3.9 concludes.
2.2 Saving and Higher Education in China
I am interested in how the expansion of higher education aects household saving deci-
sions. In this section, I document the large increase in Chinese household saving rates over
time and provide background on the relevant changes to education policy. e remainder
of the paper links these two phenomena, both theoretically and empirically.
2.2.1 Household Saving Rates in China
roughout the paper, I dene the household saving rate as
Saving rate = Income− ExpenditureIncome = 1−
Expenditure
Income . (2.1)
Figure 2.1 plots the urban household saving rate in China from 1981 to 2011. Saving
slowly trended up before 2000; aer that, though, the saving rate exploded. In recent
years, the typical Chinese household has been saving 30 percent of their income, a truly
astonishing number. is saving behavior is naturally of importance to Chinese house-
holds, but it also has important implications for the aggregate economy. e saving has
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contributed to the high investment rate (and therefore growth rate) in China. e ex-
cess saving has been owing abroad, especially to the US and Europe. erefore, there is
wide-spread interest in understanding why Chinese households save so much.
Several theories have been put forward. One strand of the literature has focused on
the economic reforms that have been ongoing since 1978. Chamon, Liu, and Prasad (2013)
argue that the reforms have led to uncertainty over income, pensions, and healthcare,
inducing Chinese households to save more for precautionary reasons.1 As an example of
this, He et al. (2018) show that the reform of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s increased
unemployment and other risks for Chinese households, generating a dramatic increase in
saving. Similarly, Choi, Lugauer, and Mark (2017) show that high income growth coupled
with high income uncertainty helps to explain why Chinese households currently save so
much more than US households. Other papers, including Song and Yang (2010), Lugauer
and Mark (2013), Song et al. (2015), and Curtis (2016), have studied the interaction between
saving and aggregate growth within the context of China.
A second strand of the literature has focused on the implications of China’s fertility
policies. Modigliani and Cao (2004) and Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark (2015) appeal to the life-
cycle hypothesis of household saving to argue that the large demographic changes, caused
in part by the One Child Policy, have increased saving rates over time.2 Several papers
have documented specic examples of how demographics impact saving in China. Imro-
horoglu and Zhao (2018a) argue that increases in expected old-age health costs and the
aging population act together to increase savings. Rosenzweig and Zhang (2014) present
evidence showing that the increase in the prevalence of co-residing elderly parents helps
to explain household saving behavior. Wei and Zhang (2011) and Zhou (2014) show that a
gender imbalance in the sex-ratio has interacted with life-cycle considerations to impact
saving.
My paper is related to these previous studies, in that the cost for higher education
has shied to families and saving for college varies over the life-cycle.3 China radically
and very rapidly altered its higher-education policies, which allows me to study house-
holds that experienced a sudden change in their expectations for sending their children
to college. I next provide background on these policy changes.
1See Chamon and Prasad (2010) for more on how the burden for many expenditures shied away from
collectives and onto households. Also, see Yoo and Giles (2007).
2Also, see Bairoliya, Miller, and Saxena (2018), Banerjee et al. (2015), Chao et al. (2011), Choukhmane, Coeur-
dacier, and Jin (2017), Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark (2017), and Lugauer, Ni, and Yin (2017).
3In a paper related to mine, Chen and Yang (2012) use the education reform in China to test the theory of
precautionary saving. Also, note that housing in China shares these characteristics; see Chen, Yang, and
Zhong (2016).
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2.2.2 Background on Higher Education Enrollment Policy
College admission in China is based purely on the Gaokao (college entrance exam) admin-
istered every year in June. Students are admied on a provincial basis, and the Ministry of
Education decides the number of students from each province. e enrollment rates vary
substantially across provinces. So, students compete for admission with other applicants
within their province. If a high school graduate fails to get into a college, they can retake
the exam and reapply in the following year. Due to the Cultural Revolution, the entrance
exam was suspended between 1968 and 1978. In 1978, China initiated sweeping economic
reforms, including reinstating the college entrance exam and enrolling new students into
universities.
Figure 2.2 shows the number of students matriculating, total number enrolled, the
number of college teachers and sta, and the number of higher institutions by year. ere
were over 400,000 new students enrolled in 1978, and about 850,000 students total. e
number of students gradually increased until 1999. en, China instituted the higher edu-
cation expansion, and enrollment exploded. In 1999 alone, the number of newly enrolled
students increased by more than 40 percent. Over 1.5 million high school students began
college in 1999, and by 2012 nearly 7 million students were starting college each year.
Figure 2.3 plots this unprecedented increase in college enrollment alongside the national
enrollment rate. e jump in the enrollment rate aer 1999 (from below 40 percent to
over 60) is readily apparent. My analysis focuses on this sudden policy change.
e central Chinese government designed and controlled the 1999 higher education
expansion, and it reected the government’s political objectives. China had experienced
various social and economic headwinds in the 1990s, including a sizable reduction in em-
ployment at State-Owned Enterprises. e children of the large Chinese baby-boom gen-
eration were facing a bleak employment outlook, and the government was urged to nd a
solution.4 According to lore, Min Tang, an economist at the Asian Development Bank in
China, proposed enrollment expansion in a November 1998 leer to Premier Zhu Rongji.
e hope was that doubling college enrollment within three years would stimulate invest-
ment in services, construction, and other related industries and would ultimately increase
consumption (Wan, 2006). It was also suggested that households could use their savings
to pay for college tuition and expenses. e plan was implemented almost immediately.
So fast was the enrollment policy changed that typical Chinese households could not have
anticipated its timing nor size. Moreover, as I show below, the policy had a dierential
impact across households. e increase in enrollment rates diered by province as well
4Even though the One Child Policy went into eect before 1980, the sheer size of the previous generation
meant that in aggregate they still had many children reaching adulthood.
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as by other observable household characteristics. I exploit the massive policy change to
estimate how the expansion in higher education aected household saving.
e link between education and saving that I propose is a simple one. Households
had to save in order to aord college tuition and expenses. Student loans were not readily
available (Wang et al., 2014), and while the prevalence of college increased, so did the
cost.5 Figure 2.4 plots the total annual tuition and fees per student for dierent types of
education over time. Due to compulsory education laws, the cost of aending elementary
school and middle school remained close to zero. In contrast, the already high tuition
and fees for college went up by a factor of four. Education was (and remains) a major
expenditure category for Chinese households (Chamon and Prasad, 2010). According to
Yao et al. (2011), most Chinese households save for education motives, and Wei and Zhang
(2011) show that 76 percent of single-female-child households save for education.
e college expansion reform implemented by the Ministry of Education of China
serves as a good natural experiment for analyzing the impact of education expansion
on household saving. First and foremost it was a large exogenous shock. Second, the
magnitude of the expansion varied by province even though it was implemented nation-
wide. Each province received a dierent “quota” to determine how many students were to
be admied, and families could not easily relocate due to the Hukou registration system.
us, the change in the expected probability of aending college depended on geography;
however, as I show below, other household characteristics maered, as well. My empirical
strategy leverages the exogenous variation in expected enrollment rates at the household
level. Before detailing the approach for analyzing the data, I next present a theory for
why an expansion in higher education relates to household saving behavior.
2.3 A Model of Households Saving for College
is section contains a simple two-period model of household saving decisions. My goal
is to motivate my empirical analysis by presenting an explicit theory showing how en-
rollment rates can impact saving decisions. e key choice by households in the model
is whether or not to save enough to cover college tuition and expenses. An expansion in
college opportunities induces some families to increase their savings.
For tractability, I consider households with log utility over consumption C in period
5Credit constraints oen bind even when loans can be obtained by some. See Keane and Wolpin (2001),
Cameron and Taber (2004), Carniero and Heckman (2009), Brown, Karl Scholz, and Seshadri (2012), Sun
and Yannelis (2016) and Malkova and Braga (2018) for example.
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1 and expected consumption C ′ in period 2.
U = lnC + E[lnC ′]. (2.2)
e household receives income Y in period 1, which is split between consumption and
saving S. us, the budget constraint in the rst period is
C + S = Y, (2.3)
where households begin life with no assets and saving must be positive. I abstract from
discounting future utility and set the return on saving to zero, as these considerations do
not materially alter the analysis.
e household saves in order to consume in period 2, but also to potentially pay college
tuition for their child. e saving decision is made before knowing whether or not their
child will be admied into college. However, the household does know the probability
p that their child gets in. Within the model, I interpret the education expansion as an
increase in p. When a child is accepted into college, the household can pay tuition and
expenses τ out of savings. If the household has not saved enough, S < τ , then the child
cannot aend college. e household’s second period budget constraint is
C ′ = S + Ic(θ − τ), (2.4)
where θ is the benet from sending a child to college and Ic equals one if the child aends
college and zero otherwise.
I assume that the benets of sending a child to college outweigh the costs; thus, θ >
τ > 0, and if S ≥ τ , an admied child always enrolls in college. ere are many other
ways to model the benets from college, but this modeling choice is tractable and easy
to interpret. e household must decide whether it wants to consume less in period 1
in order to have enough saved up to potentially pay college tuition τ . e benet θ can
be taken literally as the incremental increase in old-age support from having a college-
educated child, but also more broadly to include non-monetary benets.
With this set-up, I can examine how household saving decisions change in response to
the policy of increasing the enrollment rate p. First, consider a household that is saving too
lile to send their child to college, S = Y/2 < τ . For this household, the marginal utility
of consuming in period 1 exceeds the expected marginal utility of saving for college. Even
if their child is accepted into college, the household will not obtain θ in the second period.
However, for this low-saving household, an increase in p could induce the household to
save more (enough to cover tuition τ ). at is, an increase in p increases the expected
utility of saving for college. e exact p in which the household is indierent between
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saving τ (and possibly sending their child to college) and continuing to save less than τ
is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (reshold p). For a household choosing to save less than τ when p = 0, the
expected utility from saving τ and saving less than τ become exactly equal at pt > 0, where
the threshold pt is given by:
pt =
ln
[
Y 2
4(Y−τ)τ
]
ln θ
τ
. (2.5)
Proposition 1 has several implications.6 Most relevantly, as higher education is ex-
panded (p increases), a low-saving household (saving less than τ ) will start saving τ once
p reaches the threshold pt. is theoretical result helps to motivate my main empirical
strategy. Households experiencing a large increase p are particularly likely to increase
their saving to pay for tuition. I make use of this intuition by estimating the idiosyn-
cratic increases in p across households and quantifying how changes in p impact saving.
Proposition 1 also indicates that the threshold pt decreases with the benets derived from
college θ, increases with college costs τ , and decreases with income Y over the relevant
range of variable values. See the Appendix for more details.
Not all households react to the increase in p in the same way, though. Households
experiencing a smaller increase in p may not hit their threshold, leaving their saving
behavior unchanged. Another set of households may have been saving enough to send
their children to college, S ≥ τ , prior to the education expansion. ese high-saving
households might have higher incomes or expected benets from college, or they may
have already faced a p that exceeded their threshold. High-saving households could even
reduce their saving (but only as low as τ ) as p goes up. I show this for the model in the
Appendix (and for the data in Section 2.6.2), and the result is intuitive. An increase in
p for a household already saving more than τ merely increases the chance of obtaining
θ in period 2. is increase in expected income in period 2 lets the household consume
more (and save less) in period 1, to smooth consumption. e increase in p may also
reduce uncertainty, which again lowers saving. Clearly, households with older children
or no children might also react dierently. e model could be expanded to consider these
additional household types; however, the remainder of the paper focuses on households
with young children. I do briey return to the issue of heterogeneous responses below,
but for the most part the exploration of dierent household types lies beyond the scope
of this paper.
6I derive Proposition 1 in Section A of the Online Appendix in a straightforward way. I nd the threshold
p by equating the lifetime utilities from either saving for college or not.
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I introduce the data next and then provide the details of the identication strategy.
2.4 Data
I use household level information from the China Household Income Project (CHIP).7
e CHIP consists of repeated cross-sections of data from household surveys that were
conducted in ve waves across 12 provinces. It is the most widely-used micro data set
on Chinese households. e survey contains questions on income and expenditures, as
well as other household characteristics such as geographic location, number of children,
and educational aainment. I use the 1995 and 2002 waves of urban households, which
bracket the 1999 college expansion.
e raw data contains 6,929 household observations in 1995 and 6,835 in 2002. I focus
on households with school-age children, but I also make use of households with college-
age children. I dene school-age as between 6 and 18 because it covers the usual elemen-
tary through high school years. I dene college age as between 18 and 23, and consider
all households containing any college-age child as a college household. Households with
children between 6 and 18 (but none between 18 and 23) count as school-age children
households. I do not use households in which all children are older than 23 or younger
than 6. To hone in on prime-age workers, I drop households whose head’s age is less than
25 or above 60.
e key variable of interest is the saving rate, as calculated for each household using
Equation (2.1). To eliminate outliers, I drop households in the tails (highest and lowest one
percent) of the saving rate distribution in each year. I also drop the few households that
changed Hukou aer the expansion but before their children took the college entrance
exam. Lastly, I drop households from the 2002 sample in which a child took the exam be-
fore 1999 (when the expansion began) because I will use the households with college-age
children to estimate the change in the likelihood of college enrollment (due to the policy).
e nal data set consists of 2,900 school-age children households and 1,218 college-age
households in 1995 and 2,357 school-age children households and 973 college-age house-
holds in 2002.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics by household type (college or school-age chil-
dren) for 1995 and 2002. e average saving rate for school-age children households rises
considerably between 1995 and 2002, more than a 30 percent increase from 10.7 to 14.2. As
7As mentioned above, the education expansion likely impacted some types of households dierently than
those with young children. erefore, using micro data is critical to my identication strategy; it also
allows me to net out other factors aecting saving that might be correlated with the education expansion
(e.g. income). I return to these issues below.
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the large standard deviations aest, there is ample variation in saving across households
to exploit. In the remainder of the paper, I link the saving behavior to the expansion of
higher education. Note, that over the same time period, the average saving rate among
households with college-age children actually decreased. I do not directly study this de-
crease, but it might be related to the larger share of college-age children aending college
in 2002 (18.3 percent) versus 1995 (10.1 percent). I use this observed increase in college
aendance to estimate the changes in the expectation of aending college for younger
children.
e remainder of Table 2.1 reports the means and standard deviations for the control
variables that I include in my regressions.8 Many of the controls also had large changes
over time. For example, China’s rapid growth pushed up incomes, assets, and expenses.
Other changes can be traced to specic policies. e decreasing number of children was
likely due to fertility policies set in the 1970s. While changes in home ownership and
employment at State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) can be traced to privatization policies
enacted in the late 1990s (Chen, Yang, and Zhong, 2016; Berkowitz, Ma, and Nishioka,
2017; Chen and Wen, 2017). Importantly, I not only control for variables related to these
other policy initiatives, but I also allow their impact on saving rates to vary over time.
I also run several additional robustness checks to show that these other policies do not
drive my results.
As mentioned, I use the sample of households with college-age children to estimate
the change in college probability. However, since quotas for college admiance were set
at the province level, I also use province specic information on enrollment rates. For
each year and province, I approximate the enrollment rate with the ratio of new college
students to the number of senior high school graduates.9 Figure 2.5 shows the estimated
college enrollment rates from the 12 provinces represented in the dataset from 1990 to
2002. In general, there is an upward trend, although many provinces dip just prior to
the expansion. Aer 1998, enrollment rates increase for all provinces. But neither the
enrollment rate levels nor the changes in enrollment rates are uniform across provinces.
ese dierences in enrollment changes were driven by policy, and they therefore help
us to identify the impact on savings. e next section provides further details.
8Appendix B provides denitions for each variable.
9As far as I know, publicly available data on provincial college admission rates does not exist. Fan et al.
(2017) uses university-specic cuto scores collected from newspapers and websites to examine college
expansion in China, and Bollinger and Hu (2017) use the number of people taking the college entrance
exam and subsequent enrollment at the national level.
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2.5 Empirical Approach
e theoretical model in Section 3.4 emied a straightforward relationship between the
policy-induced change in a household’s expectation of college and its saving rate. How-
ever, the available data (comprised of repeated cross-sections) does not track the same
households over time, and it does not contain a measure of the expected probability of
aending college. My empirical approach overcomes the data limitations in two ways.
First, I use the provincial enrollment rates in conjunction with the sample of households
with college-age children to estimate the change in college probabilities for households
with younger children. Second, I use a quasi “dierence-in-dierences” regression ap-
proach to compare how the estimated changes in college probability aected saving rates
for households in 2002 (who were all impacted by the policy) versus how the probabil-
ity changes aected 1995 households (before the education expansion occurred). us,
I can net out unobserved factors that may cause a spurious relationship between saving
rates and the increased likelihood of college, leaving only the impact aributable to the
education expansion.
Specically, I estimate Equation (2.6) twice; once using the 1995 sample of households
with school-age children and once using the 2002 sample of households with school-age
children.
SRij = pi∆pij +X ′ijδ + λj + uij. (2.6)
e dependent variable is the saving rate (SRij) for household i from province j. e
coecient (pi) on the change in college probabilities (∆p) is the key parameter of interest.
We obtain two estimates, one for 1995 (prior to the policy change) and one for 2002 (aer
the expansion). In each separate regression, pi measures how much of a dierence having
a higher ∆p makes for saving. e dierence between the two estimates, pi2002 − pi1995,
then, is akin to a dierences-in-dierences estimate, with the dierence aributable to
the education expansion. Another interpretation is that the estimate of pi using the 1995
households provides a “counterfactual” for what would have happened to saving rates for
the 2002 households in the absence of the education expansion.
e vectorXij contains the control variables listed in Table 2.1, λj represents province
xed eects, and uij captures measurement error. Note that the coecients (δ and λ’s) are
estimated separately for 1995 and 2002. e impact from the controls can vary over time.10
10us, the use of micro data allows us to net out changes in the relationship between other observables
and saving behavior by households with young children in a way that would not be possible with only
aggregated provincial data. Relatedly, as I discuss below, I can estimate a household specic change in
enrollment probability.
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Recall, for example, that the housing market changed during the late 1990s. e regres-
sions allow the relationship between home ownership and savings to change, accordingly.
I return to housing (and other) reforms in Section 2.7.1.
I do not directly observe ∆pij ; I estimate it in two steps using the households with
college-age children and the estimates of province enrollment rates described above. First,
I estimate Equation (2.7) two times, once using households with college-age children in
the 1995 sample and separately using the 2002 college-age households.
pij = X
′
ijβ + γERi + ζj + vij. (2.7)
e dependent variable (pij) equals one if the household’s college-age child is enrolled
in college, and zero otherwise. e share of college-age children aending college jumps
from about 10 percent in 1995 to over 18 percent in 2002; see Table 2.1. e control vari-
ables are the same as above, and ζ represents a full set of province xed eects. Note that
ERi is the household specic enrollment rate corresponding to the year that the house-
hold’s child took the college entrance exam in province j.
With estimates of β, γ, and ζ from both 1995 and 2002 in hand, the second step is
to calculate the predicted probability of college enrollment, p, for each household in the
subset of families with young (age 6 to 18) children. To do so, I plug in the observable
data (Xij and the province) into the estimated version of Equation (2.7) to get an estimate
of p for each household with young children.11 I do this twice for each household (and
for both the 1995 and 2002 samples) - once using the vector of coecient estimates based
on 1995 college-age households and once using the estimates from 2002. I then use the
dierence in the two estimated probabilities as my measure of the household’s change in
the expected probability of sending their children to school.
∆pij = X
′
ij ·
(
βˆ2002 − βˆ1995
)
+
(
γˆ2002ER2002j − γˆ1995ER1995j
)
+
(
ζˆ2002j − ζˆ1995j
)
. (2.8)
I assume that the variation in ∆p across households was exogenously driven by the
higher education expansion. If this were strictly true, then I would only need to calculate
∆p for the 2002 households and estimate Equation (2.6) one time. However, the treatment
intensity could have been correlated with unobservable household characteristics. us,
I estimate ∆p and pi for the 1995 households in order to dierence out any spurious (or
pre-existing) correlation between household saving and ∆p. In a sense, the ∆p estimates
11ese children had not yet taken the college entrance exam, so I use the survey year enrollment rate for
ER.
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for the 1995 households act as a placebo to check the ecacy of the treatment on the 2002
households.
e other identifying assumption is that households experiencing dierent treatments
(low changes in college probability versus high) would have had similar trends in their
saving rates if the college expansion had not occurred. In Section 2.6.2, I use aggregate
data to provide evidence that the saving rate trends were in fact similar across households
in the years leading up to the college expansion.
2.6 Higher Education Expansion’s Eect on Saving
is section reports my main ndings, which are obtained by estimating Equation (2.6) via
ordinary least squares and Equation (2.7) as a probit model. According to the estimates,
a 10 percentage point increase in the expected probability of aending college leads to
a more than 7 percentage point increase in the average household’s saving rate. e
estimates are statistically signicant and robust to a host of specication alterations. I
begin by discussing the probit model.
2.6.1 Who Goes to College?
e 1999 higher education expansion increased college opportunities for nearly all fami-
lies. To calculate household-specic changes in the expectation of college, I rst estimate
Equation (2.7) using the subset of families with children in their college years (age 18 to
23), separately for 1995 and 2002. e dependent variable is the dummy variable indicat-
ing whether a household has a college child, and the controls include all those listed in
Table 2.1, as described above. e Appendix reports the probit estimate details.
I then use the resulting coecient estimates from Equation (2.7) to calculate an ex-
pected college probability for each household with young children (ages 6 to 18). Figure
2.6 shows the distribution of predicted college probabilities for the 2002 households us-
ing both sets of estimated coecients. e distribution shis to the right when using the
2002 coecients. Aer the 1999 college expansion, the predicted probability of aending
college increases markedly. e increase is mostly driven by the increase in provincial
enrollment rates, but other factors maer, too.
Finally, I calculate the change in college probability using Equation (2.8). Again, I
do this for both the 1995 and 2002 households with young children. To get an initial
sense of the relationship between the change in college probability and saving rates, I also
regress the household specic saving rates on the controls listed in Table 2.1 (for the 2002
households). Figure 2.7 plots a ed curve (smoothed by a local polynomial regression
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(Fan and Gijbels, 1996) of the residuals against the change in college probability. e
curve lines up closely with the predictions of my theoretical model. Small increases in
college probability appear to be less correlated with saving. However, once the change
becomes large enough, saving rates are higher, too. I next estimate this relationship using
a quasi-dierence-in-dierences approach, in order to net out unobservable factors for
households experiencing dierent changes in college probability.
2.6.2 e Main Empirical Findings
Table 2.2 reports the main regression results based on Equation (2.6). e estimate of pi
(the marginal eect of the change in college probability) for the 2002 sample equals 0.849.
e eect on saving is quantitatively large and statistically dierent from 0 at beer than
the 1 percent signicance level. Households for which the probability of aending col-
lege went up saved more. e estimate for the 1995 sample is much smaller (0.101) al-
though still positive. Recall, the 1995 sample was not (yet) actually subject to the college
expansion, while the 2002 sample was. us, I interpret the dierence in the two coef-
cient estimates as the eect due to the policy change. is ‘dierence-in-dierences’
(DD) estimate equals 0.748, and it is statistically dierent from zero. Taken literally, the
DD estimate implies that, on average, a 10 percentage point (policy driven) increase in
the expected probability of college increased the typical households saving rate by about
7.5 percentage points. is eect is very large, but given the dramatic increase in saving
observed in China aer 2000, it is not implausible. Also note, the impact on aggregate
saving is not straightforward to calculate because households with older children or no
children likely reacted to the policy changes, possibly through general equilibrium eects
on future employment or wages.
Table 2.3 reports two sets of robustness checks.12 All the regressions include the full
set of controls, but I do not report the coecient estimates to save space. In the rst set
(columns 1-4), I drop households residing in Beijing (columns 1 and 2) and Beijing and
Chongqing (columns 3 and 4). Dropping Beijing and Chongqing is somewhat arbitrary,
but the estimates for the changes in college probability are largest for households in these
two provinces, on average (see Figure 2.5 and Appendix Table C.2). e resulting DD es-
timates are smaller than the main DD estimates; however, the estimated eect is still very
large and statistically signicant. I retain the households from Beijing and Chongqing in
the remainder of my analysis.
12As an additional robustness check, I also have conducted a standard placebo check by randomly assigning
households to dierent provincial enrollment rates. I nd no signicant impact on saving, providing
additional support for the main results.
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e measure of the saving rate could be partially determined by transitory shocks
to household income (Carroll and Samwick, 1998). Following a strand of literature, in
the second set of robustness checks (columns 5 and 6), I replace my dependent variable
in Equation (2.6) with a measure of each household’s cumulative saving rate.13 e 1995
CHIP survey asks about annual income going back to 1990 and the 2002 survey asks about
income every year starting with 1998. I aggregate each household’s previous 4 years’ in-
comes to form a measure of permanent income, in order to average out transitory shocks.
en, the cumulative saving rate is dened as Wi
Ii
, where Wi is household’s total assets
reported in the survey year and Ii is my measure of permanent income. With this set-up,
the coecient on ∆p represents the impact on this accumulated saving rate. Again, I nd
that the increase in college probability leads households to save more. Overall, the results
across the robustness checks reported in Table 2.3 reinforce the main results. e num-
ber of observations is less than in the main regressions (note, for columns 5 and 6, I drop
households that do not report wealth), but the eects remain statistically signicant and
quantitatively large.
e empirical results in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are consistent with the intuition coming
out of my structural model that low-saving households (S < τ ) experiencing a large
enough increase in the likelihood of college (p) will start to save more (i.e. Proposition 1).
However, the model also implies that high-saving households could react to the college
expansion by saving less (see Appendix A). In other words, the model suggests a dierence
in the eect on families with ample savings versus those with lile. I can use the data along
with the dierence-in-dierences approach to check this implication from the structural
model.
To this end, I rst regress gross savings (rather than saving rates) on the full set of
observables and province xed eects, separately for each year. i use the 1995 coecient
estimates to predict counterfactual saving levels for households in 2002 (and vice versa).
Based on these predicted savings, I classify households into low savings (boom quartile)
and high savings (top quartile). en, I re-run the main regressions for each group in each
year.
Table 2.4 presents the results. e rst column reports the estimates for the low saving
and high saving households in 1995; the second column reports 2002. A positive corre-
lation exists for low savings households in both years. In contrast, this relationship is
negative for high savers in both years and large and statistically signicant aer the col-
lege expansion. ese estimates are consistent with the idea (coming out of the structural
model) that households with high saving levels reduce their saving when college oppor-
13See Lusardi (1998), Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schuendeln (2005), and He et al. (2018), for example.
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tunities increase. e DD estimates further indicate that an increased college probability
leads high-saving households to save less, while low-saving households save more.14
I end this section by revisiting the identication strategy. A critical assumption for
the dierence-in-dierences framework is that the dierentially treated groups were not
trending (before the treatment) in ways correlated with the treatment.15 In my case, the
concern is that the types of households experiencing large increases in their college prob-
ability were also the types of households already increasing their savings, anyway. is
concern is valid, and I can even imagine that the policy makers might have wanted to
target the treatment towards households with increasing rates of savings because these
households would be most able to pay for college. With the cross-sectional data at hand,
I cannot directly check the micro-data for pre-trends; however, I can take a more aggre-
gated look at the data. Figure 2.8 plots changes in the average household saving rate
before the education expansion (from 1995 to 1998) against enrollment rates during the
enrollment increase (1998 to 2002), for each province. ere exists lile correlation, and
the ed line actually reveals a slightly negative relationship. In other words, the policy
did not selectively increase enrollment rates more for the provinces in which saving rates
were already growing the most before the policy was enacted. Recall that the household-
level estimates for the change in college probability (Equation (2.7)) were a function of the
provincial enrollment rates. So, from this perspective, the treatment on individual house-
holds does not seem to depend on their pre-policy saving behavior. us, I conclude that
the analysis is not picking up pre-trends, but, instead, the saving behavior is driven by
the response to changing college opportunities.
2.7 Other Explanations for China’s High Saving Rates
is section examines the other main explanations for China’s high household saving
rates put forth in the literature (see Section 3.3). First, I examine policy changes enacted
around the same time. en, I examine demographic changes. As noted above, the regres-
sions already include a number of controls aimed at accounting for these related factors.16
Moreover, I think these other factors were unlikely to be linked to the paern of increased
college opportunities. However, since the policy reforms and demographic changes were
14Note, these results are consistent with the main ndings, Table 2.4 omits the middle two quartiles and
focuses on gross saving rather than saving rates.
15Another critical assumption is that households did not select into experiencing a higher increase in college
probability, for example, by moving across provinces. is is unlikely to have occurred because of the
speed of the policy implementation and the Hukou restrictions on migration. Just to be sure, I have
checked that the results do not change when I remove the few households in the sample that changed
their Hukou aer the policy.
16e main regressions also allow the coecient estimates on these controls to change over time.
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so big and also impacted household saving, I now go beyond simple control variables and
allow for interactions with the variable of interest. roughout the many specications,
the impact of higher education expansion on saving rates remains large and statistically
signicant.17
2.7.1 Other Reforms
I begin by interacting the change in college probability (allowing for heterogeneous ef-
fects) with the variables related to three other large reforms: SOE reform, housing reform,
and healthcare reform. Specically, we estimate
SRij = W ′ijδ + pi ·∆pij + φ · Zij + ψ ·∆pij · Zij + λj + uij, (2.9)
where Zij represents a dummy variable capturing either SOE job status, public health
coverage, or private house ownership (each is considered separately). Vector W is the
vector X , including all covariates except Z .18 en, ∂SRij/∂∆p = pi + ψ · Zij is the
marginal eect for each household. I report the average marginal eects, based o of
the marginal eects across dierent Zij’s. I am interested in whether controlling for the
heterogeneous impact across Z (i.e. the exposure to other reforms) alters the estimate (pi)
for the education expansion eect, and I nd that it does not.
Employment at a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)
Public sector jobs used to be part of the so-called “iron rice bowl” of social support. e
SOE reform in the 1990s, however, led to massive layos and made even incumbent SOE
workers less secure in their employment. As discussed above, several papers have shown
that the new risk led to an increase in precautionary saving. If the households that expe-
rienced large increases in the likelihood of college were also facing greater employment
risk, then the estimates could be conating the two channels. Columns (1) and (2) of Table
2.5 provide evidence against this possibility. e coecient estimate for ∆p (0.786) in 2002
is high, even aer controlling for the interaction with SOE status. Note, the interaction
term is positive in both years, but small and statistically insignicant. e boom line is
that the DD estimate (7.6 percentage points) remains large and close to the baseline result.
17e Appendix also reports triple dierence-in-dierence estimates, which leverage these other factors
aecting saving rates to further dierence out potential trends coming from a third, omied, dimension
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
18To save space, the tables below do not report the coecient estimates for the controls.
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Public Health Coverage
Healthcare is another motive for precautionary saving (Chamon and Prasad, 2010), as
well as life-cycle saving. Access to public health coverage has been in ux in China due
to policy changes, migration and Hukou regulations, and population aging. Columns (3)
and (4) of Table 2.5 report estimates controlling for heterogeneous eects based on having
public health coverage. e resulting DD estimate of 0.89 is actually slightly higher than
the baseline estimate. Interestingly, the coecient estimate for the interaction term ips
signs and becomes statistically insignicant aer the college expansion.
Home Ownership
China also reformed its housing market in the 1990s. By 1998, most families were allowed
to own their homes, and many households saved in the form of housing or in order to
buy housing (required down payment rates were high). Again, as with the other reforms,
I think that a connection between housing reform and exposure to the higher education
expansion is unlikely at the household level. Columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.5 indicate
that controlling for the interaction between the change in college probability and home
ownership has lile impact on the main estimate. e DD estimate (0.80) remains very
large.
2.7.2 Household Demographics
I next consider regressions that control for interactions with variables capturing house-
hold demographic characteristics. I still apply the approach embodied in Equation (2.9),
leing Z represent the various demographic factors of interest.
Number of Children
China enacted the One Child Policy in 1978, although enforcement of the policy varied
over time and by location. Several papers have shown that Chinese households with
fewer children (i.e. one) tend to save more and have drawn a connection between China’s
fertility policies and high saving rates. One reason why single child households might save
more is to invest in their child’s college education (a quantity/quality tradeo similar to
Becker and Lewis (1973a)). In order to examine the potential heterogeneous eect across
households with dierent numbers of children, I dene a new variable Single that is equal
to one if there is only one dependent child and zero if there are two or more children. We
re-estimate Equation (2.9), interacting the new variable (Z = Single) with the change in
the probability of college.
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Table 2.6 columns (1) and (2) present the results. e resulting DD estimate for the
average marginal eect equals 0.77, close to my baseline result. Note, the coecient es-
timate on Single, while not statistically signicant, is close to 0.024 both before and aer
the education expansion. is estimate is similar to that in Lugauer, Ni, and Yin (2017);
they estimate a 2.4 percentage point decrease in saving rates due to each additional child
using a dierent data set and dierent estimation methodology.
Sex Composition
Some Chinese households may prefer having a son over a daughter because sons tradi-
tionally support their parents in old age. Relatedly, the One Child Policy may have led
to the gender imbalance now prevelant in China. Households with sons invest dier-
ently for their child’s education and also for marriage and housing purposes. Wei and
Zhang (2011) show that these factors have had a large impact on household saving rates
in China.19 erefore, I next interact college probability with a variable (Z = Male) that
equals one if a household has only male children and is zero otherwise. I count mixed
gender households (of which there are few) as non-male households. Columns (3) and (4)
of Table 2.6 suggest that the male child aect is quite small. Moreover, the estimate of the
college expansion eect (DD=0.76) remains large.
Life-Cycle Saving and Age Eects
Simple life-cycle theory predicts that households of dierent ages can have dierent sav-
ing paerns. e younger households in my sample (household head with an age closer
to 25) might be net borrowers, while older households (age close to 60) rapidly accumu-
late assets in anticipation of retirement. e older the household head, the closer the
child is to college age, on average. To address this, I next interact the household head’s
age (Z = Age) with the change in college probability. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.6
present the results. Once again, the DD estimate (0.88) remains similar to the baseline
result.
In summary, the 1999 higher education expansion had a large eect on household
saving rates, and this nding holds across households with dierent exposures to other
reforms and dierent demographic characteristics. While the economic reforms and de-
mographic factors likely also impacted household saving (my regressions do not rule out
these alternative stories), the increase in college opportunities had an additional eect
above and beyond these other explanations.
19Cai et al. (2019) and Zhou (2014) also discuss related issues.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I exploit the policy-induced increase in college enrollment to estimate the
impact on household saving rates in China. I nd that the expansion in higher education
resulted in higher household saving rates, especially for previously low-saving house-
holds experiencing a large increase in the probability of sending their children to col-
lege. rough this saving channel, the college expansion likely aected China’s economic
growth rate and international capital ows. e ndings are robust to a host of speci-
cation modications, as well as to controlling for other concurrent policy changes and
on-going demographic changes.
China’s education expansion was unique in several ways. e policy change was large
and swily implemented, and college enrollment levels were relatively low before the re-
forms. Also, China had strict fertility controls at the time, eectively shuing down the
quantity channel in the classic fertility theory of a quantity/quality trade-o. ese char-
acteristics helped inform my estimation strategy, but it remains a question as to whether
the ndings are applicable to other countries and situations. Similarly, my regressions
necessarily capture the short run responses, from when the policy was new and unex-
pected, rather than the long-run response. I leave an exploration of these important is-
sues to future research. However, the story is straightforward. Households save to pay
for college. e cost of higher education went up signicantly despite the rapid growth of
household income. Student loans were not readily available in the early stage of the ex-
pansion and Chinese households must nance their child’s education out of their accumu-
lated savings. I believe this example may also shed lights on how education opportunities
shape household saving behaviors in other countries where households are credit con-
strained. Many countries are debating whether to increase higher education enrollment
while questioning where the funding will be. Since the return of college education exceeds
the cost according to many studies (Li, 2004; Li and Xing, 2010), households save more to
support child’s college education. Expanding higher education means that more families
will expect their children to aend university; hence, these households save more.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics by Year and Children’s Age
School-Age College-Age
1995 2002 1995 2002
Saving rate 0.107 0.142 0.141 0.128
(0.226) (0.342) (0.238) (0.334)
Child college aainment dummy 0.101 0.183
(0.301) (0.387)
Controls
Number of kids 1.111 1.076 1.631 1.159
(0.323) (0.267) (0.630) (0.404)
Number of elderly 0.0838 0.0878 0.0755 0.0647
(0.313) (0.340) (0.279) (0.262)
Private house 0.410 0.782 0.475 0.757
(0.492) (0.413) (0.500) (0.429)
Housing accumulation fund 0.441 0.543 0.424 0.540
(0.497) (0.498) (0.494) (0.499)
Age 39.74 39.94 50.10 47.27
(5.058) (4.911) (4.638) (3.273)
Gender 0.633 0.652 0.664 0.638
(0.482) (0.477) (0.472) (0.481)
Currently employed 0.980 0.923 0.860 0.853
(0.140) (0.267) (0.347) (0.354)
College degree 0.066 0.110 0.100 0.050
(0.247) (0.313) (0.300) (0.219)
SOE job 0.822 0.325 0.825 0.342
(0.383) (0.468) (0.380) (0.475)
Public health 0.703 0.636 0.709 0.680
(0.457) (0.481) (0.454) (0.467)
Employment tenure 15.80 13.58 21.41 16.32
(7.425) (8.613) (10.23) (11.60)
Years of schooling 10.45 11.46 10.32 10.29
(2.984) (3.004) (3.651) (2.881)
Spouse years of schooling 9.657 10.67 8.714 9.582
(3.476) (3.571) (4.148) (3.439)
Annual income 1.349 2.244 1.655 2.335
(0.705) (1.408) (0.900) (1.394)
Annual expenses 1.175 1.805 1.379 1.901
(0.624) (1.222) (0.797) (1.133)
Total assets 1.076 3.954 1.454 4.056
(1.473) (10.05) (3.932) (5.415)
Observations 2,900 2,357 1,218 973
Notes: is table reports means for the 1995 and 2002 CHIP data, by household
type. School-age households report having at least one child aged 6-18 and none
older. College-age households have at least one child aged 18-23. Standard devia-
tions are in parentheses. Income, expenses, and assets are in 10,000s of yuan.
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Table 2.2: College Probability’s Eect on Household Saving Rates
(1) (2)
1995 2002
∆p 0.101 0.849
(0.099) (0.240)
No. kids 0.009 0.016
(0.009) (0.018)
No. elderly people 0.003 0.009
(0.008) (0.006)
Private house 0.000 -0.042
(0.009) (0.016)
Housing accumulation fund 0.013 0.012
(0.006) (0.010)
Head age 0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
Head male 0.001 0.026
(0.009) (0.010)
Head currently working 0.020 0.040
(0.014) (0.022)
Head with college degree -0.002 -0.057
(0.015) (0.021)
Head SOE job 0.019 0.019
(0.006) (0.012)
Head public health 0.002 0.030
(0.009) (0.009)
Head tenure 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Head years of schooling -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Spouse years of schooling 0.004 0.007
(0.001) (0.002)
Annual income 0.433 0.277
(0.062) (0.026)
Annual expenses -0.531 -0.359
(0.080) (0.033)
Total assets 0.001 -0.004
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 2,900 2,357
R2 0.745 0.698
DD 0.748
(0.260)
Notes: is table reports regression estimates of
Equation 2.6 for 1995 and 2002. Row DD reports
the dierence in the coecient estimates (pi) on
∆p. e regressions include province xed eects,
and the parentheses report robust standard errors
clustered by province.
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Table 2.3: Robustness Checks
No Beijing No Beijing & Chongqing Cumulative Saving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
∆p 0.133 0.614 0.149 0.675 1.453 9.895
(0.063) (0.215) (0.067) (0.258) (0.468) (5.265)
Observations 2,690 2,225 2,690 2,136 2,536 2,232
R2 0.735 0.693 0.735 0.689 0.085 0.263
DD 0.481 0.526 8.442
(0.224) (0.267) (5.286)
Notes: Each regression is based on Equation 2.6. e dependent variable for the rst four
columns remains the saving rate. e dependent variable for columns 5 and 6 is the cumulative
saving rate. Each regression includes the full set of controls, except assets are not included
in columns 5 and 6 due to collinearity with the dependent variable. e regressions include
province xed eects, and the parentheses report robust standard errors clustered by province.
Table 2.4: Changes in the Relative Savings on Initial Low and High Savers
(1) (2) (3)
1995 2002 DD
Low Initial Savers 0.129 0.547 0.418
(0.304) (0.718) (0.780)
[725] [590]
High Initial Savers -1.015 -8.280 -7.265
(0.821) (1.902) (2.071)
[725] [589]
Notes: is table reports the eect on high (pre-
dicted savings above the 75th percentile) and low
(below the 25th percentile) saving households us-
ing gross savings as the dependent variable. Each
regression includes province xed eects and the
full set of controls. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered by province. Brackets
contain the number of observations.
26
Table 2.5: Other Reforms
SOE job Public health Private house
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
∆P 0.022 0.786 -0.096 1.057 0.126 1.092
(0.174) (0.238) (0.078) (0.492) (0.104) (0.301)
∆P×SOE job 0.076 0.187
(0.176) (0.159)
∆P× Public health 0.201 -0.193
(0.035) (0.269)
∆P× Private house -0.073 -0.248
(0.075) (0.194)
SOE job 0.018 0.011 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019
(0.006) (0.015) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012)
Public health 0.002 0.031 0.001 0.036 0.002 0.031
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Private house 0.000 -0.042 0.002 -0.045 0.000 -0.040
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.016)
Observations 2,900 2,357 2,900 2,357 2,900 2,357
R2 0.745 0.698 0.745 0.698 0.745 0.698
Marginal eect 0.085 0.846 0.046 0.934 0.096 0.897
(0.094) (0.237) (0.092 ) (0.334) (0.099) (0.242)
DD 0.761 0.888 0.801
(0.255) (0.346) (0.261)
Notes: Each regression includes province xed eects and the control variables. e
parentheses report robust standard errors clustered by province.
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Table 2.6: Demographics
Number of kids Gender of kids Life-cycle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
∆p 0.075 1.118 0.038 0.858 -0.061 2.122
(0.102) (0.356) (0.142) (0.241) (0.466) (0.909)
Single 0.024 0.025
(0.049) (0.037)
∆p× Single 0.028 -0.269
(0.116) (0.237)
Male 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.006)
∆p×Male 0.105 -0.017
(0.099) (0.121)
Head age 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
∆p× Head age 0.004 -0.029
(0.009) (0.019)
Observation 2,900 2,357 2,900 2,357 2,900 2,357
R2 0.745 0.698 0.745 0.698 0.745 0.699
Marginal eect 0.100 0.869 0.089 0.850 0.079 0.957
(0.096) (0.242) (0.109) (0.239) (0.143) (0.259)
DD 0.769 0.762 0.877
(0.260) (0.263) (0.296)
Notes: Each regression includes province xed eects and the control variables. e
parentheses report robust standard errors clustered by province.
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2.10 Figures
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Figure 2.1: Household Saving Rates
Notes: e data is from the China Yearly Statistical Book and the National Bureau of Statistics. e variables
used to construct the saving rate are per capita total income of urban households (y) and per capita annual
cash consumption expenditure of urban households (e). e household saving equals (y − e)/y.
0
50
0
1,
00
0
1,
50
0
2,
00
0
2,
50
0
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Year
New enrollment (10,000) Total enrollment (10,000)
Teachers and staffs Institutions
Figure 2.2: China Higher Education Expansion
Notes: e data comes from the China Yearly Statistical Book and the National Bureau of Statistics.
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Figure 2.3: New Students Enrolled and the Enrollment Rate
Notes: e enrollment data is from the China Yearly Statistical Book and the National Bureau of Statis-
tics. e enrollment rate is calculated by dividing the number of newly enrolled students by the num-
ber of national college entrance examination takers. e number of exam takers was collected from
hp://news.koolearn.com/20180606/1152629.html.
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Figure 2.4: Cost of Education
Notes: e data comes from the China Yearly Statistical Book and the National Bureau of Statistics.
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Figure 2.5: Enrollment Rate by Province
Note: We obtained the underlying data from the National Bureau of Statistics. is gure plots the annual
rate of planned new enrollment in regular higher institutions divided by the number of senior high school
graduates, from 1990 to 2002 by province. Prior to 1997, Chongqing was part of Sichuan, so we use the
Sichuan rate.
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Figure 2.6: Estimated College Probability for 2002 Households
Note: is gure shows the distribution of estimated college probabilities across the households surveyed
in 2002, based on the coecient estimates from both the 1995 and 2002 probit regressions of Equation 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: Saving Rate and Change of Probability for 2002 Households
Note: is gure shows the relationship between saving rates and the change in college probability for 2002
households via local polynomial regressions.
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Figure 2.8: Test for Pre-Trends
Note: e vertical axis measures the saving rate change between 1995 and 1998. e horizontal axis mea-
sures the subsequent enrollment rate changes between 1998 and 2002. e underlying data comes from the
National Bureau of Statistics Yearly Statistical Book.
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Chapter 3 College Education and Internal Migration in China
3.1 Introduction
Geographic mobility is an equalizing force for wages and employment (Morei, 2011).
Movement across geographical boundaries has large implications, including aecting lo-
cal government public expenditures (Tiebout, 1956) and housing prices (Garriga et al.,
2017), improving intergenerational mobility (Derenoncourt, 2018; Nakamura et al., 2019),
reducing welfare dependence (Hartley, Lamarche, and Ziliak, 2017), reducing income in-
equality (Razin and Sadka, 2016), improving health status (Black et al., 2015), and increas-
ing education aainment (Chen et al., 2018). Understanding what factors aect migration,
therefore is important for both researchers and policy makers.
Among those factors it is of special interest that how college education aects mi-
gration because college educated workers are important for both the local and national
economy (Morei, 2004). Longstanding empirical results show mobility rises with edu-
cation (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak, 2011), and empirical evidence found in the U.S. and
Europe support this relationship (Malamud and Wozniak, 2012; Machin, Pelkonen, and
Savanes, 2012; Weiss, 2015). However, the connection between education and internal
migration in China is less researched and may dier due to a large share of less educated
population in China who migrate.1 Several reasons can explain the lack of studies looking
into this relationship. First, there is lack of data with detailed information on individual’s
timing of education and residence location throughout time, so it is very dicult to in-
vestigate how education aects people’s mobility later in life. Instead contemporaneous
migration is heavily examined in the literature because the household registration sys-
tem, well known as hukou, aaches geographic status to each individual and is widely
available in data sets. Second, the composition of long-distance migrants does not vary
in education due to the small share of college educated people in Chinese population.
Data from the Rural Household Survey suggests the majority of rural migrants are people
who completed education less than secondary school (de Brauw and Giles, 2015). Since
most colleges are located in cities (Xing and Zhang, 2017), seeking tertiary education in
order to move to cities became one popular approach to overcome hukou barriers for
young people. Once college education is completed, it is much easier to leave rural area,
1Luo and Xing (2016) nd that less educated people in China are more responsive to regional demand shis.
Lu and Xia (2016) use 2010 Census data show unconditionally college workers are more likely to move
intra-provincial while people without college degree are conducting more inter-provincial migration.
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therefore this mechanical rural-urban education-migration relationship is less aractive
to researchers.
China implemented an unprecedented higher education expansion in 1999, which sud-
denly increased the enrollment of college students. e enrollment rate for high school
graduates jumped from less than thirty percent to more than sixty percent in 1999 and
was kept at a high level and now is eighty percent. Nearly seven million college students
graduate every year. In this paper, I take advantage of this shock and estimate the im-
pact of college education on life time cross-province migration in China, including both
unskilled and skilled labor.
Understanding the link between college education and mobility in China is important
in several aspects. First and foremost, China is of special interest because of its sheer size
of migrant population. e latest data shows in 2017 there are 244 million people resid-
ing in a place that is dierent from their registered location while every year the higher
education system adds 7 million college students into labor market. How do these college
graduates choose where to live is an important issue. Second, College workers are vital for
local and national economic development and understanding how inter-province migra-
tion of educated workers is shaped by college education is important for designing local
public policies. Increasing enrollment locally could retain more college students (Groen,
2004; Winters, forthcoming), however, if college-educated workers are more responsive to
labor market shocks (Wozniak, 2010), brain drain could happen to some local economies.
Educated workers are aracted by dierent amenities (Su, Tesfazion, and Zhao, 2017) and
also make an area more desirable to live (Shapiro, 2006). ere are cases in recent years
where some provinces in China have a sizable higher education system but suer losses
of college graduates. Rural-urban and urban-urban migration might go beyond provin-
cial boundaries and take time, which is less examined in the literature. It is important for
local government to understand the mechanism between college education and lifetime
mobility.
In this paper, I look into how college education aects people’s later life location
choices in China. An individual is a migrant if he/she is residing in a province that is
dierent from his/her province at age 12. Unlike previous literature, it includes both rural-
urban and urban-urban movement. Regressions of migration on education are biased due
to omied variables and self-selection. People who would be likely to migrate also tend
to earn more education. I utilize the variation in provincial level number of colleges in-
duced by the large expansion of higher education since 1999, to examine the impact of
college education on inter-province migration of young adults in China, using the China
Family Panel Studies (CFPS). It is the ideal dataset of this study for several reasons. First,
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it records adult respondent’s residence location of childhood and survey year. Second, it
has rich information on current year and duration of each level of education so that I can
calculate the year survey respondents graduated from high school and went to college.
Once the college-going year is obtained, I am able to match the province-year number of
colleges to each individual. e exclusion restriction requires later life location choice is
aected by education only through college-going year number of colleges. Because col-
lege admission is province-based, if people could select into provinces with more colleges,
then the identication is invalid. But due to hukou restriction, people have to take the col-
lege entrance exam in their hukou province no maer where their secondary education
takes place. Selecting into advantageous provinces is unlikely in China. e other poten-
tial threat to my identication strategy is the correlation between migration and college
expansion policy. However, pre-trend analysis suggests there is no clear relationship be-
tween the size of expansion and the migration paerns at province level. If anything, it
will bias my estimates downward since a beer location will aract people to stay, not to
move away.
e IV estimates show a causal explanation that college education makes people more
likely to reside in a dierent province than the childhood province. In general, aending
college increases one’s out-province migration propensity by 9.1 percentage points, which
is a large eect considering the average migration rate is around 9 percent in China. e
result is also robust to dierent measures of migration and subsample tests. I discuss sev-
eral explanations that lead to the main results. I rst examine how childhood rural/urban
hukou aects inter-provincial migration through college education. en I look into the
dierential impact of college in terms of within-province and out-province hukou migra-
tion. Next I use Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to see if higher education expansion could
explain the dierence between migration paerns. ese results indicate that urban res-
idents are less likely to conduct long-distance move possibly due to higher opportunity
cost of changing hukou, which is associated with advantagous urban amenities; college is
more salient in determining cross-province hukou migration. Next, I test if college educa-
tion aects a set of personal beliefs such as family network and education, which I suspect
as a channel that could inuence people’s later life location choices. e results show that
college-educated people are more prone to disagree with the importance of family and so-
cial connections, in contrast, they are more inclined to support the idea that education is
more important, which implies how college education improves people’s ability to depend
on themselves.
e contribution of this paper is threefold. First, to my best knowledge, this paper is
the rst aempt to link college education and cross-province lifetime migration in a devel-
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oping country like China and nds indirect consequences of higher education expansion
of China. Second, unlike existing studies focusing on low-skilled and hukou migration, it
includes both hukou and non-hukou, skilled and unskilled labor migration and answers
the question of whether people are more likely to move across provincial boundaries in a
general context. ird, it adds Chinese evidence to the literature on the determinants of
migration and nds a consistent story comparing to the U.S. and Europe.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses related literature on
internal migration. Section 3.3 introduces the institutional background of China’s inter-
nal migration and higher education. Section 3.4 presents a simple framework of migration
and its implication. Section 3.5 and 3.6 describe the data and empirical strategy. Section
3.7 presents the main results and robustness checks. Section 3.8 discusses potential mech-
anisms. Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Motivation and Related Literature
ere are two strands of literature focusing on dierent aspects of migration, typically the
determinants and impacts of migration.2 e determinant side is related to questions con-
cerning why and who moves, which is believed to be aected by push- and pull- factors.
Sjaastad (1962) was the earliest paper proposing the idea that whether an individual will
move depends on the dierence between the present value of income and costs of mov-
ing, where the laer includes both money and non-money costs and the migration rate
increases with education and diminish with age and distance moved (Schwartz, 1976).
Factors such as income (Kennan and Walker, 2011), wealth constraints (Dustmann and
Okatenko, 2014), historic linkage between host and home locations (Kinnan, Wang, and
Wang, 2018), number and gender of children (Huang, Lin, and Zhang, 2019), tax incen-
tives (Agrawal and Foremny, 2019; Kleven et al., 2019), trade shocks (Greenland, Lopresti,
and McHenry, 2019; Tombe and Zhu, 2019; Fan, forthcoming), welfare reform (Kaestner
et al., 2003), health care (Alm and Enami, 2017), local amenities (Su, Tesfazion, and Zhao,
2017), environmental conditions (Chen, Oliva, and Zhang, 2017; Khanna et al., 2019), and
cyclical factors (Saks and Wozniak, 2011) all contribute to the determinants of moving.
People always move for beer jobs and higher living conditions. However, the con-
nection between education and migration is less studied in the literature. In theory, it is
generally believed that mobility rises with education. Empirical evidence shows more ed-
ucated people tend to move more and take longer-distance migration even though there
is a secular decline in mobility in the U.S. for every demographic group (Molloy, Smith,
2For detailed discussion of internal migration, please refer to two survey papers Lucas (1997) and Greenwood
(1997) that focus on developing and developed countries respectively.
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and Wozniak, 2011, 2017). Malamud and Wozniak (2012) use the national and state-level
induction risk during the Vietnam War to identify both college aainment and veteran
status for men observed in the 1980 Census and examine the causal eect of education on
migration using variation in college aainment. ey nd that an additional year of col-
lege education increases the probability of living outside one’s birth state by 0.03 to 0.09
percentage points, which could account for 10 to 25 percent of the probability of moving
for men in their sample. Wozniak (2010) uses local labor market demand shocks to exam-
ine the impact of education on mobility and nds college students are more responsive
to distant labor market shocks and hence more likely to move than less educated people.
Machin, Pelkonen, and Savanes (2012) use Norwegian data to examine how education
aects mobility using the compulsory education reform. Weiss (2015) adopts a similar
identication strategy but includes more European countries. Both of the two papers nd
more education leads to higher mobility in Europe.
Most research studying China’s internal migration has been focused on the rural-
urban population ow and contemporaneous hukou migration because of its unique char-
acteristics in terms of both large rural-urban divide and mobility restrictions. Even though
local residence benets are limited to people without hukou, less educated people from
rural places still have large incentives to move into cities. Zhang and Song (2003) nd
that rural-urban migration contributes dominantly to urban population growth and at-
tracted by economic growth, not vice versa. eir analysis also shows that rural-urban
income gap encourages interprovincial migration. Other papers that look into the wage
dierential, education opportunities and discrimination against migrant workers (Wang,
Zhang, and Ni, 2015, Zhang et al., 2016; Pakrashi and Frijters, 2017). e probability of
rural migrants returning to home is increasing in education aainment, and more edu-
cated people are less likely to choose migration over local non-farm employment in order
to avoid the risks associated with migration and the cost of being separated from families
(Zhao, 1999, 2002).
Given the prosperous development of research on internal migration in China and
its outcomes, there is a missing piece that lacks investigation. How does education af-
fect people’s migration in China? Few studies look into education-based migration. Be-
cause of the fact that regular higher institutions in China are located in cities (Xing and
Zhang, 2017) and hukou restriction, education-based migration creates a huge incentive
for skilled people to move (Liao et al., 2017). Pan (2016) also nds such incentives to
stay in school disappear aer the removal of selective mobility restrictions. But it does
not answer the question if college people are more likely to conduct long-distance move
since rural-urban migration includes both within-province and cross-province movement.
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Given the great inux of college students induced by the higher education expansion,3 the
relationship between education and migration in China demands more research since the
migration of college students aects the spatial distribution of human capital and it has
an important implications on economic development and local labor market.
3.3 Internal Migration and Higher Education in China
In this section I rst discuss the institutional background of mobility in China and its
related migration measure. en I discuss the higher education system in China and its
recent expansion.
Hukou is a unique characteristic of China’s socioeconomic development and was cre-
ated in the 1950s to restrain people from moving between rural and urban as well as dif-
ferent cities in order to facilitate production under a centrally-planned economy. It does
not only classify residents into rural and urban areas, but also into specic urban areas.
Hukou status was aached to an individual when he/she was born, mainly following par-
ent’s hukou status. For example, a child born in Shanghai can registered in Beijing if the
father has a Beijing hukou. As China began the opening-up and reform policies in late
1970s, increasing amount of labor has been freed from rural areas, leading to an increas-
ing number of people owing into cities. Figure 3.1 shows the migration population in
China for the last three decades. It reects the relaxation of mobility restrictions which al-
lows more people to move, and the dramatic size of the population that engage in moving
within China. e migration control policies were gradually relaxed to meet the demand
and since the 1990s people could nd a job without converting hukou. Even though the
restrictions of moving have been reduced aer the economic reform and allowing people
to live anywhere in China, major public services such as health care and public educa-
tion are still only available to local hukou holders. Education, joining the army, geing a
job, and buying an apartment are among the most common ways one can change hukou.
However, in some cases, they do not necessarily result in hukou conversion, which could
be due to the stringent hukou restriction or personal choice. Table A1 presents dierent
measures of internal migration in China. As can be seen from this table, hukou mea-
sure of both lifetime and contemporaneous migration is underestimated. erefore, given
moving is more driven by market conditions and the interest of this paper is to look at
3It increased new college enrollment from 1.5 million in 1999 to 6.9 million in 2012, most of them look for
a job and stay in cities aer graduation. Based on a 2013 survey, 12.6 percent of college graduates migrate
to a third place which is dierent to the origin and college locations, 11.1 percent are return migrants, 9.1
percent stick to where the college locates, and 54.3 are stayers, who learn and get employed in original
area without any migration (Yue, 2014).
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how college education aects later life location choice, I focus on inter-provincial lifetime
migration in this paper.
e National College Entrance Exam (NCEE) is held in June every year and eligible
students take the exam, receive scores, and then apply for colleges. e enrollment is
mainly administered by the Ministry of Education and coordinated between provincial
and central government. Admission is based on provincial quota system so students from
the same province compete with each other. e number of students can be enrolled for
each province depends on how many colleges a province has and the allocation between
in-province and out-province quota. Students who fail to get into college can retake the
exam in another year. In 1999, the central government implemented the policy to expand
its higher education size to enroll more students. is expansion has led to millions of
students geing into college. e enrollment rate went up dramatically in the early years
of expansion and soon stabilized around 80 percent. Number of colleges also went up at
the same time to meet the demand for higher education. Figure 3.2 plots the total number
of colleges in China for each year and we can see a massive increase post 1999. Provinces
had a great deal of discretion in the design and administration of their higher education
institutions, and both the quantity and quality varied widely. Figure 3.3 shows variation
in number of colleges for selected provinces over time. I take advantage of the massive
policy change to estimate how college education aected young adults migration decision.
3.4 Model
In this section, I discuss a simple choice model related to education and moving cost fol-
lowing Wozniak (2010) to illustrate the possible consequences of college expansion. Con-
sider a resident whose childhood province is j∗, the location choice problem is:
arg max
j∈J
U(wj) = arg max
j∈J
{∑
t
δ(e)t
[
E(w(e)jt)− c(e)(j,j∗)t(1|j 6= j∗)
]}−α(e)(j,j∗)(1|j 6= j∗)
(3.1)
wherewj is the wage/consumption in province j; (j, j∗) denotes origin-destination province
pair; e represents education level and t indexes time; δ is a discount factor; c is a recursive
moving cost function associated with education such as travel cost back to home province
and psychic cost of being away from home; α is a function of one-time moving cost also
depending on education such as the opportunity cost of giving up the existing job and
local amenities associated with home province hukou status.
If expected benets from living in another province exceeds the costs to moving to
that province, people will make the move from j∗ to j. It is straightforward to see the
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probability of moving is increasing in e if moving cost is decreasing in education. For
instance, if cities in away provinces relax the policies on hukou to increase college grad-
uates, then ∂α/∂e < 0. To see this, assuming the wage function is a constant for each
province over time and recurring cost is also constant and independent from education
but one-time moving cost is decreasing in education. en the probability of moving to
another province j 6= j∗ is as follows:
Pr(j 6= j∗) = Pr
[∑
t
(E(w(e)jt)− c)− α(e) >
∑
t
E(w(e)j∗t)
]
. (3.2)
As the size of higher education in China expands, e is increasing so that α(e) is less than
before, therefore the moving probability increases (Tombe and Zhu, 2019; Fan, forthcom-
ing).
is simple choice model predicts that as people become more educated, the proba-
bility of migrating to another province should increase if all else is equal, which oers an
empirical perspective to test it.
3.5 Data
3.5.1 Data Sources
e China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) is a widely used longitudinal survey conducted
by the Institute of Social Science Survey (ISSS) of Peking University. It is the most com-
prehensive panel survey data covering contemporary China. e rst wave started in
2010 which is the baseline sample. It records detailed information on household member
residence location, education aainment level and graduation year, economic conditions
such as wage, income, and non-economic outcomes including beliefs and health status.
Five provinces were selected for initial sampling and other provinces were later sampled
to ensure representativeness. Figure A1 in the appendix shows the geographical coverage
of CFPS provinces. ese 25 provinces contain 95% of the total population of China, and
closely resemble the full population of China (Xie and Hu, 2014).
I collect college data for each province, each year, from the China Yearly Statistical
Book. It records the total number of regular higher institutions for each province from
1987, including two-year colleges that oer professional undergraduate degrees, which
vary both cross provinces and over time. Figure 3.3 shows the variation of number of
colleges for selected provinces.
In order to account for local economic factors at the provincial level, I collect data
from the China Yearly Statistical Book on provincial total urban population, total number
of non-farm employment, GDP per capita, and urban wage.
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3.5.2 Key Variables
e primary interest of outcome is migration status. Measuring mobility involves dening
geographic units of origin and destination locations and the time period people must move
between origin and destination locations (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak, 2011). However,
dening migration in a Chinese context is more complicated. ere are at least three
dimensions of migration under a Chinese context: rural-urban, hukou, and general type
of moving. Existing literature focuses on the rst two types in part because of the lack of
information on survey respondent’s residence location over time. However, CFPS enable
me to examine general migration as well as the other two types due to the rich information
on residence location. I dene inter-provincial migration as the respondent is residing in
a province that is dierent from province at the age of twleve. CFPS asks very detailed
information about family member’s residence province at birth, age 3, age 12, and the time
of survey, I use province at age 12 as a proxy to measure province status before college-
going year. ough moving between age 12 and age 18 is possible and may be endogenous
to college going decisions, given hukou restriction in China, this is unlikely.
CFPS also obtains detailed information on education level, duration, and completion
(drop-out) year, and converts corresponding education level to years of schooling. I rst
calculate the starting year of each education level by using the end year subtracting du-
ration. I assume college year is the same year when high school is completed for those
people without college. For those people who do not nish high school, I assign age 18
to them, which is the year they became adults. en I am able to match the college-going
year with the number of colleges in that province to exploit the variation of access to
college on one’s college status.
3.5.3 Sample Selection
I rst restrict the age of respondents when taking the survey to be between 25 and 40 so
I focus on the lifetime migration decision of young adults. People without detailed birth
province and hukou information area not included in the sample. Individuals who took
the college entrance exam prior to 1987 are also dropped because the earliest information
of higher education at provincial level is available from year 1987, which corresponds to
the birth cohort of 1970 that was supposed to take college entrance exam in the same
year. I also drop the cohort born aer 1986, because they are supposed to take the college
entrance exam aer 2004, and will not be expected to graduate until 2009, when the survey
was conducted. Lastly, I include full-sample of both urban and rural individuals, women
and men.
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3.5.4 Summary Statistics
Tabel 3.1 reports summary statistics for major variables in terms of individual’s migration
status and college aainment. From column (1) and (2) we see that migrants are more
educated than non-migrants. e share of people ever aended college is 16% and 21.6%
respectively. e share of migrants for non-college and college individuals are in column
(3) and (4), 8.9% for people without any college experience and 12.4% for people with some
college. Females are more likely to reside in a dierent province compared to males but
slightly less likely to become a college student. Migrants are younger and have fewer
siblings, which is in part due to the one-child policy. e gap between non-college and
college people, however, is larger, which could be associated with their rural/urban status.
Marriage rate is higher for migrants and non-college people. From column (3) and (4),
urban children are also more likely to aend college as 53.1% of them had urban hukou at
age 12.
3.6 Identication Strategy
e ordinary least squares estimation of migration on education takes the specication:
Migijrt = β0 + β1Collegei +X
′
ijrtδ + ψrt + φj + uijrt. (3.3)
Migijrt is equal to one if individual i from province j region r who was born in year t
resides outside the age 12 province in 2010 and zero otherwise. is specication controls
for many personal aributes and unobserved heterogeneity at the province and regional
level. X ′ijrt is a vector of variables controlling for individual characteristics such as gen-
der, number of siblings, marriage status and rural/urban hukou status at age 12 as well as
a set of province economic variables to control for economic and labor market conditions
of people’s college-going year. e regression also controls for age 12 region-by-cohort
xed eect ψrt and age 12 province xed eect φj . e inclusion of φj accounts for any
provincial level shocks that result in unobserved heterogeneity between people from dif-
ferent provinces. Because China was implementing various reforms and large national
and regional projects such as the “China Western Development” in 1999 and the ”Rise of
Central China Plan” in 2004, region-by-cohort xed eect ψrt will absorb such hetero-
geneity, which eliminates the trend at the aggregate level.
Even though I can control for many observed aributes and unobserved xed eects,
OLS estimates may still be biased due to remaining factors in the error term. For exam-
ple, individual ability may be positively correlated with preferences for moving and also
makes the individual more likely to get into college, leading β1 to be overestimated. An
44
instrument for college needs to meet two conditions: correlated with college going deci-
sions and exogenous to later life location choices through the error term. I take advantage
of China’s higher education expansion and use the number of colleges at province level to
identify the variation in college education. I use provincial level number of colleges to in-
strument for college status following the spirit of Currie and Morei (2003). NumCollegejt
is measured by number of regular higher institutions in province j of college-going year
t. It varies both cross provinces and over time. Since college status is a binary endoge-
nous variable, I use a two-step IV method to estimate the impact of college on migration
(Wooldridge, 2010). First, I estimate the binary response model of college on the set of
covariates and number of colleges by probit:
Pr
(
Collegeijrt = 1
∣∣∣∣X ′ijrt,NumCollegejt) = Gˆ. (3.4)
Aer obtaining the ed probabilities Gˆ, I then estimate Equation 3.3 by IV using instru-
ment Gˆ, which delivers an ecient IV estimator.
I rst discuss the exclusion restriction of my identication strategy and then present
my rst-stage estimates in the results section. e exclusion restriction requires that the
number of colleges in each province has no inuence on later life migration choices except
through the channels of college aainment. My instrument could fail to meet this restric-
tion if young people aempted to exploit provincial variation in college probability by
moving between provinces. e rst violation is unlikely because of the aforementioned
hukou restriction. One can only take the college entrance exam in the hukou province,
while changing hukou status is quite dicult. In my main analysis, out-of-province mi-
gration is dened as current residence province is dierent from the province at age 12. If
some parents want to switch from a province with a small number of colleges to a province
with a large number of colleges province so that their children have beer chance of at-
tending college, it is not easy to achieve.
e second threat is the potential correlation between the size of higher education
expansion and local economic conditions that aect migration. First, the novelty of my
identication comes from variation at province-college-year level, where I assume the
number of colleges only aects college aainment at year t, not in t+k years, when indi-
viduals choose the location to live. If beer education amenities will make such locations
more desirable to live, it may aract people to stay or come back to the home province,
rather than move away. is would lead to a downward bias. To examine the possibility,
I use 1990 and 2000 China Censuses to construct migration paern at provincial level and
conduct a pre-trend test. Figure 3.4 shows there is no clear evidence showing the increase
in number of colleges select into provinces that draw more migrants.
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e third potential threat is hukou reforms. Various papers utilize hukou policy re-
forms at dierent administrative level to examine if those changes aect people’s mobility
though there is no consensus on ndings. Sun, Bai, and Xie (2011) nd lile evidence of
hukou reform on migration. Kinnan, Wang, and Wang (2018) however nd strong ev-
idence on rural-urban migration. Fan (forthcoming) use city-level data and nd strong
evidence of hukou reform on share of local hukou holders and migration rates. If number
of colleges is correlated with hukou reform, for instance, local governments could en-
dogenously relax hukou policies and build more colleges to aract more human capital,
then people from provinces with more relaxed hukou policies are also more likely to go
to college. I use data collected by Fan (forthcoming) along with number of colleges at
province-year level to test if hukou reforms are correlated with college construction. Fig-
ure 3.5 presents the evidence that there is no clear positive correlation between these two
reforms. Hukou reforms do not select into those provinces with more aggressive college
expansion. Again, if there exists any possible connection between these two reforms, it
could only result in an underestimate of college’s impact on cross-province migration.
3.7 e Impact of College Education on Cross-Province Migration in China
is section reports the main ndings by estimating Equation 3.3 via ordinary least squares
and instrumental variables. Based on the estimates, aending college leads people 9.1 per-
centage points more likely to reside in a province that is dierent from age 12 province.
e results are robust to a series of tests.
3.7.1 Main Estimates
e main results are presented in Table 3.3. Column (1) to (3) report OLS estimates for
Equation 3.3. Individuals with some college on average are 2.8 percentage points more
likely to move out of their childhood province. Males are less likely to migrate compared
to females with a coecient of -2.6 percentage points, possibly through marriage chan-
nel. Chinese females are commonly moving to their husbands’ locations, therefore we see
the dierences between gender. More siblings create a higher probability for individuals
to migrate out of their childhood place. ey can aord to leave because their siblings
could share the responsibility to co-reside with parents and provide old-age support. is
is consistent with what Ma and Wen (2016) found that the probability of co-residence is
positively associated with relative education of the children when parents can provide
help but negatively associated with education when parents need help. Married people
are more likely to live outside their age 12 provinces. Parental education aects migration
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dierentially. ere is no signicant impact of childhood urban hukou status while people
who live in urban areas are more likely to be a migrant, which is not surprising consid-
ering the one-way trac of urbanization of China. Push factors such as GDP growth
rate, employment opportunities, and wage growth rate at provincial level have quantita-
tively large but not statistically signicant impact on moving except for GDP growth rate.
However, the signs are consistent with the intuition that the more rapid local economy
is growing in the home provinces, and the more local jobs are available, the less likely
people will migrate out.
e 2SLS estimates are presented in columns (4) through (6) of Table 3.3. Table 3.2
shows corresponding probit estimates for preferred specication of column (6). e de-
pendent variable in Table 3.2 is college status with one being having aended any college.
It also controls for age 12 region-by-birth cohort xed eect and age 12 province xed ef-
fect. Individual demographic variables and college-going year provincial economic con-
ditions are also included. e control variables show that men and women are equally
likely to go to college. More siblings will lead to lower probability of college, which is
consistent with quantity and quality trade o theory (Becker and Lewis, 1973b). Parental
education and childhood urban status also aect college aendance. e F statistics are
reported in the boom of Table 3.3 and indicate the instrument has good power.4
e set of control variables in Table 3.3 have similar signs and magnitudes in both
OLS and IV regressions. e IV estimate for college is larger than OLS and is statistically
signicant at 5% level. College experience will make people up to 9.1 percentage points
more likely to migrate out of province compared to non-college people, which is a large
eect. Considering the mean migration rate is only 9 percent, college doubles the migra-
tion propensity. e explanation for such a dierence between OLS and IV is that using
college as a treatment variable, the IV recovers the local average treatment eect which a
particular group of higher returns to college is picked up. It is smaller than what Malamud
and Wozniak (2012) found in the U.S. that aendance and completion of college increase
out-of-state migration for men by 20.1 and 24.1 percentage points if using national induc-
tion risk,5 but still quite interesting to see that college education increases the probability
to migrate in China given the sheer dierences in terms of culture of moving and hukou
4Please see Andrews, Stock, and Sun (forthcoming) for a discussion of weak instrument and rst stage F
statistics. ey derive if there is only one endogenous variable, the Kleibergen-Paap robust F statistic is
equivalent to the MOP eective F statistic (Montiel Olea and Pueger, 2013).
5eir denition of migration is based on birth place where I use more ner measure to reduce the over-
estimation of college’s impact. Also, their sample only includes men who are considered to be aected
by induction risks. I use a sample of both men and women. e subsample test of gender are presented
in appendix. It actually shows a higher impact of education on female. College increases women’s out-
province migration rate by 16.2 percentage points while men are only 10.5 percentage points, though not
statistically signicant.
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restriction.
3.7.2 Robustness Checks
In this section I conduct a series of robustness checks using dierent measures of migra-
tion and subsamples of CFPS data to examine the impact of college education on cross-
province migration in China. e results support the main estimates.
First, I examine the impact of college on birth province migration. Recall that in the
main analysis, my denition of out-of-province migration is based on age 12 province.
Following Malamud and Wozniak (2012) I change the home province measure of migration
from age 12 province to birth province. Even though moving during childhood is less
frequent especially under the Chinese context, and as stated previously that it could only
lead to an underestimation of the impact, it is still interesting to see the eect of college and
whether it follows the prediction. I use the same set of variables to control for individual
background characteristics and college-going year provincial economic conditions except
for hukou. I replace the status at age 12 in the main regression with status at age 3 because
it is closer to the birth time. I also change the xed eect into birth province and birth
region-by-cohort xed eects. e result is shown in column (1) of Table 3.4. People with
college education are 9.4 percentage points more likely to migrate to a dierent province
in their mid-ages, comparing 9.1 percentage points of main results, the estimate is slightly
larger because it includes those people who have changed residence province between
birth and age 12.
What is driving the impact of college on inter-provincial migration in China? Is it
because the regional disparity that more educated people have been moving from the west
and central areas to the coastal region and more developed provinces in east China aract
more college students? Figure 3.6 shows the geography of cross-province migration in
China based on share of in-migrants to current native residents calculated from CFPS data.
As we can see from this gure, Beijing and Shanghai as the two largest municipalities are
very diversied and have been long aracting people to move in 6. Other dark regions
such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu are also east and coastal provinces. I conduct
a series of tests to see if the migration paern is shaped by these provinces and the east
region. I rst exclude people who are living in Beijing and Shanghai and the result is
shown in column (2). Ten percent of the sample are from Beijing and Shanghai, but hardly
changes the estimate compared to the main regression. It implies that even though people
are migrating to these two cities, college does not make moving into these two cities
6Chongqing became independent from Sichuan aer 1998, therefore also consists a large share of “migrants”
if people who were born in Sichuan and live in Chongqing now.
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more likely compared to other places. ere are similar movements induced by college
education taking place in the rest of China as well. I further drop people who are residing
in the east region, the coecient actually is raised to 16 percentage points, higher than
the estimate from the whole sample. e impact of college education on inter-province
migration is more pronounced in inland China. e result is in contrast to the common
perception of “peacock ies southeast”,7 which people use to describe the direction of
population ow of skilled labor in China. However, it does not contradict the phenomenon
because both unskilled and skilled labor are moving into east region. e estimates are
only reecting the relative role of education in out-of-province moving but not capturing
the aggregate population stock change.
Lastly, I limit my sample to people who at least graduated from high school. Column
(4) shows that college people are 14 percentage points more likely to migrate out compared
to people with high school education. Because I assign the college year as age 18 to those
people who do not have high school degree, this underestimates the impact of college
education by placing it on lower skilled people. erefore the college eect is higher for
marginal people.
3.8 Discussion
e empirical results evidently reveal a causal relationship between college education and
long-distance move in China and are surprisingly close to the U.S. In this section, I propose
and explore several explanations behind education and cross-province migration in China.
First, I investigate how hukou system distorts the impact of college on inter-provincial
migration. e estimates show that hukou lowers the propensity of out-of-province mi-
gration in general but has dierential impact on people with dierent education level.
en I utilize several questions in the CFPS survey to examine how beliefs on family and
social networks are aected by college education, and hence connected with migration
propensity.
3.8.1 Hukou Restriction
Rural/Urban Origins Rural-urban migration has been heavily examined in the liter-
ature and considered as a large contribution to urbanization of China (Zhang and Song,
2003; Chan, 2008; Liao et al., 2017). Since most unskilled workers come from rural areas
and make up the majority of the migration population, it draws a lot of aention where
7e Peacock Flies Southeast is the rst narrative poem in Chinese history.
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urban-urban migration has received less focus.8 However, as depicted by Figure 3.7, there
exists an increasing gap of college opportunities between rural and urban China. If col-
lege education aects mobility and access to college is easier in urban area, we should
see higher mobility among urban residents because inverse-migration (urban to rural) is
less likely and observed in data. Table 3.5 shows the estimates aer I split the sample into
two groups which include people with at least high school degree who were holding rural
and urban hukou at age 12 respectively. Strikingly, college aects long-distance move for
rural people more signicantly than urban counterparts. A rural student who receives
college education is 12.2 percentage points more likely to move out of province compared
to rural people without college experience while urban people both college educated and
not are not statistically dierent in cross-provincial movement. One potential explana-
tion for this is due to the hukou system. e opportunity cost of converting from one
urban city to another is higher than from rural to urban, since people have to give up a lot
of amenities associated with old hukou, which osets the college eect on long-distance
moving. Another possibility is that the local labor market absorbs rural people within the
same province rst. e impact from GDP growth rate speaks to such eect. It places
a strong negative eect on out-province migration for rural children, which implies that
rural children with college education are aracted to relocate to urban area within the
same province rst. When they ood in and take jobs in urban areas, it pushes the lo-
cal urban people to migrate out. An increase in urban job opportunity will lead to 9.2
percentage points higher probability of moving out for urban children when they have
college education.
HukouMigration Why are urban people more likely to receive a college education but
on average are less likely to migrate out? e suspect is that the hukou conversion cost
hinders urban people’s mobility. As discussed earlier in this paper, another commonly
used measure of migration in China is hukou migration. Moving within China has been
increasingly popular while changing hukou status is not as easy as moving between loca-
tions. If college probability is positively correlated with general migration, it should also
aect hukou migration but with smaller magnitude because such restrictions add addi-
tional moving cost. Table 3.6 follows this idea and report two estimates based on dierent
types of hukou migration.
I construct two new outcome migration variables, HKin and HKout. ey are obtained
by matching one’s current hukou location with birth hukou location. Notice this measure
does not require people staying at the current registered hukou location. One could have
8One paper Ye et al. (2016) looks into this issue with a focus on high-skilled labor migration in China.
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a registered Beijing hukou when he or she was born and never changed it, but is living
in Shanghai now. is individual in the main analysis will be dened as a migrant but
will not be treated as migrant in this case since the registered hukou location has not
changed. As long as the two hukou cities do not match with each other within a provincial
administrative boundary, this respondent then is a in-province migrant. If the current
hukou city is in a dierent province from birth city province, he or she will be labeled as
an out-birth hukou province migrant.
Column (1) only includes individuals who are staying or moving within birth hukou
provinces. I do not include people who moved hukou out of birth hukou province. HKin =
1 if respondent’s hukou is associated with a dierent city. I add back those people who
moved hukou out of their birth provinces in column (2). In this case, HKout = 1 if people
changed hukou out of birth hukou province and HKout = 0 for both people staying in the
same city and people who were moving within birth hukou province.
e coecients for college in both regressions are similar but out-province hukou
migration has a smaller estimate than the main regression of general cross-province mi-
gration. Since applying for hukou conversion usually happens aer living in a place for a
period of time and converting hukou adds extra cost, the probability impact of college on
the hukou migration is smaller. Because residing and working in a city is practically un-
constrained, we see a higher impact of college on general migration, which is more driven
by the labor market force rather than local amenities associated with hukou status. is
also implies that college students are more responsive to labor market shocks (Wozniak,
2010). College has a statistically signicant impact on out-province hukou migration com-
paring to in-province hukou migration even though the magnitudes are close. It is possible
because cities expand by absorbing the surrounding rural area rst in the early stage and
people know cities closer to their birth place within a province are beer than cities far
away to another province. It is easier for less skilled people to get a job and sele down
in a more integrated market within a short distance range. erefore we observe such a
less signicant impact of college on in-province hukou migration.
is set of results rst identies that dierent original location generates dieren-
tial impact of college on cross-province migration because the unequal access to college
education. Second it shows the distortion role of hukou on internal migration, which low-
ers the propensity of people with college experience to overcome the barrier compared
with regular moving. As discussed earlier, hukou reforms do not select into provinces
with more rapid higher education expansion and explain very lile of the variations in
number of colleges. In addition, hukou policies in the sample period do not discriminate
people based on original province. If hukou policies favor college students more, then all
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else equal people with college education could be more able to obtain hukou, therefore
they are more likely to move out of their childhood province.
3.8.2 College Expansion
Table 3.7 further shows the results aer I divide the sample into people whose college year
was before and aer the 1999 college expansion. As can be seen from the coecients for
college, those people who hold a college degree that were aected by the expansion are
not only more likely to migrate out comparing to non-college people, but at an increased
rate. is sheds light on the potential mechanism that college education provides access
to a variety of things that will open the world for people, such as people from dierent
background. I decompose the migration rate dierence between the two groups (Oaxaca,
1973; Blinder, 1973).9 Let us rewrite the migration equation as follows:
Msi = β
s
0 +
∑
k
βskX
s
ik + 
s
i , (3.5)
whereXsi is a vector of individual characteristics including college education dummy, age,
male dummy, number of siblings, marital status, parental education, age 12 urban hukou
dummy, and urban sample dummy along with age 12 province and college year dummies.
s ∈ {0, 1} represents college year before and aer the expansion. e dierence between
migration probability from years before expansion s = 0 and aer the expansion s = 1
can be wrien as
M1 −M0 =
(
βˆ10 − βˆ00
)
+
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βˆ1kX
1
k −
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βˆ1kX
0
k
)
. (3.6)
M0 and M1 are average cross-province migration rates for people whose college year
are before and aer the expansion in year 2010.
{
βˆ00 , βˆ
1
0
}
capture the estimated constant
terms.
{
X0k , X
1
k
}
are the mean values of the kth regressor, and
{
βˆ0k , βˆ
1
k
}
are the estimated
coecients for the corresponding covariates.
en Equation 3.6 can be rewrien as
M1 −M0 =
∑
k
βˆ∗k
(
X1k −X0k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Explained
+
∑
k
[(
βˆ1k − βˆ∗k
)
X1k +
(
βˆ∗k − βˆ0k
)
X0k
]
+
(
βˆ10 − βˆ00
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unexplained
,
(3.7)
where βˆ∗k are the estimates from the pooled regression using the whole sample. en
the average migration rate dierence is decomposed into two components. e rst term
9Colas and Ge (forthcoming) use two censuses from 1990 and 2005 to decompose the migration rates time
dierence. Here I decompose the cross-sectional dierence between two groups of people in year 2010.
52
on the right hand side corresponds to the part that can be explained by the dierence
in observed individual characteristics X such as more education and younger age. e
second term represents the part of change in migration rate that is caused by change in
estimates, which are considered to be “unexplained”. For instance, if college expansion on
average increases the later cohort education level and people with higher education level
are more likely to migrate, then we would expect to see contributions in the rst term.
Table 3.8 illustrates the decomposition results of change in migration probability for
people whose college year were before and aer the expansion. I also calculate the con-
tribution of changes of individual characteristics as well as changes in coecients. It is
natural to think that the two groups dier greatly in age, therefore it is the single most im-
portant factor explaining the change in migration probability. However, observed college
education accounts for 45.5 percent of migration rate dierence where the unobserved
change in coecients contributes 81.8 percent. It suggests the higher education expan-
sion does not only bring more people to college, but also change the migration behaviors.
3.8.3 Beliefs in Family Network, Social Connections, and Education
College time is one of the most critical period of one’s life in shaping individual’s view
of the world and society. It does not only aect those people who aend college, but also
pass onto next generations (Roland and Yang, 2017). If aending college makes people
more able to work and live life on their own, then they will be less reliant on family ties,
and hence are more likely to reside in dierent places than family location.
I rst look into individual’s belief of the importance of a family network on one’s suc-
cess. e CFPS survey asks adult respondents how much they agree with the following
question related to the aitude towards success, which is “the most important factor af-
fecting one’s future success is whether his/her family has connections”. Six choices are
presented, ranging from “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, to
“agree”, “strongly agree” , and “do not know”. In addition, there is also a set of questions re-
lated to whether respondent had experiences such as unfavorable policies, unjustly treated
by income, household registration type and gender, unreasonably delays and stalling, and
being charged unreasonably when going to government oces for business.
If an adult respondent believes that the family connection is the most important fac-
tor aecting success, then we should predict he or she is less likely to move away from
home location since family network mainly stays and grows locally. Regardless of where
education takes place, they expect to return to home location to take advantage of family
network so that they can achieve beer outcomes in their life. In contrast, if receiving
more education makes them compete mainly through skills and ability, then they would
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rely less on family resources and hence are less likely to agree with such a statement. All
else equal, opportunity outside family inuences will aract more college people. ere
are also two related questions asking if the respondent believes “the higher level of edu-
cation one receives, the higher the probability of his/her future success” and “in today’s
society, having social connections is more important than having individual capability”.
Combining these three questions, I can examine one potential mechanism that college
education aects migration through growing individual’s ability and shaping personal
beliefs.
I construct new variables called Aijrc, which represents the answers from respondent
i from province j, region r, and cohort c. It equals 1 if answers ”agree” or ”strongly agree”
to those aitudes questions and 0 if answers ”strongly disagree” or ”disagree”. Indierent
people are dropped for analysis.10 I test whether college education aects individual’s
belief on family network, education and social connections via the following regression:
Aijrt = X ′ijrtβ + Z
′
iδ + piCollegei + θrc + γj + uijrc. (3.8)
Xi is a set of control variables as in the main regression. Zi represents the answers to ques-
tions related to experiences. Collegei is instrumented by number of colleges and parental
education levels. θrc accounts for region-by-cohort xed eect and γj controls for age 12
province xed eect. pi delivers the impact of college education on personal beliefs.
e regression results are presented in Table 3.9. In the rst column, the coecient on
college status is negative and also statistically signicant, implying people with college
experience are less reliant on family network.11 Interestingly, the experience of delays and
stalling has the largest magnitude and statistical signicance level, which meets the intu-
ition that people who have diculties in doing business with government are more likely
to agree family network could help them succeed. Controlling for those variables, college
is still playing an important role in shaping people’s beliefs, which could aect one’s ai-
tude on migration. In column (2), where I further test people’s beliefs on education, I nd
that there is not much dierence between college and non-college people agreeing with
the statement that higher education level makes people more likely to succeed. But col-
lege people are more likely to agree that education is more likely to bring success. e last
column uses people’s aitude on social connection as dependent variable and I still nd
that people with college are more likely to disagree with social connection is more impor-
10In this case, the dummy variable Att = 1 can be interpreted as percent of respondents who agree and
Att = 0 can be interpreted as percent of respondents who disagree. I also check including indierent
people and code them into “agree” group or “disagree” group.
11e estimates for the other two ways of coding are similar. pi is -0.088 if I classify indierent people as
agree. pi is -0.149 if I classify them as disagree.
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tant than individual ability. All three regressions provide evidence that college education
has a profound inuence that shapes individual’s beliefs.
3.8.4 Placebo Tests
In this section, I perform two placebo checks to further test the validity of the identifying
variation I exploit from the college expansion and the robustness of the main results. If
the number of colleges at province-college-year level is correctly reecting the college-
going opportunities and aects the migration decision, then fake cut-o college years and
provinces should not have a causal impact on one’s migration decision later in life.
Fake College Years I forward and postpone the college year for each individual two
years respectively and match the corresponding number of colleges in the same province.
en I reestimate the main specication. e estimates are presented in the rst two
columns in Table 3.10. It is clear to see that the coecients on college are not signicant.
Fake Provinces While the number of colleges does not only vary over time for the
same province, but there also exists large cross-sectional dierences within China. If the
causal impact in the main result is correctly identied, creating fake provinces should not
have signicant impact on migration. I generate random provinces and assign them to
individuals and match college information. Column (3) shows the results. ese placebo
tests suggest my estimated impacts from college are causal.
3.9 Conclusion
Geographic mobility has been an important factor that improves individual’s welfare. Ed-
ucation is one of those factors that signicantly aects the ability of moving because
it oers skills and networks (Malamud and Wozniak, 2012). It is widely supported by
empirical evidence found in the US and Europe, less is known about developing coun-
tries like China because of less educated population and lack of data tracking people’s
location. e development in both reducing mobility restriction and expanding college
education has been a unique feature of China’s socioeconomic changes in the past three
decades. Understanding the link between college education and mobility across adminis-
trative boundaries in China is both interesting to researchers and policy makers that try
to gauge the relationship in a developing country seing.
Motivated by this question, in this paper, I use variation in number of colleges in each
province and college-going year level that is induced by the expansion of higher educa-
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tion in China to instrument for people’s college aendance status. e expansion took
place in 1999 and was implemented swily. e hope was that doubling college enroll-
ment within three years would stimulate investment in services, construction, and other
related industries and would ultimately increase consumption (Wan, 2006). However, the
increased stock of college educated people likely also aected migration paern. I use
China Family Panel Studies 2010 wave to analyze how college education impacts cross-
province migration for Chinese young adults. Unlike existing literature, I include both
rural-urban and urban-urban migration as well as hukou and non-hukou migration to see
the general eect of college. e 2SLS estimates show that aending college will increase
residing in a province that is dierent from childhood province by 9.1 percentage points.
e eect is large as it doubles the average cross-province migration rate in China but
consistent with what has been found in the U.S. literature. A series of tests show that
cross-province is not one-way trac from inland China to coastal region. Actually, the
impact of college on less developed area is more pronounced in making college educated
people move inter-provincially. However, urban hukou holders are not aected by col-
lege on moving over provincial boundaries, mainly due to the migration cost of giving
up benets associated with existing hukou status. High skilled people are more likely
to change hukou both within- and out- province but more signicant impact is found
in out-province migration. Younger people have higher mobility than older cohort, but
the college expansion likely aected a lot of unobserved factors related to education and
changed the migration paern. In order to examine the potential mechanisms behind
these changes, I test how college shapes personal beliefs on family network and educa-
tion out of hypothesis that people who rely less on family resources are more likely to
conduct long-distance move. e results indicate people who receive college education
disagree that family network is the most important factor aecting success. Instead, they
are more prone to agree more education is more important though there is no signif-
icant dierence between them and non-college people. is nding is consistent with
the story that college education increases skills and people with is paper adds to the
missing piece of linking education and internal migration of China and provides evidence
that college education makes people not only more educated, but also more mobile, in a
Chinese context.
ough the evidence shows a clear causal relationship between college education and
internal migration in China through college expansion, it remains a question to what
extent the contribution to migration comes from education itself and college location. I
leave this for further work using more detailed college location data to separate the eect
of college location from college education as a whole.
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3.10 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Non-migrant Migrant Non-college College
Migrant 0.089 0.124
(0.285) (0.330)
College 0.160 0.216
(0.366) (0.412)
Male 0.521 0.410 0.508 0.524
(0.500) (0.492) (0.500) (0.500)
Birth year 1976.9 1977.5 1976.8 1978.0
(4.670) (4.532) (4.652) (4.563)
Age 33.08 32.49 33.23 31.98
(4.667) (4.534) (4.650) (4.556)
College age 18.55 18.48 18.24 20.10
(1.727) (1.592) (0.991) (3.155)
Married 0.898 0.913 0.919 0.797
(0.303) (0.283) (0.273) (0.403)
No. siblings 2.015 1.918 2.154 1.256
(1.509) (1.524) (1.512) (1.260)
Mother years of schooling 4.104 4.998 3.555 7.353
(4.259) (4.374) (3.966) (4.383)
Father years of schooling 6.417 7.043 5.881 9.448
(4.299) (4.584) (4.154) (3.944)
Urban hukou at age 12 0.213 0.223 0.152 0.531
(0.410) (0.417) (0.359) (0.499)
Urban 0.558 0.795 0.516 0.905
(0.497) (0.404) (0.500) (0.294)
Observations 5,337 561 4,924 974
Note: is table shows summary statistics of sample from CFPS 2010 for main analysis.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3.2: Probit Result
Probit
No. colleges 0.038***
(0.006)
Male 0.065
(0.063)
No. siblings -0.079***
(0.030)
Married -0.316***
(0.105)
Mother years of schooling 0.054***
(0.008)
Father years of schooling 0.065***
(0.009)
Urban hukou at age 12 0.459***
(0.081)
Urban 0.698***
(0.085)
GDP growth rate -2.995**
(1.211)
Urban employment to population ratio 4.058**
(1.887)
Wage growth rate 3.214**
(1.431)
Observation 5,262
Note: Dependent variable is college dummy. Age 12 region by
birth cohort xed eect and age 12 province xed eect are in-
cluded for each specication. Robust standard errors are clustered
at age 12 province by cohort level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 3.3: Main Result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
College 0.044*** 0.029* 0.028* 0.056 0.089** 0.091**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045)
Male -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
No. siblings 0.009*** 0.009** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 0.029** 0.028** 0.034** 0.033**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Mother years of schooling 0.003** 0.003** 0.002 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father years of schooling 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban hukou at age 12 -0.014 -0.014 -0.023 -0.024
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Urban 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.048***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
GDP growth rate -0.270* -0.239
(0.152) (0.155)
Urban EPR -0.102 -0.179
(0.201) (0.209)
Wage growth rate 0.198 0.174
(0.174) (0.172)
Observation 5,262 5,262 5,262 5,262 5,262 5,262
F statistic 83.436 273.288 265.554
Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable of cross-province migration (mean=0.09). Age 12 region by birth
cohort xed eect and age 12 province xed eect are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at age 12
province by cohort level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.4: Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth Migration Drop Beijing and Shanghai Drop east region High school & College
College 0.094* 0.093** 0.160** 0.140*
(0.053) (0.045) (0.068) (0.074)
Male -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.031**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014)
No. siblings 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.008* 0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Married 0.025 0.034** 0.039* 0.055**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.026)
Mother years of schooling 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Father years of schooling -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban hukou at age 3 0.001
(0.018)
Urban hukou at age 12 -0.024 -0.041* -0.034*
(0.016) (0.022) (0.020)
Urban 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.080***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.020)
GDP growth rate -0.348** -0.251 -0.172 0.224
(0.166) (0.162) (0.232) (0.216)
Urban EPR 0.681* -0.211 0.115 -0.459
(0.409) (0.224) (0.515) (0.304)
Wage growth rate 0.224 0.182 0.134 -0.529*
(0.183) (0.177) (0.242) (0.282)
Observation 5,263 4,926 3,596 1,863
F statistic 277.737 262.202 200.379 46.307
Note: is table use alternative specications to examine robustness of main model. Column (1) change dependent variable to birth province migration.
Column (2) drops individuals who were born in Shanghai or Beijing. Column (3) drops people who were born in the east region, which includes not only
Beijing and Shanghai, but also other coastal provinces. Column (4) uses people with at least high school degree. Birth region by cohort xed eect and birth
province xed eect are controlled in column (1). Other three specications control for corresponding xed eects at age 12. Robust standard errors are
clustered at province by cohort level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Impact of College on Cross-Province Migration for Dierent Childhood hukou
Status
(1) (2)
Rural Urban
College 0.122** 0.044
(0.062) (0.056)
Male -0.020** -0.030**
(0.009) (0.013)
No. siblings 0.012*** -0.013
(0.003) (0.009)
Married 0.027 0.040**
(0.017) (0.018)
Mother years of schooling 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.003)
Father years of schooling -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.003)
Urban 0.046*** 0.029
(0.011) (0.038)
GDP growth rate -0.292* 0.045
(0.176) (0.332)
Urban employment to population ratio -0.394 0.092
(0.252) (0.461)
Wage growth rate 0.281* -0.115
(0.169) (0.469)
Observation 4,112 1,120
F statistic 114.614 84.082
Note: is table provides IV estimates people with at least high school
education from dierent childhood hukou status. Column (1) uses peo-
ple whose age 12 hukou was rural. Column (2) uses people whose age
12 hukou was urban. Age 12 region by cohort xed eect and age
12 province xed eect are included. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered at age 12 province by cohort level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 3.6: In- and Out-Birth Hukou Province Migration
(1) (2)
In-province Out-province
College 0.092 0.089**
(0.058) (0.040)
Male -0.026** -0.035***
(0.012) (0.007)
No. siblings -0.001 0.009***
(0.005) (0.003)
Married 0.025 0.029***
(0.019) (0.011)
Mother years of schooling 0.001 0.002**
(0.002) (0.001)
Father years of schooling -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Urban hukou at age 12 -0.063*** -0.004
(0.022) (0.016)
Urban 0.042*** 0.014*
(0.016) (0.008)
GDP growth rate -0.275 -0.104
(0.189) (0.147)
Urban employment to population ratio -0.045 0.931***
(0.245) (0.315)
Wage growth rate 0.091 0.052
(0.215) (0.171)
Observation 4,915 5,200
F statistic 240.487 274.224
Note: is table provides IV estimates for alternative measures of migration.
Column (1) uses within-birth hukou province migration (12.54% people changed
hukou across dierent cities within a province). It excludes those people whose
hukou location is outside birth hukou province. Column (2) uses out-birth hukou
province migration (5.47% people changed hukou to another province). Birth re-
gion by cohort xed eect and birth province xed eect are included. Robust
standard errors are clustered at birth province by cohort level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
62
Table 3.7: e Dierential Impact of College Education on Migration before and aer
Expansion
(1) (2)
Cohort before expansion Cohort aer expansion
College 0.084 0.186**
(0.054) (0.085)
Male -0.026*** -0.025**
(0.010) (0.012)
No. siblings 0.007** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.007)
Married 0.031* 0.038*
(0.017) (0.022)
Mother years of schooling 0.000 0.003
(0.001) (0.002)
Father years of schooling 0.001 -0.004*
(0.001) (0.002)
Urban hukou at age 12 -0.027 -0.036
(0.019) (0.026)
Urban 0.044*** 0.056***
(0.012) (0.020)
GDP growth rate -0.071 -1.175
(0.190) (0.865)
Urban employment to population ratio -0.257 -1.452**
(0.380) (0.723)
Wage growth rate 0.087 0.169
(0.193) (0.404)
Observation 3,459 1,717
F statistic 231.373 93.405
Note: is table presents IV results of college education on cross-province migration for people who
went to college before and aer 1999 the expansion of higher education. Age 12 region by cohort xed
eect and age 12 province xed eect are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at age 12
province by cohort level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Decomposition of Changes in Migration Probability
Change in
migration
probability
Contribution
to total
change (%)
Total change 1.1 100.0
Explained
College 0.50 45.5
Age 2.90 263.6
Gender 0.00 0.0
No. siblings -0.90 -81.8
Marital status -0.40 -36.4
Mother’s education 0.50 45.5
Father’s education 0.00 0.0
Urban hukou -0.00 0.0
Urban 0.30 27.3
Total explained change 2.30 209.1
Unexplained
College 0.90 81.8
Age -0.10 -9.1
Gender -0.80 -72.7
No. siblings 1.50 136.4
Marital status -1.00 -90.9
Mother’s education 1.40 127.3
Father’s education -1.80 -163.6
Urban hukou 0.40 36.4
Urban 0.80 72.7
Total Unexplained -1.20 -109.1
Note: is table shows the results of decomposition of changes
in migration probability between people whose college year
were before and aer 1999. Age 12 province and college year
xed eects are controlled and normalized so the reference
group will not aect results.
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Table 3.9: IV Results of College Education on Personal Beliefs
(1) (2) (3)
Family Network Education Social Connections
College -0.104* 0.076 -0.045
(0.059) (0.075) (0.090)
ExpPolicy 0.022 0.007 0.033
(0.022) (0.025) (0.023)
ExpRich 0.044* -0.016 0.000
(0.025) (0.017) (0.013)
ExpHukou 0.041 -0.030 0.005
(0.029) (0.030) (0.028)
ExpGender -0.036 -0.021 0.035
(0.043) (0.034) (0.023)
ExpGov -0.011 -0.029 0.015
(0.029) (0.022) (0.016)
ExpConf -0.013 -0.020 0.048*
(0.038) (0.024) (0.025)
ExpDelay 0.078*** -0.000 -0.005
(0.025) (0.021) (0.027)
ExpFees 0.012 0.041 0.057***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.021)
Observation 4,771 4,866 4,926
Note: is table shows IV results of college education on aitudes. Number of
colleges is used as instruments. Individual characteristics such as gender, mar-
ital status, number of siblings, childhood hukou status, current urban/rural lo-
cation, and income status are included but not listed. Experiences such as un-
favorable policies (ExpPolicy), mistreated by poor and rich status (ExpRich),
mistreated by hukou status (ExpHukou), mistreated by gender (ExpGender),
mistreated by government policy (ExpGov), having conict with government
(ExpConf), experiencing delays when doing business with government (Ex-
pDelay), and being charged unreasonable fees (ExpFees) are reported. Age
12 region by cohort xed eect and province at age 12 xed eect are also
controlled. Robust standard errors are clustered at age 12 province by cohort
level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.10: Placebo Tests
(1) (2) (3)
-2 Years +2 Years Fake Province
College 0.078 0.070 0.059
(0.050) (0.046) (0.040)
Male -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.023**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
No. siblings 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 0.032** 0.031** 0.029**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Mother years of schooling 0.002** 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father years of schooling -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban hukou at age 12 -0.023 -0.020 -0.018
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Urban 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.055***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
GDP growth rate -0.192 -0.254 0.014
(0.153) (0.156) (0.117)
Urban employment to population ratio 0.208 -0.026 -0.605**
(0.222) (0.174) (0.279)
Wage growth rate 0.144 0.176 -0.002
(0.174) (0.175) (0.122)
Observation 4,922 5,262 5,176
Note: is table shows results of placebo tests. In column (1), I move college year two years
forward and in column (2) I move college year two years aer. Column (3) randomly assign
college province to each individual. Other control variables are the same as in Table 3.3.
Robust standard errors are clustered at age 12 province by cohort level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
66
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Figure 3.1: China’s Migration Population, 1982-2017
Notes: is gure plots China’s migration population from 1982 to 2017. Data is from 2018 China Migration
Population Development Report.
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Figure 3.2: Number of Colleges
Notes: is gure plots number of regular higher institutions in China. Data is compiled from China Yearly
Statistical Book.
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Figure 3.3: Variation in Number of Colleges
Notes: is gure presents number of colleges for selected provinces over time. Source: China Yearly Sta-
tistical Book.
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Figure 3.4: Pre-Trend Test of Migration Rate Change and Number of Colleges Change
Notes: is gure presents the evidence that change in number of colleges at province level is not targeting
migration paern. Net migration rate is calculated by using in-migration rate subtracting out-migration
rate. Out migration is dened as people who lives in a dierent province ve years ago and based on origin
provinces. In-migration is similar calculated but based on current residence province. Data is obtained from
censuses 1990 and 2000. Change in number of colleges is calculated as the dierence between 2004 and 1999.
Sichuan and Chongqing are dropped out because of changing provincial boundary. Hainan is also dropped
out because of no data. e ed line has a slope of -19.63 with p-value 0.702.
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Figure 3.5: Number of Colleges and Hukou Reform
Notes: is gure shows scaer plot of number of colleges and hukou reform for province-year pairs be-
tween 1987 and 2004. Each dot represent a pair of number of colleges and hukou reform index. Reform
index is the mean of city reform index in a province, which is compiled by Fan (forthcoming). I rst run
separate regressions of the two variables on a set of province and year xed eects and obtain the residuals.
en I plot the residuals of the two variables against each other. e ed line has a slope of -0.034 with
standard error 0.41. e p-value is 0.934 and R2 is 0.
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Figure 3.6: e Geography of Cross-Province Migration
Notes: is gure shows the map of cross-province migration in China based on author’s calculation of
CFPS sample data. Sample consists people of age 25 to 40. e share is calculated as number of people
who are residing in the province that is dierent from age 12 province, which is the same as the share of
in-migrants for each province.
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Figure 3.7: Share of College People by Rural/Urban hukou at Age 12
Notes: is gure shows the share of rural and urban college people in 2010 by their urban hukou status at
age 12.
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Chapter 4 How Do School District Boundary Changes and New School Proposals
Aect Housing Prices
4.1 Introduction
ere were 89,528 public elementary and secondary schools operating in the United States
during the 2014-2015 school year. Among those schools, 126 changed agency or boundary
and 390 were expected to open within 2 years1. e opening and closure of schools not
only aects students and parents, but also the home values in the school district (catch-
ment area for individual schools) as many households purchase a home to gain access to
beer schools for their children. A survey of recent home buyers found that y-three
percent of households with children under the age of eighteen said that the quality of
the school district as important in their housing decisions and y percent cited con-
venience to schools as important.2 According to a local news report, redistricting Hen-
rico County, Virginia in 2017 drew criticism from some elementary school parents in the
county, “[s]ome parents explained that they moved into a house thinking their kid would
go to a certain middle school”.3 is underscores the importance in understanding how
people make housing choices and how they value a change in aendance boundaries.
In contrast to the traditional approach of identifying the impacts of schools and school
quality on property values through cross-sectional variation in quality among schools or
through boundary-xed eects (Black, 1999), I take advantage of recent high school re-
districting in Fayee County, Kentucky using a dierence-in-dierences approach. e
identication of the value of schools is unique: I am able to measure how housing prices
change when a neighborhood is redistricted from one school to another. I am also able to
identify how adding a new school to the system changes prices for houses redistricted to
the new school. Because during the period of my sample the new school is only proposed
and not yet open, I am capturing the expected valuation of a future school. As I discuss
in Section 4.2, I believe using the dierence-in-dierences approach provides distinct ad-
vantages over earlier approaches. Further, as I have comprehensive data on (mean) ACT
scores for the public high schools in Fayee County, I also contribute to the voluminous
1U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD),
“Public Elementary/ Secondary School Universe Survey”, 2014-15, Provisional Version 1a and “Local Edu-
cation Agency Universe Survey” 2014-15, Version 1a.
2National Association of Realtors, “2018 Prole of Home Buyers and Sellers,”
hps://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/les/documents/2018%20HBS%20Highlights.pdf
3hp://wtvr.com/2017/06/22/henrico-school-board-votes-for-option-e-middle-school-redistricting-plan/
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literature on the capitalization of school quality measures.
e Lexington-Fayee Board of Education approved a new boundary plan on June 3,
2015 for the ve high school catchment areas in Fayee County.4 At this time, a new high
school, Frederick Douglass, was also proposed (opened in August 2017). e catchment
zone for Douglass is between those of the Bryan Station High School and Henry Clay High
School catchment zones prior to its opening in Fall 2017 (see Figure 4.2). ese changes
in boundaries are the basis of the natural experiment we exploit to examine the eects of
school quality on housing prices.
I implement a dierence-in-dierences (DD) approach to investigate the multiple and
distinct eects of redistricting on house values in dierent school catchment areas. Im-
plementing the DD approach using boundary changes for several high schools in Fayee
county allows me to investigate the impacts of boundary changes on property values in
the dierent catchment areas – essentially allowing for less parameterized estimation.
e results show that redistricting proposed in 2015 increases housing values by 2.4 per-
cent on average for those houses redistricted to another high school. When examining
changes in property values by pairs of schools I nd that only houses redistricted from the
lowest-performing school (Bryan Station) to other existing schools gained value signi-
cantly. However, houses redistricted from existing high schools to the proposed school all
had signicant increases in value. Moreover, for most of the current higher-performing
schools, values of redistricted houses did not suer a signicant negative impact due to
the redistricting. My analysis also implies that test score changes contribute to changes
in housing values – a one point increases in ACT score increases (mean) housing values
by 0.6 percent aer the boundary change.
I use the ndings in conjunction with a simple open-city model developed in Section
4.3 to provide some insights on the impacts of redistricting on aggregate welfare sub-
ject to several important caveats. Based on my estimation of the eects of the proposed
new school I estimate that aggregate property in Fayee county increases by 108 million
dollars.
In Section 4.2 I provide a brief review of the literature on the relationship between
education and property values. As mentioned, Section 4.3 presents a simple open city
model to motivate my examination of how these boundary changes and the opening of
a new school aect aggregate benets in the city. Background on the process for deter-
mining school boundaries is discussed in Section 4.4 while Section 4.5 provides the basic
methodology and discusses the data used in empirical analysis. Section 4.6 presents the
4e ve operating high schools in Fayee County prior to August 2017 are Bryan Station, Paul L Dunbar,
Henry Clay Lafayee, and Tates Creek as can be seen in Figure 4.1
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results of estimation and Section 4.7 provides an extensions that addresses the possibility
of learning in the model and provides a placebo test. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
Economists have long been interested in estimating the relationship between housing
prices and school quality. Early work done by Oates (1969) and Kain and igley (1970)
inspired a burgeoning literature examining the impact of school quality on property val-
ues. A critical problem associated with evaluating the casual link between housing price
and school quality is controlling for neighborhood characteristics. As “good” schools are
oen correlated with other neighborhood amenities, it is dicult to isolate the eect of
school quality from the eects of these amenities through ordinary least squares regres-
sions. If increased housing prices increase property tax revenues, a greater willingness to
pay for school quality in a district will lead to increased school spending making school
quality endogenous to the district (Nechyba, 2003; Epple and Romano, 2003). Bogart and
Cromwell (1997) use an Oaxaca-decomposition to examine houses across school districts
where jurisdiction districts are overlapped and isolate the common public service eect
from observable component and unobservable component. Weimer and Wolko (2001)
also follow the same spirit nding signicant impact of test scores on housing values.
Black (1999) is the rst paper to apply boundary xed eect to the estimation of he-
donic models. She uses elementary school data in Massachuses and compares houses
within similar neighborhoods but across school aendance boundaries. e cross-sectional
regression results show 2.5 percent increase of house prices for a ve percent increase in
test scores. Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2013) use British data and boundary discontinu-
ities to examine the response of housing prices to school-mean test scores and also initial
characteristics of students and nd equal eects.
Various papers also implement dierent methods together to examine the relationship
between school quality and property values. Downes and Zabel (2002) adopt a standard
log-linear regression, a rst-dierence model, and a value-added model to examine the
impact of school characteristics on housing prices. ey nd that individuals are willing
to pay more for a house close to a school with higher standardized test scores.5 Gibbons
and Machin (2003) use semi-parametric regression, discontinuities at school boundaries,
as well as instrumental variable approach. In Gibbons and Machin (2006), they look into
the relationship between school popularity and housing prices using instrumental vari-
able and boundary xed eect. Because of institutional factors in the United Kingdom,
5ey point out that district-level measures of school aributes will create biases in the estimated eects of
school characteristics comparing to school-level measures.
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distance to schools plays an important role in determining school choice. ey nd a
one standard deviation increase in school quality increase sales prices by 3.8 percent but
this premium diers with distance to school. Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2008) uses a panel
of school districts in Connecticut to examine the eect of school district test scores and
demographic composition on housing prices aer controlling for the inuence of unob-
served neighborhood aributes with xed eects. ey nd a one standard deviation
increase in test scores leads to 1.3 percent increase in property values. ey also nd that
a 10 percentage point increase in the percent of African-Americans and Hispanic leads to
a 3.5 percent and 3 percent decline in property values respectively while in their another
earlier work where they nd demographic changes do not aect across-town dierences
in housing prices (Clapp and Ross, 2004). Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) utilizes
discontinuities in voting on education spending to see the impact of school facility invest-
ment on housing markets and nd $1 increase in spending increase housing prices by $1.5
and eect from test scores is small.
While the boundary xed eect approach has distinct advantages, recent studies have
identied several concerns with this approach. One issue that aects the interpretation
of the estimates is that with growing school districts, school boundaries are uncertain
and subject to change. In this case, risk reduces the extent of capitalization (Cheshire and
Sheppard, 2004). In contrast, while the boundary xed eect literature is based on the as-
sumption that houses near school boundaries are in the “same” neighborhood and exhibit
the same characteristics, along long-lasting boundaries sorting based on school quality is
likely to occur. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) provides strong evidence for clear
dierences in demographics (parents’ college education, percentage black, income) along
school catchment boundaries in the San Francisco MSA. Using boundary xed eects with
neighborhood demographic controls, Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) nds that the
impact of school quality on property values is reduced by almost y percent relative
to estimates with the boundary xed eects alone. Kane, Riegg, and Staiger (2006) uses
boundary xed eect and regression discontinuity methods with data from Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina between 1994 and 2001 to study the impact of various school
characteristics on housing prices. ey test whether observed housing and neighborhood
characteristics shi discontinuously at the school boundaries and nd pronounced cor-
relation between dierences in school test scores and dierences in housing and neigh-
borhood characteristics, which shows the importance to control for these dierences. An
alternative approach to addressing these concerns with boundary xed eects is to control
for demographic dierences that may arise from sorting and employ panel data (repeated
cross-sections) along boundaries (Dhar and Ross, 2012; Dachis, Duranton, and Turner,
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2012).
In addition to the widely-used boundary xed eect model pioneered by Black (1999)
and its modications discussed above, the literature has also been moving to using quasi-
experimental approaches. A number of studies adopt exogenous changes to identify
the eect of school quality on housing prices. Bogart and Cromwell (2000) employs
a dierence-in-dierence framework to examine the impact of redistricting schools on
house values in Shaker Heights, Ohio where school closing in 1984 and 1987 resulted in
dramatic shis in boundaries. ey nd the impact of losing a neighborhood school on
home values reduces house values by 9.9 percent ($5,738 at the mean house value). How-
ever, as all schools in Shaker Heights are considered to be of high quality, they are not
able to exploit variations in quality of schools. Ries and Somerville (2010) uses repeated
sales in Vancouver and exploit a redistricting process that redraws catchment areas to
study the impact of school quality on housing values. ey nd the only signicant ef-
fects of this redistricting occur for top-quartile residences. Machin and Salvanes (2016)
uses Norwegian data to examine whether access to school choice aect housing prices.
ey utilize the policy change of removing catchment areas and nd housing valuation
sensitivity is reduced, which proves parents value beer performing schools. Bonilla-
Mejı´a, Lopez, and Mcmillen (2018) takes the reform of school loery in Chicago to study
the capitalization eect and nd signicant impact of higher admission probability associ-
ated with close proximity on housing prices. Collins and Kaplan (2017) utilizes exogenous
boundary changes in Shelby County, Tennessee to estimate the eects of school quality
and district aributes on housing prices. ey use repeated sales data and control for
original school district xed eects in a dierence-in-dierences framework. eir result
shows that within the original school zone, areas zoned to higher-quality schools did not
experience increases in price, relative to areas redistricted to lower quality schools. A one
standard deviation increase in test scores increases housing prices by 3.2 percent and the
municipal district eect is 5.5 percent.
My approach most closely follows that of Bogart and Cromwell (2000), Ries and Somerville
(2010) and Collins and Kaplan (2017) by taking advantage of a natural experiment – exoge-
nous changes in school boundaries – with dierence-in-dierence estimation. In this way
we avoid concerns about sorting along school boundaries (Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan,
2007; Kane, Riegg, and Staiger, 2006). is paper diers from other studies as I am not
capturing the actual impact of school quality change associated with such redistricting
on house values but rather the impact of the expected quality change. Second, I split the
whole redistricting process further into a pre-approval period and a post-approval period
to see how people update their beliefs about where the redistricting will take place and its
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impact on house prices, contributing to a related literature on information and learning
in hedonic evaluations (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004; Ma, 2019).
4.3 e Impacts of Rezoning School Boundaries on Property Values
As discussed in Section 4.2, there have been a few studies that consider how changes in dis-
trict lines or catchment areas aect property values (Bogart and Cromwell, 2000; Collins
and Kaplan, 2017; Ries and Somerville, 2010). e primary objective of these studies has
been to identify the capitalization of dierent educational aributes and characteristics
into property values. While I, too, use changes in district lines to examine the capital-
ization of test scores, I am also interested in examining how changes in catchment areas
aect social welfare.
e objective is not to provide neither a technical nor rigorous modeling of hous-
ing market equilibrium but rather to provide some intuition to be able to make some
statements about the welfare impacts of school boundary changes based on my empirical
analysis. Essentially what I argue is that the gross property value can be considered a
measure of the willingness of a household to pay for the amenities of a house including
educational quality in the catchment area. en the aggregate social benets for a given
set of school boundaries is simply the sum of the gross residential property values in the
city given those boundaries. en, as I more formally outline below, changes in aggre-
gate residential property values due to changes in school boundaries are a measure of
changes in aggregate social benets and whether the school boundary change is poten-
tially Pareto-improving or not following the Kaldor-Hicks improvement criteria (Hicks,
1939; Kaldor, 1939). With this goal in mind, I outline a simple model of equilibrium in the
housing markets and the impacts of school boundary changes.
4.3.1 An Open City Model
Consider a simple static model of an open city (school district) consisting of J catchment
areas. Each catchment area provides public education with ej being the quality of ed-
ucation in area j. ere are N households residing in the city with each household i
consuming a private good, (xi), housing (hi), and the educational quality, (ej), within the
catchment area in which they reside. Households are assumed to be mobile between the
J catchment areas as well as between this city and other cities. To reect zoning restric-
tions and the existing housing stock, I assume that there are K distinct, discrete levels of
housing with h1 < h2 < . . . < hk with area j having skj units of housing quality hk. en
the rental value of a unit of quality hk is P kj = P
(
hk, ej
)
. en let utility for household
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be given
U
(
wi − P (hk, ej) (1 + τ) , hk, ej) (4.1)
Educational quality within catchment area j is assumed to be a function of per-student
expenditures (bj) and a factor specic to the area (Ij) that might include, among other
factors, the demographics of the area, and the enrollments, that is, ej = e (bj, Ij, Nj).
While for this analysis I assume that per-student expenditures across the city are the same
and invariant
(
bj = b, ∀ j J
)
, educational quality is assumed to increase in the district-
specic factor, ∂ej
∂Ij
> 0, and be non-increasing in enrollment, ∂ej
∂Nj
≤ 0. To close the model
I assume the existence of absentee landowners who receive the rents, that is, who own
the properties. Of course, in reality, my data is primarily composed of residents who are
both owners and occupiers of the property. is does not cause any signicant concerns
for the results I present here.
Equilibrium Conditions
Inter-city mobility requires that, in equilibrium, all households receive at least the level
of utility they could receive elsewhere that I denote by U i and therefore has no incentive
to move. en if household i chooses to reside in a house of quality hkj in area j it follows
that
U i
(
wi − P kj , hkj (1 + τ) , ej
) ≥ U i. (4.2)
and for a house of quality k in area j of the city, hkj , can be considered the maximum “bid”
for that house. en leing
{
P˜ kj
}
denote the set of all bids for a house of quality k in
area j it follows that
P kj = max
{
P˜ kj
}
(4.3)
en dene the aggregate city property value for educational expenditures bo and school
catchment areas denoted by Jo as
PA (bo, Jo) ≡
∑
j∈Jo
K∑
k=1
P kj (4.4)
Net Social Benet and Catchment Boundary Changes
Given this description of equilibrium, I can now say something about the changes in edu-
cational policy, specically, the impacts of changes in the school boundaries on property
values and welfare.
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Proposition 2. Assume that (4.2) holds with equality. en let (bo, Jo) represent the (cur-
rent) level of spending and school catchment boundaries and
(
bo, J
′) with associated aggre-
gate property value of PA (bo, Jo) and PA
(
bo, J
′) respectively. en if:
1) PA (bo, Jo) > PA
(
bo, J
′) the change in catchment area boundaries reduces aggregate
property values and therefore decreases aggregate welfare;
2) PA (bo, Jo) < PA
(
bo, J
′), the change in catchment area boundaries increases aggre-
gate property values and therefore increases aggregate welfare;
3) PA (bo, Jo) = PA
(
bo, J
′), the change in catchment area boundaries has no impact
on aggregate property values and therefore no impact on aggregate welfare.
Proposition (2) is simply an application of the well-known property of “Tiebout” equi-
libria, that property value maximization with respect to a public service implies that the
public service is eciently provided (Sonstelie and Portney, 1978). As utility of residents
is assumed equal to their next best alternative, the only changes in welfare are associated
with changes in property value and the additional income for the owners, be they resi-
dents of the city or not. en it follows that a change in catchment is welfare increasing
(decreasing) if it increases (decreases) aggregate property value.
Of course, as I explore in the empirical analysis, that aggregate property value in-
creases or decreases does not mean that there are uniform increases within the city. With
redistricting I expect that houses redistricted into districts with higher educational quality
should increase in value while those redistricted into districts with lower quality should
decrease in value.
I further note that the assumption that the change in property values in the areas
switched to another catchment area captures the benets of redistricting relies on the
assumption that educational quality in other areas is unaected. Of course, opening a
new school may reduce crowding in existing schools increasing property values in those
areas or, if the new school takes the best teachers away from existing schools educational
quality might be reduced in the remainder of the school district. In either case, the change
in property values in those areas that have switched schools would represent a relative
increase (decrease) in property values and benets, not an absolute increase (decrease). Of
course, it follows, then, that if redistricting aects welfare in areas that are not redistricted,
Proposition 2 will not strictly hold.
4.4 Background of Redistricting in Fayette County
According to Fayee County Public Schools (FCPS) statistics, there has been an average
increase in enrollment of 600 to 750 students a year in the school district for the past ten
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years. To accommodate this growth, a redistricting process began in 2013 in anticipation
of a new high school in 2017. e year-long work of drawing new school boundaries
began in spring 2014 with a commiee of parents, teachers, Fayee County Public School
administrators, two school board members, a district Equity Council representative, a
city planning ocial, a home builder and other community stakeholders. e commiee
met three times to review some initial demographic information and community growth
trends. In April 14, 2015, the commiee presented a plan to the Fayee County Board
of Education with a summary of its dra proposals. e school board then met with
the redistricting commiee on April 21st for a joint work session. At their June 3, 2015
meeting, e Fayee County Board of Education approved the redistricting plan.
Figure 4.1 shows the map of the original school catchment areas and Figure 4.2 shows
the proposed plan. e locations of each high school is labeled on the map. Under the new
plan, Bryan Station still covers a large proportion of Fayee County but the southeast part
was redistricted to the proposed school. ere are not large geographical changes in the
other four school catchment areas. e overlapped map in Figure 4.3 indicates how the
boundaries change. e dashed line represents the old school district boundaries and red
solid line represents changes in school district boundaries from the redistricting. Based
on these changes, I am able to determine the school catchment area for each house sold
before and aer the redistricting process.
Housing sales data from Fayee County Property Valuation Oce (PVA) comes with
an address for each sale record. Using ArcGIS I match each sale with a high school catch-
ment area.6 As mentioned, the data from 2003 to August 2017 are prior to the implemen-
tation of the new school district plan. For my purposes, all the sales prior to June 3, 2015,
the approval date for the redistricting proposal, are in the “old” catchment area – the ac-
tual school catchment areas for all sales. Based on the redistricted map and location of
each house, I dene the “new” school catchment area, reecting the proposed boundary
changes, which is relevant for all sales aer June 3, 2015. Table 4.1 shows sales transac-
tions categorized into old and new school catchment areas. Of the 13,823 houses sold in
the Bryan Station area during the years of study, 7,153 sales are within both old and new
Bryan Station area while 1,079 sales occurred in the area to be redistricted to the Paul L.
Dunbar High School and 5,591 sales were in the area to be in the proposed school (Fred-
erick Douglass) catchment area. e second largest change was in the Henry Clay High
School catchment area where 7,268 of the 10,920 sales were located in the Henry Clay area,
1,290 of the sales were in the Tates Creek catchment area and 2,342 transactions were in
6e geographic coordinates for all Fayee county addresses are available from the Lexington Fayee Urban
County Government.
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the catchment area of the proposed high school. Lafayee High School catchment area
was subject to redistricting to both the Henry Clay and proposed high school catchment
areas, but with only a few sales in the laer.
4.5 Empirical Strategy and Data
A conventional way of modeling the marginal willingness to pay of school quality is he-
donic estimation. It uses the following reduced-form regression:
lnPij = X
′
iβ + Z
′
iδ + Sj · γ + uij, (4.5)
where Pij is sale price of a house i in school catchment area j, Xi is a vector of housing
aributes and Zi represents locational characteristics. Sj is a measure of school quality,
usually observed by test scores and γ delivers the marginal willingness to pay for a unit
increase in school quality. uij is the error term which is assumed to be independent from
school quality. However it suers omied variable bias if there is unobserved eect in
u such as neighborhood characteristics that cannot be measured or if sorting behavior
exists where people choose a school with added-value not derived from quality (Black,
1999; Gibbons, Machin, and Silva, 2013).
As discussed in Section 4.2 one approach used to address these unobserved neigh-
borhood eects is to estimate a boundary xed eects model only using a narrow band
of properties along the school boundaries (Black, 1999). While numerous studies since
Black (1999) have used the boundary xed eect approach, the approach I follow is a
dierence-in-dierences estimator employing a change in school boundaries as the ex-
ogenous treatment.
4.5.1 Dierence-in-Dierences
I exploit a natural experiment arising from school boundary changes to examine the cap-
italization of school quality7. In essence, I am looking at the same house before and aer
the announcement of redistrictings though I am not using repeated sales as in Ries and
Somerville (2010) but pooled cross-sections. My identication comes from variation in
expected school quality. As school quality of the existing high schools, at least as mea-
sured by ACT scores and funding, has not signicantly changed during the time of my
study, I am able to capture how redistricting aects housing prices through expectations
7Black and Machin (2011) and Machin (2011) provide a summary of major empirical approaches that deal
with those issues, including regression discontinuity, instrumental variables, and dierence-in-dierences
methods.
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on future school quality through announced, but not yet implemented, boundary changes.
My focus is on estimating the impact of expected school quality on capitalization by ex-
ploiting boundary changes that include creating a catchment area for a proposed school,
has not been addressed in the literature focused on using contemporaneous test scores (or
moving averages) to determine the extent that school quality is capitalized into housing
prices.
e treatment group comprises all “catchment-switching” houses – houses that were
sold in a (high school) catchment area that is dierent from the future, redistricted catch-
ment area. In contrast, the control group is “non-switching” houses, housing sales with
no change in future catchment area as a result of redistricting.
Formally, let Treatij be a dummy variable indicating the treatment status of house i in
school catchment area j that equals one if a house will be in a new catchment area aer
redistricting is implemented – these are the “switchers”. In Table 4.1, the control group are
the diagonal representing those non-switching house sales. I also dene a binary variable
Postit that equals one if a house i sold in year twas aer the approval of redistricting plan
and equals zero if sold before. Using a dierence-in-dierences (DD) approach I estimate
the impact of changing school catchment area boundaries on housing prices. en leing
lnPijt denote the log of sale price of house i in catchment area j at time t, I estimate
lnPijt = X
′
ijtβ + Z
′
ijtδ + φ · Treati + ψ · Postit + θ · Treati · Postit + uijt. (4.6)
where θ represents the eect of switching catchment areas on housing prices and should
be interpreted as the eect of all aspects of how schools aecting property values and
underlying preferences. Specically, I have not included any separate measures of edu-
cational quality in (4.6) but in Section (4.6.2) I consider how the redistricting aects the
impact of current test scores on housing prices. en comparing expected pre- and post-
treament housing prices for houses in the control group I have
E[lnP 0ij1|Treati = 0]− E[lnP 0ij0|Treati = 0] (4.7)
= (X ′ij1 −X ′ij0) · β + (Z ′ij1 − Z ′ij0) · δ + ψ.
Analogously, the expected change in sale price for treatment group before and aer the
approval of redistricting is:
E[lnP 1ij1|Treatij = 1]− E[lnP 1ij0|Treatij = 1] (4.8)
= (X ′ij1 −X ′ij0) · β + (Z ′ij1 − Z ′ij0) · δ + ψ + θ.
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e dierence of the two groups then is:(
E[lnP 1ij1|Treati = 1]− E[lnP 1ij0|Treati = 1]
)
(4.9)
− (E[lnP 0ij1|Treati = 0]− E[lnP 0ij0|Treati = 0])
= θ.
en by double-dierencing the treatment and control group average eect, I obtain the
price eect of redistricting on houses for a specic school catchment area j,
∆ lnPj = θ. (4.10)
e key identifying assumption of dierence-in-dierences model is common trends.
It implies that in the absence of the redistricting approval, the potential log prices of
houses in the treated group would have followed the same trend as log prices in the control
group. Under this assumption θ will identify the average treatment eect on the treated.
Figure 4.6 provides evidence to support the assumption. To construct this gure, I rst
pool all transactions over the years to run a regression of log price on a set of covariates,
controlling for house characteristics, distance to urban boundary, city center, and nearest
park, and also current school catchment area xed eect. en I predict the residuals for
each sale and collapse them at quarterly level. Next I plot the residuals against time using
local polynomial regressions (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). Houses that are located in catchment
area that is going to be redistricted follows a similar trend comparing to houses that are
staying in the same catchment area. Nevertheless, housing prices in treatment group seem
to be lower, while aer the second quarter of 2015, it overtakes control group.
4.5.2 Data and Summary Statistics
Housing Data
My housing price data comes from the Fayee County Property Valuation Administrator
(PVA).8 It includes general characteristics of all parcels matched to a sales data set. e
sales data set records all transactions from January 2003 to August 2017. For each house,
I have its physical characteristics including the number of bathrooms, square footage,
replaces, and exterior nish along with its transaction history (e.g. sale date, price, and
sale type). I choose the arm’s length transactions of single-family residential houses and
drop the top and boom one percent of observations based on prices to eliminate the
impact from extreme values. Column (1) - (5) of Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics
8See hps://fayeepva.com for more on the Fayee County PVA.
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of all houses in each school catchment area that were sold during this time period. e
Henry Clay and Paul L. Dunbar catchment areas have the most expensive homes but these
homes also tend to be larger, have more bathrooms and are more likely to have brick
nishes. In contrast, Bryan Station has both the least expensive and smallest houses. It is
worth noting that houses sold in Bryan Station are average a distance of 3.3 miles from the
high school, almost double the distance for homes in the Tates Creek and Paul L. Dunbar
catchment areas. In Figure 4.4 I plot the median price of sales for each school catchment
area between 2003 and 2017.
In columns (6) and (7) of Table (4.2) I divide sales into treatment and control groups.
Doing so, I do not see a large dierence in terms of sales price, square footage, stories
and, bathrooms. Not surprisingly, the most signicant dierence in the distance measures
between the two groups is distance to school. While house age, number of full bathroom,
exterior nish (brick) are dierent, it does not suggest that redistricting was inuenced
by the characteristics of the housing stock. While there may be potential cross-school
dierences for treatment and control houses, there is no evidence of dierences in housing
characteristics between non-switching houses and switching houses within the same old
catchment areas, that is, a house being redistricted from current catchment area to another
catchment area is exogenous to its characteristics.
Schoolality
While it is not necessary to have school test scores data to quantify school quality premi-
ums with the empirical strategy, I follow the literature and obtain data on the mean ACT
test score in each of the high schools between 2003 and 2017.9 Dills (2004) nds evidence
that housing values do in fact respond to ACT scores. Figure 4.5 presents the annual av-
erage ACT composite scores for each school by year. It is clear that Bryan Station has
signicantly lower scores than the other high schools in all tested subjects. e other
four schools have relatively similar scores except for 2009 and 2011 where I see a spike at
Paul L. Dunbar High School. Similar to dierences in ACT scores across the high schools,
Figure 4.4 shows consistency in dierences in housing price across the school catchment
areas. Comparing with the trends in house price dierences between the catchment areas
and the ACT scores (Figure 4.5), the housing price dierential between the Henry Clay and
Paul L. Dunbar, relative to the gap in test scores, has been widening. In contrast, though
Lafayee and Tates Creek performed dierently in test scores, their housing prices moved
together.
9ACT test scores are available from the Kentucky Education Department, see
hps://education.ky.gov/AA/Acct/Pages/Prociency.aspx.
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One concern with using ACT scores to measure school quality is the possibility of
selection bias – the students taking the exam might not be a representative sample of all
students in the school. As of 2007-2008 school year all Kentucky juniors are required to
take the ACT, dramatically reducing concerns about selection bias. Based on the school
report cards we obtained, the percentage of students tested does not vary much across
schools or years with more than 98 percent of high school students in Fayee county
taking the ACT during the sample period.
4.6 Results
Here I discuss the results of estimating (4.6) as well as extensions of it. I rst show that
without controlling for school test scores, the unconditional catchment-switching eect
is, on average, increasing sale prices for homes scheduled to change high schools in 2017.
en I follow Black (1999) using common school boundaries to eliminate unobserved
neighborhood eects and nd that the redistricting announcement disrupt the relation-
ship between current school quality, as measured by current ACT scores, and housing
prices. I further include test scores in the dierence-in-dierences specication to see
whether actual school quality has eect on housing prices aer redistricting. While cur-
rent ACT scores had signicant eect on housing price prior to the redistricting announce-
ment, aer the announcement the eect was dramatically aenuated and insignicant.
Next I examine how the impact of the redistricting may dier for dierent school pairs
and nd a non-negative eect on sales prices of the “switching” houses in each of these
school pairs. To beer assess the distribution of the benet of these boundaries changes, I
conduct a triple-dierences (DDD) estimation to see what type of houses gain most from
this redistricting. Results show that larger houses benet more from being redistricted.
Finally, I test to determine whether the capitalization of redistricting varies with the cer-
tainty of the plan.
4.6.1 Unconditional Switching Eect
Table 4.3 provides the pooled OLS regression results under several alternative specica-
tions. Column (1) includes house characteristics, distance measures, and policy variables.
Column (2) - (6) add dierent controls for school catchment area, census tract, year, and
census tract by year xed eects. e coecients for the house characteristics have ex-
pected signs and are signicant in all specications. In my preferred specication (column
(6)), square footage positively aects housing value, house age aects the price quadrat-
ically, an additional full bathroom increases the price by thirteen percent while an addi-
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tional half bathroom leads to a 7.2 percent increase, and all brick and part brick houses
cost 9.2 percent and 4.3 percent higher than other houses. However, distance measures
are not a signicant determinant of sale price when I control for location and time.
e coecient on Treat variable is not signicantly dierent from zero in all speci-
cations implying that, on average, houses in areas proposed to switch high school catch-
ment areas are not systematically higher in value than houses that remain in the same
catchment area. e coecient on Post of 1.8 (percent) indicates appreciation for both
switching and non-switching houses. Estimates of the coecient on the interaction term
Treat · Post suggest that houses redistricted to a dierent school catchment area increase
2.4 percent in price on average. When considering these results, keep in mind that the
coecient estimates from the pooled regressions are the eect of redistricting in all ve
school catchment areas with the coecient on Treat · Post aggregating the switching ef-
fects between dierent school catchment areas. is aggregation or, averaging, of the
impacts of boundary changes is likely to mask the dierential eects of individual bound-
ary changes, some of that may be positive and some that may be negative. In Section 4.6.3,
I examine the dierential impact of the redistricting process on each school area.
4.6.2 Test Scores Eect
One explanation for the impact of redistricting on property values found from estimating
(4.6) is the change in expected school quality for those houses scheduled to be redistricted.
e results in Table 4.3 show the unconditional eect, which controls for the original
school catchment area xed eect without including test scores. To beer understand the
impacts of redistricting on property values, I next estimate the relationship between test
scores (ACT) and property values. e particular interest is on how the impact of test
scores on property values may change aer the announcement of redistricting.
I follow Black (1999), among others, to control for the school aendance using a
boundary xed eect approach to isolate the eects of school quality on property values
from other shared amenities along school boundaries. ere are ve schools in Fayee
county and I have a total of seven boundaries by pairing shared boundaries. ese bor-
dered pairs capture those unobserved characteristic within a similar neighborhood but dif-
ferent catchment areas. As I have a repeated cross-section following Dhar and Ross (2012)
and Dachis, Duranton, and Turner (2012) I include xed eects for each school/border to
control for sorting and resulting demographic dierences along school boundaries (Bayer,
Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007; Kane, Riegg, and Staiger, 2006). I separately estimate re-
peated cross-sectional regressions using observations within k miles from the common
boundary for sales before and aer the boundary change. Between June 2015 and August
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2017, the new school aendance boundary had been approved but not yet taken eect
and home buyers still sent their children to the current schools. If the coecients on test
scores signicantly diers before and aer the approval of the redistricting proposal, then
it would indicate a change in home buyer’s preference. If a static housing price model cor-
rectly reects the marginal willingness to pay for school quality, then these coecients
should not dier and all the change in price should be aributed to the expected quality
change of school district. I express my estimating equation as a simple cross-sectional
hedonic as in (4.5) in which, as mentioned, the sample is restricted to sales within k miles
of the seven boundaries and run separately for sales prior to and aer the June 2015 an-
nouncement of redistricting.
Table 4.4 presents the results of my estimation. Column (1) reports coecient esti-
mates when I include all sales within Fayee County and do not control for boundary
xed eects while in columns (2) - (5) I select sales within 0.4 miles to 0.1 mile increments
from each boundary controlling for school/boundary xed eects. Column (6) does not
include a school/boundary xed eect. In general, I nd that before the redistricting pro-
posal increases in ACT composite test scores increase housing prices. In contrast to Black
(1999) and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) among others, the coecient I estimate
on test score without controlling for boundary xed eects (columns (1) and (6)) are not
signicantly greater than the estimated coecients when I control for the boundary xed
eect. As I further restrict the aention on houses near the boundary, the test score has
a greater impact on prices before the redistricting approval. Within 0.1 mile from the
boundary, a one point increase in school ACT test score will increase house prices by 5.6
percent.
Approval of the redistricting plan seems to aenuate the impact of ACT scores. Panel
B shows that aer the announcement of the redistricting plan, I see a similar impact of
school quality on housing price for the entire, post-announcement sample with an average
2.7 percent premium associated with one point increase in test scores. However, aer
approval of redistricting, the eect along the boundaries are reduced and insignicant
– consistent with future school options, with potentially dierent school quality, along
these borders. More importantly, test scores do not provide signicant explanation for
dierences in housing values along school boundaries that have not changed during the
period in which redistricting has been approved but is not yet operational.
An alternative to identifying the pre- and post-announcement eects of test scores
on housing prices using a boundary xed eect approach is to estimate a dierence-in-
dierence model. Modifying (4.6) to include test scores with the potential for dierential
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eects before the announcement of redistricting, gives
lnPijt = X
′
ijtβ+Z
′
ijtδ+γSjt+φ ·Treati+ψ ·Postit+ρSjt ·Postit+θ ·Treati ·Postit+uijt.
(4.11)
where Sjt is the mean ACT for school j in year t.10
Table 4.5 shows the results from estimating alternative specications of (4.11). Columns
(1) and (2) are pooled cross-sectional regressions; in column (1) I report the results when
I do not control for school xed eects. From column (1), a one point increase in current
test scores on average is associated with 2.5 percent increase in housing price. In contrast,
in column (2) when the school-xed eect is included, the estimate of the test score on
housing prices is insignicant and essentially zero – the eect of the test score is “fully
absorbed” by school xed eect. Column (3) reports the estimates where I use current test
scores as an intensity measure of the treatment and interact it with Post to see whether
the school quality, as measured by the ACT score, of “old” school zoning still aects hous-
ing prices. e coecient on Score ·Post is 0.4 (percent) but is statistically insignicant.
Intuitively this insignicance is expected as the current score in the “old” school may not
be a good predictor of the score in the new school. However, adding the switching eect
corrects people’s expectation. e estimate of the interaction term Treat ·Post (θ) is 2.6
percent, slightly higher than 2.4 percent in Table 4.3 and echoes the results found in Table
4.4.
4.6.3 Disaggregating the Impacts of Redistricting
e redistricting proposal involved every high school in Fayee County. Where redis-
tricting means a change in future high school I expect the demand for housing and there-
fore housing prices to change. In Table 4.3, which reports the results when all boundary
changes (Bryan Station to Frederick Douglas, Henry Clay to Frederick Douglas, Bryan
Station to Dunbar, etc.) are pooled, properties scheduled to be redistricted appreciated
by 2.4 percent, which I interpret as an average eect. However, the impact of changes
in school boundaries are unlikely to be the same – those houses redistricted to what are
considered higher-performing schools should appreciate while those houses redistricted
to a lower-performing schools should, ceteris paribus, depreciate. To address the likeli-
hood of heterogenous impacts of these boundary changes, rather than pooling all sales, I
10I also estimated a triple dierence (DDD) with respect to the test score, lnPijt = X ′ijtβ+Z ′ijtδ+ γSjt +
φ · Treati + ψ · Postit + θ · Treati · Postit + ρSjt · Postit + σSjt · Postit · Treati + uijt, and found the
coecient on Sjt · Postit · Treati, σ, not to be statistically signicant, suggesting no evidence that the
impact of the current test score on housing prices is not dierent in the redistricted areas from those that
were not aer post-announcement of redistricting.
87
disaggregate them into redistricting pairs and run separate DD estimation of each pair to
examine heterogenous eects of school boundary changes.
I report these results in Table 4.6. Each column is a regression following (4.6) us-
ing all sales from a single school catchment area. My focus is on the interaction term,
Treat · Post, the DD estimate of housing price changes for houses in redistricted area
post-announcement. Inspection of the coecient on Treat · Post across the columns
does indeed indicate heterogenous impacts of redistricting with the most pronounced
eects being appreciation for houses redistricted to the proposed school (Frederick Dou-
glas). Columns (1), (3), and (5), respectively, show the eect of being redistricted to the
proposed school for houses previously in the catchment areas for Bryan Station, Henry
Clay, and Lafayee. Being redistricted from Bryan Station to the proposed school catch-
ment area leads to a 6.6 percent increase in housing price on average and is highly signif-
icant. Being redistricted from Henry Clay to the proposed school results in appreciation
of 2.2 percent. While the eect of being redistricted from Lafayee to proposed school
is quite large (10.4%), the sample of redistricted properties is small and the coecient
on Treat ·Post is only marginally signicant. Conrming my expectations about school
quality of the respect high schools, being redistricted from Bryan Station to Paul L. Dunbar
results in a 2.2 percent increase in housing price relative non-switchers in Bryan Station.
ese results are also consistent with Cheshire and Sheppard (2004), where it is ar-
gued that uncertainty plays an important role in determining expected school quality and
hence expected housing value. Because both the quality of a school could change and
boundaries could be redened, home buyers face uncertainty. Cheshire and Sheppard
(2004) estimates show that for houses located in periphery areas with new construction
the value of educational quality is discounted by more than 40 percent relative to houses
in other parts of the city. Given that Henry Clay is a considered a high-performing school
and as the new school (Frederick Douglas) was not built yet, there is a risk of no longer
being in an area with a good school, possibly explaining why the increases in sales prices
there are smaller than for houses redistricted from Bryan Station to the proposed school.
Further, as property values in the Henry Clay area are higher than Bryan Station, the
smaller percentage increases in property values should not be entirely unexpected. e
remaining boundary changes as a result redistricting are positive though some are quite
small and insignicant but none of them is signicantly negative. ese nonnegative
results are in contrast to Bogart and Cromwell (2000) nding of an average decrease of
9.9 percent in housing values in those areas which changes catchment areas. e results
show that redrawing the school aendance boundaries in Fayee County have beneed
houses to be redistricted not only in the aggregate level, but also for each of the individual
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high school catchment area changes
4.6.4 Who Benets from the Boundary Change?
e previous dierence-in-dierences results show that, on average, there exists a relative
increase in prices for houses sold in locations scheduled for redistricting. To gauge the
magnitude of this redistricting plan on aggregate house values and tax revenue, I use
property assessment data in 2013, one year before the start of redistricting process, to
calculate the total gain in property values. I focus on houses that will be redistricted to the
new school catchment area and multiply the 2013 value by the corresponding coecient I
nd in the boom line in Table 4.6. e results are listed in Table 4.7. e total increase in
the housing stock value in Bryan Station is more than 85 million dollars from around 8,000
houses that will be redistricted into the proposed area. Henry Clay also has substantial
increase around 15 million dollars. ough Lafayee has the largest estimate (10.4%) from
previous section, but due to lower average house value and fewer houses, the total gain
is less than the other two catchment areas. But the aggregate impact of the new school
is large. e total value of housing stock in the three catchment areas amounts to more
than 2 billion dollars and change of value is around 108 million dollars, an increase, on
average, of $9016 per house. If I annualize the benets over a 15 year period at a discount
rate of 3.5%, this is a benet of $783 per year per household. e estimated construction
cost of the new high school was 82 million dollars11 though this cost does not include
any additional costs associated with maintenance of new facilities or any other costs not
strictly a function of enrollments. As discussed in Section (4.3), to the extent that adding
the new high school (Frederick Douglass) aects educational quality in the other high
schools, the change in value is a measure of the relative benets of the new school, not
the absolute benets.
Dierential Eects of Redistricting by House Size
Could this benet I have found merely indicate there also exists losers? ough I am not
able to calculate the relative change of such a policy on houses that will stay in original
school catchment area, I can investigate what type of houses benet from such redistrict-
ing through a triple-dierences (DDD) analysis. I should expect larger families to benet
more from redistricting to what is considered a beer school and, therefore, larger houses
should appreciate more as the family size is correlated with the house size. My specica-
11See Kennedy, Mike “$82 million high school opens in Lexington, KY” American School & University (Au-
gust 8, 2017), hps://www.asumag.com/new-construction/82-million-high-school-opens-lexington-ky.
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tion has the following form:
lnPijt = W
′
ijtβ + Z
′
ijtδ + φ · Treati + ψ · Postit + θ · Treati · Postit
+ τ · Sizei + η · Treati · Sizei + ξ · Postit · Sizei + ζ · Treati · Postit · Sizei + uijt, (4.12)
where W is the same set of control variables as X excluding Size, which is a measure
of house i size. I employ two alternative measures of house size: a) the number of full
bathrooms and b) the log of square footage. e parameter ζ then implies the relative
change of a larger house comparing to a smaller house in the treatment group aer the
approval of redistricting plan.
e rst set of results with the number of full bathrooms to indicate size is found in
Table 4.8. e parameter of interest is ζ , the coecient on Treati ·Postit ·Sizei. For the ma-
jority of redistricted areas, I see a positive eect of house size on the eect of anticipated
redistricting albeit with only three of the eight areas having statistically-signicant, pos-
itive coecients. Of those areas redistricted to the proposed high school only for Henry
Clay is the estimate of ζ statistically signicant. e exception to positive eects of house
size on the value of redistricting is in the area that is redistricted from Lafayee to Henry
Clay, which has a 3.7 percent decrease (per bathroom) in house values for larger houses.
Similar results are also found in a second set using log(square footage) as the measure of
size. However, with this measure I do not see any strong negative values for ζ .
A possible explanation for the negative coecient on ζ in the area redistricted from
Lafayee to Henry Clay could be the systematic preference for smaller houses in Lafayee
catchment area. e summary statistics of house characteristics in column (3) of Table 4.2
shows that compared to the other schools, houses in Lafayee are substantially smaller
and have fewer bathrooms and replaces.
4.7 Extensions and Tests of the Model
4.7.1 Information Updating
Recent studies (Ma, 2019; Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004) suggest that learning has been an
important factor that potentially biases hedonic estimates . In regard to my DD estimates,
there might be concerns that some people have anticipated redistricting prior to its pas-
sage (June 2015) as the Fayee County Public Schools (FCPS) announced its intention to
redraw school boundaries on April 29, 2014. If the boundary changes were anticipated
prior to June 2015 I could have a downward bias on the coecient on Treat · Post my
measure of the impact of redistricting on housing prices. To address this issue, I add a
period between the day FCPS announced the redistricting process (April 29, 2014) and
90
the day the plan was ocially approved (June 3, 2015). Specically, let Ti, i = 1, 2 be the
timing of announcement and approval date respectively. Also dene two new binary vari-
ables indicating the period of a house sold at time t, Post1 is equal to one if T1 ≤ t < T2
and zero otherwise. Post2 is equal to one if t ≥ T2 and zero otherwise.
lnPijt = X
′
ijtβ+Z
′
ijtδ+φ·Treati+κ·Post1+λ·Treati ·Post1+ψ ·Post2+θ·Treati ·Post2+uijt
(4.13)
where λ captures the premium of information received by home buyers between the day
when FCSC announced that redistricting was to be considered and the approval date of
the plan. e term θ captures the “net” impact of approval of the redistricting plan. In the
absence of an information eect, that is no anticipation of redistricting changes I expect
λ to equal zero. Column (1) of Table 4.10 reports the results of estimating (4.13) using all
observations. In general, with this sample the information premium does not have an im-
portant impact. However, the net benet of redistricting, the coecient on Treat ·Post2,
is large (3.1 percent) compared to the estimate from the base model, (2.4 percent) though
it is statistically insignicant. Column (2) - (8) report the results of separate regressions
performed using a sample from a single catchment area. Similar to the previous result,
values of houses redistricted out of Bryan Station increased in value. Sale prices increased,
on average, by 7.1 and 3.9 percent for transactions that took place in the catchment areas
for the proposed school and Paul Dunbar High School in the post-approval period, larger
than the DD estimate of 6.6 and 2.2 percent reported in Table 4.6. For the Henry Clay High
School catchment area, I also observe a 4.2 percent increase in house values redistricted
to the proposed school and an insignicant but positive eect for houses that will be in
Tates Creek. Only redistricting from Paul Dunbar to Lafayee and from Tates Creek to
Henry Clay show negative net impact in the post-approval period. Overall I nd that the
results reported in Table 4.10 are still consistent with what I found in when estimating the
boundary xed eect models with a single post-approval period (Table 4.6) – that there is
no signicant negative benet associated with boundary changes.
However, I do see signicant pre-approval eects among school areas with large (and
signicant) pre-approval positive appreciation for houses redistricted from Henry Clay
to the proposed school and a smaller, positive pre-approval eect on houses redistricted
from Henry Clay to Tates Creek. Negative and signicant pre-approval treatment eects
are found for houses redistricted from Dunbar to Lafayee and Tates Creek to Henry
Clay12. Even if some the estimates of pre-approval treatment eects are not signicant,
they reduce measured net benet so the estimates my base model ((4.6) and Table 4.3)
12Lafayee to Henry Clay is not signicant in pre-approval period. However, I have very few observations
in Lafayee so it is hard to make a valid inference.
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are smaller than when pre-approval impacts are considered. Without considering peo-
ple updating their beliefs will not only bias the results downward, but also the opposite
direction (Ma, 2019).
4.7.2 Placebo Test
Last, to assess validity of my dierence-in-dierences approach, I implement a placebo
test with results provided in Table 4.11. In this exercise, I randomly draw a new treatment
group from those sales that are not aected by the policy change in each school catchment
area from a uniform distribution. en I discard the true treatment groups and run regres-
sions on the false treatment and true control group for each old school catchment area.
e results are found in Table 4.11. e coecients on Treat · Post in each school area
regressions are not statistically dierent from zero, suggesting my results are unlikely to
be biased.
4.8 Conclusion
Using the exogenous shock of school redistricting process in Fayee County, Kentucky,
I am able to identify the house values change of switching from one school catchment
area to another. My estimates suggest that on average prices of houses being redistricted
will increase by 2.4 percent aer the approval of the redistricting plan but the extent of
appreciation diers across redistricting pairs. Houses in the lowest-performing school (as
measured by ACT scores) that are redistricted to the new school appreciate by 6.6 percent
relative houses that are not redistricted, equivalent to a price increase of $8,212 using the
mean price of the original catchment area. While being redistricted into a new catchment
area poses some uncertainty, in contrast to Bogart and Cromwell (2000) I do not nd any
signicant negative impacts from redistricting on house values. Following conventional
approach I apply boundary xed eect model to examine the impact of test scores on
house prices and nd that the change of boundaries disrupts existing valuation of school
quality near the boundaries. I also derive a series of tests to on how expectations of school
quality are capitalized into housing prices. A triple-dierences model is used to see the
heterogeneous impact of redistricting plan on dierent types of houses, specically houses
that dier in size. Because household size (number of children) is correlated with house
size, I expect to nd stronger eects from redistricting in larger houses.
By adding a pre-approval period, I am able to compare the net change of housing price
under the actual treatment eect with the price change caused by anticipation before
people know the exact change of new plan. e results show that people do respond
92
to such an information shock and by controlling for anticipation, the benet of being
redistricted will increase the price more. I also test whether the school quality change
causes the increase in housing prices and the regression results show that people behave
similarly in response to the test scores change and thus the majority of the variations in
housing price change can be explained purely by the redistricting treatment. My results
also provide evidence to support the Kane et al. (2003) nding that housing price volatility
does not respond to short run test score changes. I nd no signicant negative eect on
house prices if more information is presented to households over time (Figlio and Lucas,
2004).
As I consider redistricting of houses to a proposed, not operating school, the appre-
ciation from redistricting to the proposed school (Douglass) is presumably an indication
of the expected increase in school quality. As Frederick Douglass High School became
operation in August 2017, an interesting future extension would be to compare the sales
prices in the Douglass catchment area prior to the school’s opening to sales prices fol-
lowing its actual operation. While at this moment the post-opening sales data is limited,
this comparison would provide an interesting comparison of expected and realized school
quality on property values.
Another possible extension is to consider how this redistricting and, in particular, the
opening of the new high school aect demographic composition. As suggested by Bayer
et al. (2007); Kane et al. (2006) and Dhar and Ross (2012) while neighborhoods on opposite
sides of a school boundary might initially have very similar dynamics, if the schools sig-
nicantly dier in quality one might expect sorting based on preferences and income to
lead to signicant dierences in demographics along school boundaries. is redistrict-
ing will provide an opportunity to see if and how the demographics of neighborhoods on
each side of this new school boundary evolve.
93
4.9 Tables
Table 4.1: Number of Sales based on the Rezoned School Districts, 2003-2017
Bryan
Station
Henry
Clay Lafayee
Paul L.
Dunbar
Tates
Creek Proposed Total
Bryan Station 7,153 0 0 1,079 0 5,591 13,823
Henry Clay 0 7,268 0 0 1,290 2,342 10,920
Lafayee 0 1,088 8,918 0 0 204 10,210
Paul L. Dunbar 0 0 1,403 5,611 0 0 7,014
Tates Creek 0 113 0 0 9,130 0 9,243
Total 7,153 8,469 10,321 6,690 10,420 8,137 51,190
Notes: is table shows number of sales in each school catchment area in terms of its relative location
before and aer the redistricting.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bryan
Station
Henry
Clay Lafayee
Paul L.
Dunbar
Tates
Creek Treat Control Total
Sale price 124,417.5 186,499.5 140,818.6 183,844.9 150,736.5 150,705.0 154,869.5 153,802.9
(57108.1) (105610.1) (55798.1) (101122.4) (68487.0) (76785.5) (83854.5) (82121.4)
Log sale price 11.65 11.99 11.79 11.98 11.84 11.82 11.83 11.83
(0.382) (0.534) (0.366) (0.524) (0.403) (0.432) (0.469) (0.460)
Log square footage 7.325 7.445 7.344 7.494 7.408 7.391 7.393 7.393
(0.299) (0.388) (0.294) (0.390) (0.365) (0.329) (0.356) (0.350)
Age at sale date 22.36 35.33 41.27 30.03 24.10 24.09 32.38 30.26
(52.36) (50.12) (43.19) (30.43) (32.31) (36.56) (47.24) (44.90)
Maximum stories 1.369 1.426 1.325 1.410 1.407 1.380 1.386 1.385
(0.440) (0.446) (0.417) (0.458) (0.467) (0.445) (0.446) (0.446)
No. of full bathroom 1.850 1.891 1.688 1.982 1.909 1.922 1.832 1.855
(0.568) (0.728) (0.587) (0.827) (0.626) (0.659) (0.665) (0.665)
No. of half bathroom 0.427 0.485 0.397 0.565 0.554 0.476 0.475 0.475
(0.507) (0.535) (0.508) (0.529) (0.529) (0.520) (0.525) (0.524)
No. of replace 0.480 0.418 0.303 0.414 0.501 0.511 0.396 0.426
(0.513) (0.508) (0.462) (0.530) (0.510) (0.519) (0.502) (0.509)
All brick 0.201 0.467 0.451 0.558 0.384 0.353 0.402 0.389
(0.400) (0.499) (0.498) (0.497) (0.486) (0.478) (0.490) (0.488)
Part brick 0.627 0.376 0.387 0.361 0.490 0.522 0.445 0.464
(0.484) (0.484) (0.487) (0.480) (0.500) (0.500) (0.497) (0.499)
Distance to school 3.330 2.172 2.062 2.089 1.998 3.202 2.151 2.420
(1.776) (1.177) (1.237) (1.447) (1.317) (1.264) (1.530) (1.537)
Distance to park 0.541 0.476 0.475 0.427 0.451 0.497 0.477 0.482
(0.404) (0.322) (0.228) (0.425) (0.229) (0.302) (0.346) (0.335)
Distance to 0.912 1.655 1.788 0.725 1.068 1.279 1.237 1.248
Urban Service Boundary (0.725) (1.202) (1.076) (0.638) (0.634) (0.874) (1.024) (0.988)
Distance to city center 3.822 4.030 3.838 4.444 5.452 4.262 4.245 4.249
(1.370) (1.861) (1.628) (1.603) (0.807) (1.435) (1.670) (1.613)
Observations 13,823 10,900 10,210 7,014 9,243 13,110 38,080 51,190
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Sale price is adjusted by U.S. urban housing ination deator. Distance to school measures
the minimum distance to the actual catchment area school. Distance to park, urban service boundary, and city center are referring to the
minimum distance to nearest park, urban service boundary and city center. Top and boom 1% observations are dropped from data.
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Table 4.3: Main Results
Dependent Variable: LN(Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat -0.001 -0.024 0.018 -0.024 0.016 0.010
(0.030) (0.027) (0.057) (0.027) (0.052) (0.050)
Post -0.077∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.009 0.021∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Treat×Post 0.022∗ 0.027∗ 0.004 0.029∗∗ 0.004 0.024∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
Log of square footage 0.947∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
Age -0.074 -0.122∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.143∗∗ -0.152∗∗
(0.069) (0.064) (0.058) (0.066) (0.058) (0.058)
Age square 0.003 0.006∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.002 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
No. full bathrooms 0.152∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
No. half bathrooms 0.080∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
All brick 0.124∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Part brick 0.070∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017)
Urban 0.047 0.057 -0.132∗ 0.091 -0.108 -0.112
(0.083) (0.088) (0.069) (0.089) (0.067) (0.072)
Stories -0.112∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016)
Dist to USB 0.095∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.025 0.018
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Dist to city center 0.025∗∗∗ 0.020∗ -0.005 0.023∗∗ -0.003 -0.016
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016)
Dist to nearest park 0.018 0.031 0.006 0.039 0.013 0.022
(0.027) (0.028) (0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.020)
Dist to school -0.022∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.005 -0.017∗∗ -0.008 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012)
School FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract FE No No Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract×Year FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 51,190 51,190 51,190 51,190 51,190 51,190
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Dependent variable is log sale price for all regressions. Age is mea-
sured in 100 years. Robust standard errors are clustered at census tract level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table 4.4: Boundary Fixed Eect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All 0.4m 0.3m 0.2m 0.1m 0.1m
A. Before (Announced School Redistricting)
ACT Score 0.001 0.033** 0.028* 0.036** 0.049* 0.052***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.019)
Observations 41,294 14,256 10,718 6,913 2,884 2,884
B. Aer (Announced School Redistricting)
ACT Score 0.014 0.018 0.022 0.015 0.019 0.027
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020)
Observations 9,896 3,215 2,423 1,541 638 638
Boundary FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: Dependent variable is log sale price. Each column is a separate regression.
We use school-year composite test scores to measure the school quality. House
characteristics such as log of square footage, age, number of bathrooms, all brick
and partial brick dummies, and stories are included. We also control for distance to
nearest park, distance to urban service boundary, distance to school, and distance
to city center. Census tract by year xed eects are also included. Robust standard
errors are clustered at census tract level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Log of Sale Price on ACT Scores, Pre- and Post-Catchment Area Changes
Dependent Variable: LN(Sales Price) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ACT Score 0.025*** 0.001 -0.002 0.000
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Post (Announced Redistricting) -0.053 -0.087
(0.056) (0.056)
Score×Post 0.004 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003)
Treat (Change in School Catchment Area) 0.010
(0.050)
Treat×Post 0.026**
(0.013)
School FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51,190 51,190 51,190 51,190
Notes: Dependent variable is log of house price. Each column is a separate regression. House
characteristics such as log of square footage, age, number of bathrooms, all brick and partial
brick dummies, and stories are included. We also control for distance to nearest park, distance
to urban service boundary, distance to school, and distance to city center. Census tract by year
xed eects are also included. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: LN(Sales Price) on Pre- and Post-Announcement Catchment Area Changes by Catchment Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bryan
Station to
Proposed
Bryan
Station to
Paul L.
Dunbar
Henry
Clay to
Proposed
Henry
Clay to
Tates
Creek
Lafayee
to
Proposed
Lafayee
to
Henry
Clay
Paul L.
Dunbar to
Lafayee
Tates
Creek to
Henry
Clay
Dependent Variable: LN(Sales Price)
Treat -0.035 0.086 0.102∗∗∗ 0.014 - 0.009 -0.060∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.072) (0.035) (0.035) - (0.040) (0.020) (0.029)
Post -0.017 -0.010 0.013 0.017 0.037∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.028
(0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
Treat×Post 0.066∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.007 0.104∗ 0.034 -0.015 0.013
(0.018) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.052) (0.028) (0.031) (0.019)
Observations 12,744 8,232 9,610 8,558 9,122 10,006 7,014 9,243
Notes: Each column is a separate regression using sales from only one school catchment area. Treat is dropped in column (5) due
to perfect collinearity of treatment status and census tract. ere are two census tracts entirely being rezoned to the proposed
school district. All regressions follow the specication in the last column of Table 4.3. Robust standard errors are clustered at
census tract level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Housing Stock Value Change
School Catchment Area Value Change ($) Number of Houses
Bryan Station 85,776,669 7,912
Henry Clay 15,206,688 2,783
Lafayee 7,237,464 1,308
Total 108,220,821 12,003
Notes: is table provides estimates of houses that will be rezoned to the new
school catchment area based on 2013 fair cash value. Total value of housing
stock in these three school catchment areas that will be rezoned to the new
school catchment area is $2,060,450,600 in 2013.
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Table 4.8: LN(Sales Price) on Pre- and Post-Announcement Catchment Area Changes and Catchment Change×Number of Fullbaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Benchmark
Bryan
Station to
Proposed
Bryan
Station to
Paul L.
Dunbar
Henry
Clay to
Proposed
Henry
Clay to
Tates
Creek
Lafayee
to
Proposed
Lafayee
to
Henry
Clay
Paul L.
Dunbar to
Lafayee
Tates
Creek to
Henry
Clay
Dependent Variable: LN(Sales Price)
Treat -0.002 0.032 0.212** 0.121 0.019 - -0.047 0.040 0.023
(0.051) (0.093) (0.077) (0.091) (0.043) - (0.068) (0.034) (0.047)
Post -0.003 -0.001 0.021 -0.027 -0.028 0.033 0.031 0.055 -0.032
(0.018) (0.050) (0.049) (0.034) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.037)
Treat× Post -0.031 -0.046 -0.164*** -0.118** 0.008 0.018 0.107*** -0.041 -0.078**
(0.038) (0.082) (0.047) (0.047) (0.028) (0.026) (0.031) (0.064) (0.036)
Fullbaths 0.123*** 0.156*** 0.188*** 0.109*** 0.125*** 0.129*** 0.124*** 0.134*** 0.115***
(0.011) (0.027) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.023)
Treat×Fullbaths 0.007 -0.047 -0.064** -0.008 -0.003 -0.097** 0.033 -0.075*** -0.067***
(0.024) (0.051) (0.026) (0.044) (0.028) (0.041) (0.033) (0.024) (0.021)
Post×Fullbaths 0.011 -0.010 -0.018 0.022 0.024 0.002 0.002 -0.009 0.030**
(0.008) (0.028) (0.029) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014)
Treat×Post×Fullbaths 0.028 0.058 0.094*** 0.053** 0.001 0.056 -0.037** 0.018 0.045**
(0.019) (0.045) (0.027) (0.021) (0.017) (0.044) (0.015) (0.026) (0.015)
Observations 51,190 12,744 8,232 9,610 8,558 9,122 10,006 7,014 9,243
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Treat is dropped in column (5) due to perfect collinearity of treatment status and census tract. All regressions
include controls and xed eects following the last column of Table 4.3. Robust standard errors are clustered at census tract level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.9: LN(Sales Price) on Pre- and Post-Announcement Catchment Area Changes and Catchment Change×LN(Square Footage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Benchmark
Bryan
Station to
Proposed
Bryan
Station to
Paul L.
Dunbar
Henry
Clay to
Proposed
Henry
Clay to
Tates
Creek
Lafayee
to
Proposed
Lafayee
to
Henry
Clay
Paul L.
Dunbar to
Lafayee
Tates
Creek to
Henry
Clay
Dependent Variable: LN(Sales Price)
Treat -0.523 -0.557 1.169*** -0.885 1.302* - -0.991 2.249*** 0.821*
(0.398) (0.618) (0.318) (0.710) (0.742) - (0.671) (0.686) (0.447)
Post 0.028 0.152 0.163 -0.314 -0.335 -0.031 -0.031 0.205 0.024
(0.108) (0.241) (0.234) (0.348) (0.342) (0.136) (0.136) (0.211) (0.139)
Treat×Post -0.259 -0.505 -0.535* 0.098 -0.791* -1.837*** 0.313 -0.090 -0.514**
(0.194) (0.366) (0.262) (0.361) (0.381) (0.270) (0.259) (0.721) (0.227)
Size 0.790*** 0.800*** 0.724*** 0.800*** 0.748*** 0.661*** 0.665*** 0.847*** 0.759***
(0.033) (0.071) (0.055) (0.069) (0.056) (0.051) (0.051) (0.071) (0.069)
Treat×Size 0.072 0.073 -0.149*** 0.128 -0.180 -0.332*** 0.134 -0.322*** -0.125**
(0.056) (0.083) (0.048) (0.093) (0.106) (0.067) (0.091) (0.096) (0.057)
Post×Size -0.001 -0.023 -0.024 0.044 0.047 0.009 0.009 -0.022 0.000
(0.014) (0.033) (0.032) (0.047) (0.046) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.017)
Treat×Post×Size 0.038 0.077 0.076* -0.011 0.112** 0.256*** -0.038 0.009 0.072**
(0.026) (0.050) (0.036) (0.047) (0.053) (0.039) (0.031) (0.098) (0.029)
Observations 51,190 12,744 8,232 9,610 8,558 9,122 10,006 7,014 9,243
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Treat is dropped in column (5) due to perfect collinearity of treatment status and census tract. All
regressions include controls and xed eects following the last column of Table 4.3. Robust standard errors are clustered at census tract level. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.10: Information Updating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Benchmark
Bryan
Station to
Proposed
Bryan
Station to
Paul L.
Dunbar
Henry
Clay to
Proposed
Henry
Clay to
Tates
Creek
Lafayee
to
Proposed
Lafayee
to
Henry
Clay
Paul L.
Dunbar to
Lafayee
Tates
Creek to
Henry
Clay
Dependent Variable: LN(Sales Price)
Treat 0.004 -0.036 0.082 0.092** 0.011 - -0.027 -0.054** -0.113***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.072) (0.034) (0.035) - (0.056) (0.021) (0.029)
Post1 0.026*** 0.009 0.018 0.004 0.024 0.051** 0.053** 0.026 0.012
(0.008) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013)
Treat× Post1 0.014 0.006 0.019 0.060** 0.028* -0.122 0.091 -0.035** -0.054*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.084) (0.063) (0.015) (0.026)
Post2 0.046*** -0.008 0.008 0.026 0.043 0.088** 0.090** 0.060*** 0.040*
(0.012) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.034) (0.033) (0.015) (0.019)
Treat× Post2 0.031 0.071*** 0.039** 0.042*** 0.014 -0.019 0.111** -0.025 -0.041
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.041) (0.049) (0.025) (0.026)
Observations 51,190 12,744 8,232 9,610 8,558 9,122 10,006 7,014 9,243
Notes: is table reports estimates based on Equation 4.13. Every column is a separate regression using sales only from one old school catchment
area. Independent variables follow the last column in Table 4.3. Robust standard errors are clustered at census tract level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.11: Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bryan Station Henry Clay Lafayee Paul L. Dunbar Tates Creek
Treat 0.001 -0.003 -0.009 0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.011)
Post -0.013 0.020 0.036∗∗ 0.027 0.028
(0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
Treat×Post 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.020 -0.033
(0.008) (0.022) (0.019) (0.011) (0.041)
Observations 7,153 7,268 8,918 5,611 9,130
Notes: We randomly assign treatment status to non-treated group in each old school district. We do not
distinguish the rezoned school district in placebo test and generally compare the fake treatment eect for
each old school district. All regressions follow the specication in the last column of Table 4.3. Robust
standard errors are clustered at census tract level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.10 Figures
Bryan Station
Henry Clay
Paul L Dunbar
Lafayette
Tates Creek
Figure 4.1: Old School Catchment Boundary
Bryan Station
Henry Clay
Proposed
Paul L Dunbar
Lafayette
Tates Creek
Figure 4.2: New School Catchment Boundary
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Lafayette
Tates Creek
Legend
Old Boundary
New Boundary
Figure 4.3: Change in High School Catchment Area Boundaries
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Figure 4.4: Median House Price by High School Catchment Area and Year
Notes: Price data are adjusted by US Urban Housing CPI.
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Figure 4.5: Composite ACT Score by High School and Year
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Figure 4.6: Sales Price Trends for Treatment Group (Houses subject to Redistricting) and
Control Group (Houses not subject to Redistricting
Notes: is gure compares the trend of prices in treatment group and control group. We rst run a re-
gression with dependent variable being log price, and independent variables including log square footage,
house age and age square, number of full bathroom, number of half bathroom, maximum stories, all brick
dummy, part brick dummy, urban dummy, distance to urban boundary, distance to city center, distance to
park, distance to school, and also school xed eect. en we predict the residuals from the regression
and collapse residuals at quarterly level. Last we use local polynomial regressions to plot quarterly price
residuals against time.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
In this dissertation, I examine policies that are related to the increase in the supply of
education and its indirect consequences. In the rst two essays, I use the expansion of
higher education in China as source of exogenous variation to examine the impact of
such expansion on the household savings rate and young adult migration behavior. e
results demonstrate that increased educational opportunities induce households to save
more and increase inter-provincial mobility. In the third essay I examine a recent school
redistricting in Fayee County, Kentucky and how it aects local housing prices through
capitalization of school quality. I nd that overall housing prices for homes that are re-
districted increased aerwards. I nd heterogeneous returns among dierent original
school catchment areas. ese results demonstrate a wide range of unanticipated eects
from education supply policies and provide implications for future policy design.
As discussed in the rst essay, existing literature has largely focused on the labor mar-
ket outcomes of the college expansion in China (Li and Xing, 2010; Li et al., 2017; Che and
Zhang, 2018; Feng and Xia, 2018). I contribute to the literature by looking at its impact
on household response. Using the Chinese household survey data 1995 and 2002 which
bracket the expansion year of 1999, I nd a 10 percentage-point increase in college prob-
ability leads households with young children to save more by 7 percentage points. It is
a large and important eect which helped China accumulate human capital. Aer ac-
counting for saving motives from other factors such as purchasing houses, precautionary
motives for being laid o from work, and saving for health expenses, the estimate remains
large and signicant. It implies that while there are dierent incentives for households
to save, college education of the child is high on the list. Understanding the relationship
between college opportunities and household saving behavior has important implications
for public policies that aim to increase human capital and the nancing of that increase.
e experience from China shows that households will save to nance college education.
While I have aempted to control for this, it should be noted that China had strict fer-
tility control at that time and student loans were not readily available to households in
the early stage of the expansion. e former condition functions as a quantity/quality
trade-o channel for households and the laer one makes households more motivated to
save.
As higher education expanded in China, an increasing number of students enrolled
in college across the country. Where they choose to locate aer their education is an
important question to examine because college educated workers are vital to local eco-
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nomic growth (Morei, 2004). erefore, in the second essay, I investigate how college
education aects people’s cross-province migration. Since the expansion of higher ed-
ucation resulted in a large dierence in the openings of colleges and universities across
provinces, I am able to use the expansion as exogenous variation in educational aain-
ment to identify the impact of college on migration. Consistent with what is found in
the U.S. and Europe (Malamud and Wozniak, 2012; Machin, Pelkonen, and Savanes, 2012;
Bo¨ckerman and Haapanen, 2013; Weiss, 2015), college education increases Chinese young
adult’s out-province migration rate by 9.1 percentage points. Considering the average mi-
gration rate is around 9 percent, this eect doubles the migration propensity for college
educated people. One limitation of this essay is that it could I could not identify where the
individual aended college. Hence, it is not clear whether some of the migration eect
occurs because individuals relocate to aend college or is concentrated on relocation aer
college. I leave this question for future research. In order to examine the mechanism that
facilitates college educated people move more, I utilize several survey questions related
to aitudes on success in life, the important of education, and the role of family network.
Instrumental variables estimates show that people with college experience rely less on
family and are more prone to agree that education is more important. One unique fea-
ture of the Chinese institutional seing is the hukou system. Because moving in China
is no longer restricted by hukou status, I do not focus on migration measures related
to hukou registered location. However, I do nd that people who held rural hukou sta-
tus during childhood are more likely to conduct long-distance movement aer aending
college compared to their urban counterparts. e underlying policy implication is infor-
mative. e opportunity cost associated with changing hukou status is big. Because rural
hukou holders face smaller cost of hukou status regardless of which urban city they go,
they may have higher mobility than urban people who have been enjoying local hukou
benets. Further reforming hukou policies to motivate more educated urban people to
move across geographical areas is important to spatial allocation of skills.
e last essay shis focus to the U.S. and examines how changes in school district
boundaries and the construction of a new school aect local housing prices in Lexington,
Kentucky. ere have been constant changes of school district boundaries in the U.S. and
the opening and closure of schools not only aect households, but also the home val-
ues. It is therefore important to understand how people make choices when purchasing
a house and how they value a change in school aendance boundaries. e third essay
utilizes the school redistricting approval in 2015 to implement a dierence-in-dierences
model which compares house values of homes that are rezoned to a new school to homes
that stay in the original school catchment area. e estimates show that average prices
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of houses being redistricted increases by 2.4 percent aer the approval. Among the het-
erogeneous returns, houses in the lowest-performing school appreciate by 6.6 percent
relative to houses that are not redistricted. ese results are in contrast to previous liter-
ature which oen nds negative impacts from redistricting on house values (Bogart and
Cromwell, 2000) because that change took place in a more homogenous school district. In
addition to identifying the causal relationship between school quality and housing prices,
I am also able to conduct several analyses that test the expectation eect and boundary
xed eect because of the unique data set. As suggested by Cheshire and Sheppard (2004),
school boundaries are uncertain and subject to change. Prior to the approval of redistrict-
ing plan, the school district had announced the plan to change the boundary. How people
update their beliefs about school quality along with boundary changes is important to
understand and also meaningful for future policy design. I nd that people do respond
to such information shocks and the benet of being redistricted will increase even more
aer controlling for anticipation. Utilizing the various changes in the school district and
the test scores, I examine whether disruptions in boundaries take away the capitalization
eect based on the boundary xed eect model pioneered by Black (1999) and others. e
results show that people do change their valuation of school quality near the boundaries.
As this paper uses data prior to the opening of the new school, the estimated eect is pre-
sumably an indication of the expected increase in school quality. e next step is to gather
more recent data and compare the actual valuation of the new school to the expectation.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Structural Model for Chapter 2
is section derives the results for the structural model that are discussed in the main text.
e rst sub-section derives Proposition 1 and the related properties of the household’s
college probability threshold. e second sub-section shows that saving can decrease with
college probability for high-saving households.
Derivation of Proposition 1
I derive the threshold pt in three steps. First, I calculate lifetime utility assuming the
child never aends college (p = Ic = 0). Second, I calculate lifetime utility assuming the
household saves just enough to pay for college (S = τ ). ird, I nd the p that equalizes
the two lifetime utilities.
First, seing p = Ic = 0 and substituting C and C ′ from the budget constraints into
Equation (2) gives
U = ln(Y − S) + lnS.
e rst order condition is
− 1
Y − S +
1
S
= 0. (5.1)
Solving for the optimal choice of S gives
S∗ =
1
2
Y. (5.2)
Lifetime utility then equals
U = 2 ln
(
1
2
Y
)
. (5.3)
Second, assuming S = τ , the household receives θ in period 2 with probability p and has
only its savings τ with probability 1− p. e resulting lifetime utility is
U = ln(Y − τ) + p · ln θ + (1− p) · ln τ. (5.4)
Finally, equating (5.3) and (5.4), and solving for p gives
ln
(
1
4
Y 2
)
= ln(Y − τ) + p · ln θ + (1− p) · ln τ.
Collecting the p terms gives
p(ln τ − ln θ) = ln(Y − τ) + ln τ − ln
(
1
4
Y 2
)
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p ln
τ
θ
= ln
(
(Y − τ)τ
1
4
Y 2
)
Hence, the college probability that leaves the household indierent between saving S = τ
and S = 1
2
Y < τ is
pt =
ln
[
Y 2
4(Y−τ)τ
]
ln θ
τ
. (5.5)
In the text following Proposition 1, I claim that pt is decreasing in the benets (θ)
from college, increasing in the costs (τ ), and decreasing in household income (Y ) over the
relevant set of parameter values. I show each of these in turn.
First, it is straightforward to see that ∂pt/∂θ < 0 (as long as pt is well dened, with
τ < Y ). us, a higher return from college lowers pt.
Second, applying a simple quotient rule, I nd ∂pt/∂τ
∂pt
∂τ
=
∂ ln
[
Y 2
4(Y−τ)τ
]
∂τ
· ln ( θ
τ
)− ∂ ln( θτ )
∂τ
· ln
[
Y 2
4(Y−τ)τ
]
(
ln θ
τ
)2 .
Clearly,
(
ln θ
τ
)2
> 0 in the denominator. e rst term in the numerator is
∂ ln
[
Y 2
4(Y−τ)τ
]
∂τ
=
1
4
Y 2
[−(Y − τ)−2 × (−1)× τ−1 + (Y − τ)−1(−τ−2)]
=
1
4
Y 2
2τ − Y
(Y − τ)2τ 2 .
is again is positive, as long as τ < Y . e second term in the numerator is also
positive because
∂ ln
(
θ
τ
)
∂τ
=
τ
θ
·
(
− θ
τ 2
)
= −1
τ
< 0.
Hence,
∂pt
∂τ
> 0.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that ∂pt/∂Y < 0.
∂pt
∂Y
=
1
ln θ
τ
· 4(Y − τ)τ
Y 2
· 2Y [4(Y − τ)τ ]− Y
2(4τ)
16(Y − τ)2τ 2
= ln
τ
θ
· 1
Y
· (Y − 2τ)
(Y − τ) < 0.
e last inequality comes from the assumption that 1
2
Y < τ . erefore, pt is decreasing
in household income.
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Saving Response for High-Saving Households
Consider a household saving more than τ , S > τ . For example, a high-income household
may have an optimal saving choice that exceeds the cost of college at any value of p, even
p = 0. Let D be the saving in excess of tuition costs (D = S − τ ). en, the utility
function can be wrien
U = ln(Y − τ −D) + p ln(θ +D) + (1− p) ln(τ +D).
e rst order condition with respect to excess savings D is
∂U
∂D
=
−1
Y − τ −D +
p
θ +D
+
1− p
τ +D
= 0,
I am interested in the response of excess savings D to increasing college opportunities,
i.e. ∂D/∂p. Using the implicit function theorem gives
∂D
∂p
= −
1
θ+D
− 1
τ+D
− 1
(Y−τ−D)2 − p(θ+D)2 − 1−p(τ+D)2
=
τ−θ
(θ+D)(τ+D)
1
(Y−τ−D)2 +
p
(θ+D)2
+ 1−p
(τ+D)2
< 0.
e inequality holds because τ < θ. erefore, households with excess savings decrease
their savings in response to an increase in p .
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Appendix B: Data and Variable Denition for Chapter 2
e primary data source is the China Household Income Project (CHIP) 1995 and 2002
urban modules. e data was downloaded from hp://www.ciidbnu.org/chip/index.asp.
I merge the individual data (that contains earnings for all family members and detailed
information on the household head) and household-level data and conduct the analysis at
the household level. Table A1 lists the denitions for the key variables.
Table A1: Variable Denitions
Variable Denition
Saving rate Household income minus consumption, divided by income - Equation (1)
Child college Dummy variable indicating a child aged 18 to 23 having aended college
Enrollment ratio New college enrollees divided by high school graduates, by province
No. kids Self-reported number of children
No. elderly people Self-reported number of parents or grandparents of the household head
Private house Dummy variable indicating private house ownerhsip
Housing accumulation fund Dummy variable indicating the head has a housing accumulation fund
Head age Self-reported age of head
Head male Dummy variable indicating whether the head is a male
Head working Dummy variable indicating the head’s current employment
Head college degree Dummy variable indicating whether head aended college
Head SOE job Dummy variable indicating employment at a State-Owned Enterprise for head
Head public health Dummy variable indicating whether head has health care provided by the state or
work unit, or has compulsory medical insurance for serious diseases
Head tenure Self-reported years of work in current job by head
Head years of schooling Self-reported years of education for head
Spouse years of schooling Self-reported years of education for spouse
Annual income Household income, totaled across family members
Annual expenses Self-reported household consumption expenditures
Total assets Self-reported household total assets
Single Dummy variable, equals 1 if a household has only one dependent child
Appendix C: Addition Tables for Chapter 2
Probit Estimates
is section provides additional details for the probit regressions (Equation 7) used to
estimate the changes in college probability.
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Table A2: Probit Estimates for the Probability of Aending College
(1) (2)
1995 2002
Enrollment ratio 2.344 -3.758
(0.944) (0.996)
Enrollment ratio square -0.917 0.570
(0.295) (0.213)
No. kids 0.116 0.024
(0.109) (0.113)
No. elderly people 0.058 0.095
(0.192) (0.148)
Private house -0.260 0.192
(0.075) (0.136)
Housing accumulation fund -0.072 0.032
(0.128) (0.128)
Head age 0.041 0.037
(0.013) (0.019)
Head male -0.064 -0.117
(0.143) (0.133)
Head currently working -0.134 0.005
(0.191) (0.133)
Head with college degree 0.423 0.532
(0.164) (0.290)
Head SOE job 0.183 -0.008
(0.280) (0.098)
Head public health 0.176 0.086
(0.152) (0.124)
Head tenure -0.008 0.001
(0.006) (0.005)
Head years of schooling 0.055 0.027
(0.020) (0.023)
Spouse years of schooling 0.064 0.014
(0.026) (0.018)
Annual income -0.063 -0.074
(0.109) (0.046)
Annual expenses 0.105 0.246
(0.074) (0.070)
Total assets -0.004 0.020
(0.015) (0.011)
Observations 1,218 973
Notes: is table reports coecient estimates from
the probit regressions. e dependent variable is a
dummy variable for whether the college-age child
has aended college. All specications include
province xed eects. Robust standard errors clus-
tered by province are reported in parentheses.
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Aer obtaining the rst stage probit results, I predict each household’s probability of
having a college child and then average the probabilities across households within each
province to obtain the mean probability before and aer the expansion. Table A3 shows
the change in probability by province for both the 1995 and 2002 survey samples.
Table A3: Change in College Probabilities by Province
1995 2002
Beijing 0.0216 0.150
Shanxi -0.0153 0.00257
Liaoning -0.0178 0.0184
Jiangsu -0.0112 0.0343
Anhui 0.00456 0.0394
Henan 0.00480 0.0336
Hubei 0.0399 0.103
Guangdong -0.0641 -0.0151
Sichuan -0.00576 0.0310
Yunnan -0.0442 -0.0191
Gansu 0.0247 0.0808
Chongqing 0.153
Observations 2,900 2,357
Notes: is table shows the aver-
age change in college probability by
province aer the rst step probit es-
timation for households surveyed in
1995 and 2002.
Triple Dierence-in-Dierence Estimates
is section reports triple dierence-in-dierence (DDD) estimates, exploiting the varia-
tion due to the other policy reforms and the evolving demographics. e DDD estimates
help to further control for confounding trends coming from a third, possibly omied, di-
mension. e dependent variable remains the household saving rate, and the below tables
report the estimated coecients for the change in college probability.
Table A4 reports the estimates when dividing the sample (of households with school
age children) based on the variables related to other policy reforms. Looking at panel
A, column (3) indicates that the DD estimates for both SOE and non-SOE households
are large. e DDD estimate is not tiny, but it is not statistically dierent from zero.
Panel B shows that the DD estimate is large for both households with and without access
to public health. Although, we note that the impact on the saving rates of households
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without public health is markedly larger. e overall paern remains the same in panel
C. As in panels A and B, the coecient estimate on the change in p is relatively small in
1995 and much larger in 2002. e estimated impact is similar for households with and
without privately owned homes.
Table A4: Triple Dierence-in-Dierence using Other Reforms
(1) (2) (3)
1995 2002 DD
Coe. Std. Err Coe. Std. Err Mean Std. Err
A. SOE job
No -0.032 (0.262) 0.676 (0.226) 0.708 (0.346)
Yes 0.109 (0.107) 1.194 (0.409) 1.085 (0.423)
DD 0.141 (0.283) 0.518 (0.467)
DDD 0.377
(0.546)
B. Public health
No -0.244 (0.160) 2.119 (0.779) 2.363 (0.795)
Yes 0.161 (0.111) 0.624 (0.274) 0.463 (0.296)
DD 0.405 (0.195) -1.495 (0.826)
DDD -1.900
(0.848)
C. Private house
No 0.151 (0.139) 1.222 (0.492) 1.071 (0.511)
Yes 0.017 (0.242) 0.869 (0.290) 0.852 (0.378)
DD -0.134 (0.279) -0.353 (0.571)
DDD -0.219
(0.636)
Notes: Each cell uses the same specication as Equation (6). e regressions include
province xed eects, and the parentheses report robust standard errors clustered by
province.
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Table A5 presents the DDD estimates related to household demographics. Panel A
breaks households into two groups based on whether there is a single-dependent child
or multiple kids. Panel B leverages the variation from households with diering gender
compositions. Panel C is based on the household head’s age. For this exercise, we classify
households into young households (age 36 and below) and old households (over age 43),
based on the boom and top quartiles of the age distribution.
Table A5: Triple Dierence-in-Dierence using Demographics
(1) (2) (3)
1995 2002 DD
Coe. Std. Err Coe. Std. Err Mean Std. Err
A. Single-dependent
No 0.186 (0.141) 1.771 (0.675) 1.585 (0.690)
Yes 0.074 (0.141) 0.824 (0.237) 0.750 (0.276)
DD -0.112 (0.199) -0.947 (0.715)
DDD -0.835
(0.743)
B. Gender
Female 0.082 (0.113) 0.845 (0.222) 0.763 (0.249)
Male 0.120 (0.147) 0.831 (0.365) 0.711 (0.393)
DD 0.038 (0.185) -0.014 (0.427)
DDD -0.052
(0.465)
C. Head age
Young 0.204 (0.334) 1.242 (0.313) 1.038 (0.345)
Old -0.103 (0.043) 0.802 (0.223) 0.905 (0.227)
DD -0.307 (0.337) -0.440 (0.384)
DDD -0.133
(0.413)
Notes: Each cell uses the same specication in Equation (6). e regressions include
province xed eects, and the parentheses report robust standard errors clustered by
province.
To summarize the DDD section, across the many specications, the general paerns
remain unchanged from our baseline regression results. e estimated change in college
probability has only a small correlation with household saving rates within the 1995 sam-
ple, and this is true across many dierent sub-groups. In contrast, the correlation in the
2002 sample is very large for all sub-groups, indicating that the expansion of education
opportunities increased household saving rates.
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Appendix D: Data for Chapter 3
CFPS Data
China Family Panel Studies was conducted in 25 provinces of China except for Hong Kong,
Macao, Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Hainan. ese 25 provinces
consists of 95% total population of China, which can be viewed as a representative sample
of China (Xie and Hu, 2014). Figure A1 shows the coverage of CFPS data, which covers
northeast, east, central, and west region of China. Since CFPS oversamples ve “large”
provinces, Shanghai, Liaoning, Henan, Gansu, and Guangdong, and these ve provinces
have regional representativeness, we can use CFPS to make statistical inferences between
provinces and regions (Xie and Lu, 2015). Base year 2010 survey is used in this study.
Tibet
Xinjiang
Qinghai
Inner Mongolia
Gansu
Sichuan
Yunnan
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Hunan
Hubei
Guangxi
Henan
Anhui
Jiangxi
Guizhou Fujian
Hebei
Shaanxi
Shanxi
Liaoning
Guangdong
Shandong
Jiangsu
ZhejiangChongqing
Ningxia
Taiwan
Hainan
Beijing
Tianjin
Shanghai
No sample
Small sample
Large sample
Figure A1: Coverage of CFPS
Notes: is gure shows the coverage of CFPS. Source: China Family Panel Studies Manual.
Measures of Migration Migration is usually dened as moving from a place to an-
other within a period of time. It consists of both geographical denition and time re-
striction. Dierent data and measure will oer dierent perspectives on mobility of a
society and hence is very dicult to conduct cross-country comparison (Molloy et al.,
2011). Since there exists hukou system in China, it has been a long time that people have
focused on hukou migration, dened as current location is dierent from hukou location,
which is hard for scholars to compare mobility in China with other countries. In this pa-
per, I mainly focus on general migration denition utilizing CFPS questions on residence
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provinces. CFPS has advantages in measuring migration because it has detailed informa-
tion on residence location at birth, age 3, age 12, and current in addition to hukou status.
Since hukou restriction on work has been gradually relaxed over time, residence location
depends less and less on hukou and hence the migration measure based on general loca-
tion is more comparable to the U.S., Europe, and other places in the world. Also because
traditional hukou measure of migration is likely to underestimate the mobility, I choose
general migration including all individuals for analysis.
I examine how college aects internal migration in China, which requires informa-
tion on location before and aer college on hands. Comparing to Malamud and Wozniak
(2012) where they used birth state and current state to measure “lifetime” migration, I use
province at age 12, which is the closest time prior to college I have, to dene migrants.
Table A6 also provides alternative measures of migration. As can be seen from the table,
hukou migration signicant underestimate mobility. Birth hukou migration rate (5.47%)
is only half of birth province migration rate (10.55%).
Table A6: Measures of Internal Migration in China
Origin Destination Migrants Non-migrants Migration Rate
Lifetime Measures
Age 12 province Current province 561 5,337 9.51%
Birth province Current province 622 5,276 10.55%
Birth hukou province Current hukou province 318 5,497 5.47%
Age 3 Rural Current urban 1,124 4,759 19.11%
Contemporaneous
Current hukou province Current province 345 5,551 5.85%
Current hukou city Current city 750 5,100 12.82%
Current hukou rural Current urban 1,388 4,305 24.38%
Note: is table shows dierent measures of internal migration based on origin and destination location
and time period. Author’s calculation based on 2010 CFPS data. Sample consists adults age between 25 and
40.
College Education CFPS asks detailed information on education level, duration, and
completion (drop-out) year, and also provides adjusted best education level based on self-
reported value from respondents and converts corresponding education level to years
of schooling. I calculate the start year of college for those people who report college
education. I assume college year is the same year when high school is completed for high
school degree holders. For those people who do not nish high school, I assign age 18
to them. Table A7 shows the distribution of average age in both college year and survey
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year. In general it ts the reality that most people go to college at age 18 since there is no
systematic deviation of age distribution throughout the sample.
Table A7: Mean Age by College Year
College year Mean age Current age Obsevations
1987 15.50 38.50 16
1988 17.90 39.90 375
1989 18.01 39.03 419
1990 18.13 38.13 348
1991 18.22 37.24 408
1992 18.34 36.40 356
1993 18.43 35.45 335
1994 18.49 34.50 336
1995 18.45 33.46 308
1996 18.52 32.53 352
1997 18.72 31.74 362
1998 18.61 30.65 364
1999 18.61 29.63 374
2000 18.81 28.84 381
2001 18.71 27.78 357
2002 19.07 27.09 352
2003 19.28 26.30 355
2004 21.13 27.14 100
Total 18.55 33.03 5,898
Note: is table shows age distribution in terms of college
year.
Figure A2 shows percent of college people by each college cohort. As can be seen from
the gure, the expansion of higher education in China lied the share of college people for
cohorts born aer 1981, around the same time the rst cohort who were aected by the
expansion in 1999. I also examine other two data sets, which are also commonly used in
China. China Household Finance Survey 2011 and China General Social Survey 2010. Both
data sets demonstrate similar paern of college people share throughout time. However,
CFPS have smaller magnitudes comparing to the CHFS and CGSS, which could only lead
to underestimate of college impact on internal migration if more educated people are more
likely to move.
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Figure A2: Share of College People
Notes: is gure shows percent of people with college at each college year cohort level. Source: author’s
calculations based on CFPS data.
Sample Selection I drop cohorts who were born aer 1985, because they are supposed
to take the college entrance exam aer 2004, and will not be expected to graduate until
2009, when the survey was conducted. I further restrict the age of respondent when taking
the survey to be between 25 and 40 in their mid-ages so it is more comparable with the
literature. Lastly, I include full-sample of both urban and rural residents. erefore the
data set consists urban natives, rural natives, rural-urban migrants, urban-urban migrants,
and urban-rural migrants. Figure A3 plots density of age distribution for migrant and non-
migrants in year 2010. Non-migrants tend to be older comparing with migrants, which
demand for control for age in regression analysis.
Higher Education Expansion
Figure A4 shows annual new enrollment in regular higher institutions and enrollment
rate. Admission was suspended between 1966 and 1970 due to the Cultural Revolution
and gradually relaxed from 1970 to 1978. In 1978, NCEE was resumed and higher educa-
tion in China was back to its normal stage. ere is a rapid increase in enrollment rate
entering 1980s and then it became relative steady later. Beginning in the 1990s it was
growing again, and the Chinese government implemented the higher education reform in
1999, which expanded its higher education size and enrolled more than 1.5 million college
students in that single year, which is more than 40 percent of previous year enrollment.
123
.
04
.
05
.
06
.
07
.
08
D
en
si
ty
25 30 35 40
Age
Migrant Non−migrant
Figure A3: Age Density of Migrants and Non-migrants
Notes: is gure plots the density of age for migrants and non-migrants.
e national average admission rate has been steadily growing over time, reaching nearly
80 percent in 2015.
College Data College data is obtained from National Bureau of Statistics. Number of
colleges is available since 1987. I merge college data with CFPS adult survey based on
inferred college year.
Hukou Reform Data
In order to examine the potential threat that if hukou reform is positively correlated with
higher education expansion and provinces with more colleges are more relaxed in hukou
policies , I use hukou reform index compiled by Fan (forthcoming). is data set is city
level so that I calculate an average index of province each year from 1997 to 2004. For
years before 1997, I assign zero to all provinces. en I run the following regressions for
number of colleges and provincial index separately and obtain the residuals.
yjt = α +
∑
j 6=1
γj +
∑
t6=1987
λt + it (5.6)
Finally, I plot the two residuals. ere is no strong evidence indicating hukou reform is
positively selecting rapid expansion provinces.
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Figure A4: Number of College New Enrollment and Enrollment Rate
Notes: is gure plots number of new students enrolled in Chinese colleges every year since 1949 and
enrollment rate since the reinstallation of college entrance exam since 1978. Data is compiled from China
Yearly Statistical Book.
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Appendix E: Additional Tables for Chapter 3
Table A8: IV Result: Step 2 First-Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Ĝ 1.207*** 1.213*** 1.207***
(0.132) (0.073) (0.074)
Male -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011)
No. siblings 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Married 0.021 0.022
(0.024) (0.024)
Mother years of schooling -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Father years of schooling -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Urban hukou at age 12 -0.035 -0.034
(0.024) (0.024)
Urban -0.019 -0.018
(0.012) (0.012)
GDP growth rate 0.085
(0.249)
Urban employment to population ratio -0.282
(0.383)
Wage growth rate -0.068
(0.261)
Observations 5,262 5,262 5,262
Note: is table shows the rst stage of 2SLS estimation. Dependent vari-
able is college dummy. Age 12 region by birth cohort xed eect and age 12
province xed eect are included for each specication. Robust standard er-
rors are clustered at age 12 province by cohort level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A9: Impact of College on Migration for High School and Above
(1) (2)
Men Women
College 0.105 0.162
(0.072) (0.100)
Male -0.033*** -0.028***
(0.008) (0.007)
No. siblings 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.012)
Married 0.017 0.091**
(0.022) (0.043)
Mother years of schooling 0.001 -0.004
(0.002) (0.004)
Father years of schooling -0.001 0.008*
(0.003) (0.004)
Urban hukou at age 12 -0.048* -0.024
(0.027) (0.027)
Urban 0.085*** 0.112***
(0.025) (0.033)
GDP growth rate 0.213 0.243
(0.298) (0.370)
Urban employment to population ratio -0.102 -0.362
(0.380) (0.480)
Wage growth rate -0.543 -0.570
(0.378) (0.416)
Observation 971 876
F statistic 26.673 34.099
Notes: is table show 2SLS results for men and women above high
school degree separately. Age 12 region by cohort xed eect and
age 12 province xed eect are included but not reported. Robust
standard errors are clustered at province by cohort level. ∗ p <
0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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